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1
Introduction
“The Great War through which we have passed differed from all ancient wars in the immense power of
the combatants and the fearful agencies of destruction, and from all modern wars in the utter
ruthlessness with which it was fought. All the horrors of all the ages were brought together, and not only
armies but whole populations were thrust into the midst of them. The mighty educated States involved
conceived with reason that their very existence was at stake. … Every outrage against humanity or
international law was repaid by reprisals often on a greater scale and of longer duration. No truce or
parley mitigated the strife of the armies. … Merchant ships and neutral ships and hospital ships were
sunk on the seas and all on board left to their fate, or killed as they swam. Every effort was made to
starve whole nations into submission without regard to age or sex. Cities and monuments were smashed
by artillery. … The fighting strength of armies was limited only by the manhood of their countries. Europe
and large parts of Asia and Africa became one vast battlefield on which after years of struggle not
armies but nations broke and ran.”1
This passage, from Winston Churchill’s The World Crisis, is a stark depiction of the reality of the
total war which engulfed the world between 1914 and 1918. In fact, the very term ‘total war’ came from
this conflict. French leaders spoke of “la guerre intégrale in 1917 to announce their government’s
intention to abandon all restraint in mobilizing French society for war.”2 German general Erich
Ludendorff believed that “war had become an all-encompassing endeavor, and its claims on belligerent
societies were absolute.”3 Winston Churchill reflected on a broader British attitude, saying:
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This is no ordinary war, but a struggle between nations for life and death. It raises passions
between nations of the most terrible kind. It effaces the old landmarks and frontiers of our
civilization.4
‘Total war’ is not a term that describes every large-scale conflict, instead focusing on those which
engaged every aspect of society and melded the civilian with the military. For historian Roger Chickering,
in a total war, “civilians were scarcely less central than soldiers to the prosecution of war; and their
pivotal roles in these wars made them just as vulnerable to systemic and calculated acts of enemy
aggression.”5 This development was not an accident. On the contrary, there was “a consistent buildup
toward ‘totality’, [which] called for the breakdown of the distinction between soldiers and civilians and
the rejection of accepted morality in warfare.”6 This did not begin with the outbreak of war in August
1914 – its roots lie buried decades earlier, in the most fractious international struggle of the age: the
Anglo-German rivalry.
That enmity, one which did so much to propel the Great Powers into the Great War, was just as
total in peace as it would be in combat. The Anglo-German rivalry was not siloed into the realm of
geopolitics; it left no aspect of life untouched. The increasing antagonism and direct confrontation were
reflected at every conceivable level: political, diplomatic, economic, strategic, social, cultural, and
personal. The total clash between these rival powers saw the globe-spanning, near-hegemonic British
Empire challenged by a rising Germany which, according to its then-State Secretary for Foreign Affairs
Bernhard von Bülow, “demand[ed] [its] own place in the sun.”7 This ‘new Germany’ was a confident and
powerful nation which was the “most willing to question western social, cultural, and political norms,”
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and attack the existing international order largely created and controlled by the British. 8 That worldsystem was meant to “encourage the growth of a single vast network centred on Britain, to distribute
credit, capital, goods, information, manpower and protection on a global basis, and not into a set of
closed ‘mercantilist’ zones each with its own rules.”9 Such was the bulwark on which Britain’s “economic
strength – and therefore her world political status – depended,” 10 and also the biggest obstacle in the
way of Germany’s quest for the preeminent world-status to which she believed she was entitled. The
fight which stemmed from this division was ubiquitous. It was seen in popular culture and intellectual
circles, reflected in infrastructure and ideology, and felt commercially and industrially. The rivalry was
also unique, especially in each nation’s perception of the other as both thesis and “absolute
antithesis”11; British and German governments and societies borrowed consciously and unconsciously
from their rival, seeking to create an imperial synthesis which would serve to gain – or maintain – world
primacy.12 The English writer G.K. Chesterton expressed this sentiment in his 1914 book The Barbarism
of Berlin, explaining his charge of barbarism against the Germans:
For we do not mean anything that is an imperfect civilisation by accident. We mean something
that is the enemy of civilisation by design. We mean something that is wilfully at war with the
principles by which human society has been made possible hitherto. Of course it must be partly
civilised even to destroy civilisation.13
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The totalized rivalry – later reflected in the practice of total war – increased in rancor between
1880 and 1914. The evolution from amity to enmity was prolonged and operated in several phases,
working in a self-reinforcing manner that drove both parties towards further resentment. At the start of
the period, neither Britain nor Germany viewed the other as its biggest threat – both seeing the
prospect of a Franco-Russian alliance as the greater menace to their aims. In the process of prioritizing
the danger of the Dual Alliance, British and German strategies shifted, leading to a direct clash of
interests. This development in the Anglo-German relationship sparked strong feelings of antagonism and
made compromise between the two powers challenging. Just as total war permanently altered the
European world, the omnipresent Anglo-German antagonism transformed the pre-war era and led
towards the conflict which devastated the Continent. For observers in both countries, the shift from
peace to war was almost welcome, being a direct confirmation of the bitterness of the pre-war rivalry. In
Germany, the Crown Prince wrote of the “gigantic conflagration of nations” which, although difficult to
end, could not be avoided. The German hand, he said, must not be deterred from the sword, which “will
remain the decisive factor till the end of the world.”14 British businessman F.S. Oliver wrote that “there
is a feeling that since the Kruger telegram, eighteen years ago, things have been working up to this issue,
and a sense of relief is experienced by the ending of it.”15 The march towards military conflict unfolded
over many decades before Sarajevo. The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand triggered a war that
was decades in the making.
The Anglo-German rivalry continued into the Great War, with observers on both sides seeing the
total clash between the two powers as undergirding the entire conflict. Writing in late 1914, Ramsay
Muir believed that Germany “deliberately precipitated” the war16, sabotaging diplomatic alternatives

14
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because “she was afraid that peace was going to be assured, and she meant to have war.” 17 He also
described the contemporary German theories of the war’s purpose, finding in them a direct anti-British
animus. For Muir, this stemmed from the “bitterness of German feeling against England which has been
displayed during the last generation, and especially during the last few years,” a hostility he called
“indeed quite extraordinary.”18 The bitterness was mutual, and was heightened by the outbreak of war.
G.K. Chesterton detailed the differences between German and British national spirits which bred this
hostility:
Now the German and the Englishman are not in the least alike… They are, in everything good
and evil, more unlike than any other two men we can take at random from the great European
family. They are opposite from the roots of their history, nay of their geography. It is an
understatement to call Britain insular. Britain is not only an island, but an island slashed by the
sea till it nearly splits into three islands; and even the Midlands can almost smell the salt.
Germany is a powerful, beautiful and fertile inland country, which can only find the sea by one
or two twisted and narrow paths, as people find a subterranean lake. Thus the British Navy is
really national because it is natural; it has cohered out of hundreds of accidental adventures of
ships and shipmen before Chaucer's time and after it. But the German Navy is an artificial thing;
as artificial as a constructed Alp would be in England. 19
These fundamental differences led Germany to misunderstand the British character and created an
overconfidence that exacerbated tensions and contributed to the outbreak of war. Muir writes about a
German offer sent to the British Cabinet, which demanded British neutrality while Germany dismantled
the French colonial empire and absorbed Belgium; this “infamous proposal” was refused by Foreign

17

Muir, 14.
Muir, 25.
19
Chesterton, 25-26.
18

6
Secretary Grey.20 The idea afoot in Germany that Britain was “too cowardly to fulfil her obligations of
honor” would be painfully corrected by the totality of the war which followed.21 Chesterton says this
well:
Nay, the mistake of Germany in the modern disaster largely arose from the fact that she thought
England was simple, when England is very subtle. She thought that because our politics have
become largely financial that they had become wholly financial; that because our aristocrats had
become pretty cynical that they had become entirely corrupt. They could not seize the subtlety
by which a rather used-up English gentleman might sell a coronet when he would not sell a
fortress; might lower the public standards and yet refuse to lower the flag. In short, the
Germans are quite sure that they understand us entirely, because they do not understand us at
all.22
The antagonism felt by Britain towards Germany in the war years was mirrored by German
intellectuals and politicians, who focused their ire squarely on London. Britain was viewed as the
ultimate foe of Germany’s historical destiny and the antithesis of German Kultur and Weltpolitik. One
important document to examine in this regard is the declaration of war aims laid out by German
Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg (Chancellor 1909-1917) in September 1914.23 On its face,
the document almost totally ignores Britain, only mentioning it twice in over six hundred words and
focusing mostly on France and the Low Countries.24 But a careful reading of the war aims shows this
emphasis to be a mask for the German government’s true target: the British Empire. Many of the
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demands center on gaining control over the coastal areas of Europe across from England; Germany
wished to annex from France a “coastal strip from Dunkirk to Boulogne,” and sought from Belgium to
“occupy any militarily important ports,” and “place her coast at our disposal in military respects.”25
These moves could only be intended to cement German control over the maritime approaches to Britain
from the Continent and prepare for a final assault on England proper. Bethmann Hollweg also
demanded economic hegemony in Europe, creating a customs union which would privilege German
business while excluding British commerce entirely – just as Napoleon attempted with his Continental
System in the early nineteenth century.26 As we shall see, this was exactly the aim which British
observers such as Cecil Spring-Rice, Edward Grey, and Ramsay Muir both feared and predicted. Other
aims which were not outwardly directed at Britain also had disguised intentions. Most of the document
focuses on Europe itself, but the brief mention of imperial affairs was a shot across the British bow. The
only mention of colonies comes near the end of the document: “The question of colonial acquisitions,
where the first aim is the creation of a continuous Central African colonial empire, will be considered
later.”27 The creation of a continent-spanning German-African Empire was the major concern of Britons
like Edwin Pratt, who wrote about the perceived danger of German imperialism in Africa to British
interests (see Chapter VII). The territories which would be taken by Germany would be a significant
danger to British African power and could split its territories in two, isolating both Egypt in the north and
the Cape in the south.
Germans outside of the government were not nearly as coy about their anti-British sentiments
and the rivalry they saw as being at the heart of the global conflict. One key example of this comes from
the economist Werner Sombart, who wrote on the subject in his 1915 book Händler und Helden

25

Ibid.
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
26

8
(Merchants and Heroes).28 He claimed that “all great wars are religious wars,” defining the “religious
antagonisms” of the twentieth century as “ideological antagonisms.”29 Despite the various clashes which
drove the war on a surface level – “between Russia and Turkey over the control of the Dardanelles,
between France and Germany over Alsace-Lorraine, between Austria-Hungary and Russia over
hegemony in the Balkans” – Sombart viewed the “main war” as a clash between two ideologies or
world-systems: the mercantile and the heroic.30 He applies discrete worldviews (Weltanschauung) to
whole nations, characterizing the British as mercantile – practical, calculating, base – and the Germans
as heroic – committed to great deeds and primordial drives.31 The understanding of British and German
national spirits as unquestionably different and in opposition to one another was similarly reflected in
Chesterton’s The Barbarism of Berlin. Sombart writes of the world-historical import of this clash of
imperial ideologies:
In this sense one can distinguish between peoples that are merchant peoples and those that are
heroic peoples, and in the same sense, mercantile and heroic ideologies stand in struggle for
predominance in this great war. Their carriers, however, the two nations that are
representatives of the ideological antagonisms, are the English and the Germans. Only as the
English–German war does the war of 1914 take on its deeper world-historical significance. The
issue of who shall rule the sea is not the great human question that is to be decided now; much
more important and central to the fate of mankind is the question of which spirit proves the
stronger: the mercantile or the heroic.32
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He viewed the Anglo-German rivalry as one “which encompasses the world in all its depths and
expanses,” and is the true heart of the world conflict.33 Sombart’s idea of the British world-system as
“mercantile” and the German push against it as “heroic” explains the perception afoot in Germany very
well; Germany sought a total overthrow of the dominant British system which it found so stifling to its
ambitions of Weltmacht. When combined with the war aims laid out by Bethmann Hollweg, this paints a
clear picture of a clash of deep-seated interests and ideologies which brought the Anglo-German rivalry
from totality in peace to totality in war.
This, then, is the central argument that I propose to make: that such peacetime antagonism was
as total as the war which it helped to bring about. It is critical to understand how the ubiquity of AngloGerman competition threatened the basis of the British imperial synthesis – the links between
commerce and strategy that characterized the late-Victorian and Edwardian periods. Unlike other Great
Power contests of the period, there was no event involving Britain or Germany from 1880 to 1914 in
which the relationship with the other was not implicated – even when that rival was not directly
involved in the event in question. Understanding this pervasiveness is key to exploring the German role
within and against the British world-system. It is also important to study the entrenched connections
between domestic politics and foreign policy in Britain and Germany, as those bonds functioned
similarly in both countries. This lashing together of the domestic and the imperial was promoted by
intellectuals, politicians, and journalists in a mutually reinforcing cycle. The push and pull of mutual
benefit and hostility explains the nature of the German threat to Britain’s global hegemony and the
incompatibility of an assertive Germany and a dominant Britain. Increasing animosity was stoked by
deliberate exaggerations of danger used for political purposes. (Part I) Imperial anxieties abounded and
were reinforced by the actions and rhetoric of the rival power. The transition from suspicion to scorn

33
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was reflected in the press and popular culture, especially in the invasion literature so popular in
Edwardian Britain. (Part II)
The Anglo-German rivalry of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is complicated
and hard to grasp in its entirety; the best way to concretize it is through clear examples of its impact on
material reality. The strongest illustration of its complexity comes in the realm of physical infrastructure,
a domain in which the British and German Empires competed continuously. The pre-war period was a
golden age of industrial-scale infrastructure investment across the world, and the potential dualpurpose nature of these projects – strategic and economic – made the Anglo-German competition
especially fierce. No type of infrastructure was spared: from maritime projects, to railways, to
telecommunications. Viewing the rivalry through the prism of such infrastructure allows us to see how
these broad historical strokes played out in real time on the ground. (Part III) All of this together can
paint a portrait of the total rivalry that led to total war.
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Part I – An Inescapable Fact: The Ubiquity of Anglo-German Rivalry
“…It would have to be assumed that Germany is deliberately following a policy which is essentially
opposed to vital British interests, and that an armed conflict cannot in the long run be averted, except by
England either sacrificing those interests, with the result that she would lose her position as an
independent Great Power, or making herself too strong to give Germany the chance of succeeding in a
war. This is the opinion of those who, see in the whole, trend of Germany’s policy conclusive evidence
that she is consciously aiming at the establishment of a German hegemony, at first in Europe, and
eventually in the world.”1
“Yet, in spite of all these considerations, the hostility of the English is primarily directed against us. It is
necessary to adopt the English standpoint in order to understand the line of thought which guides the
English politicians. I believe that the solution of the problem is to be found in the wide ramifications of
English interests in every part of the world.”2
The quotes above – one from an Englishman, the other from a German – demonstrate the
omnipresence of the Anglo-German rivalry in the first years of the twentieth century. The first was
written by Eyre Crowe, senior clerk in the Western Department in the British Foreign Office specializing
in German affairs, on January 1, 1907. 3 The second comes from Friedrich von Bernhardi, a prominent
Prussian General and Pan-German propagandist, who published the provocatively-titled Germany and
the Next War in 1911.4
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Crowe’s document, passed around the British Cabinet by Foreign Secretary Edward Grey, laid
out the stakes for Anglo-German world competition and, according to historian Xu Qiyu, began the
systematization of the British policy of containing Germany.5 The main question addressed by the
memo, and a key to understanding the ubiquity of the German threat in the British mind, is well
summarized by Paul M. Kennedy:
Would Germany be content solely to expand economically, thus contributing greatly to the
general level of Europe’s prosperity; or would her rulers seek to translate this industrial strength
into political advantage, by forcing her neighbors to become satellite states, by constructing an
enormous battlefleet for possible future use, and by demanding colonial concessions under the
threat of taking military action in Europe?6
The same question, but from the opposite perspective, was being asked in Germany. General Bernhardi
was a proponent of Weltmacht – world-power – which was, to him, the logical historical development of
the German people towards achieving their civilizational destiny.7 “There can be no standing still, no
being satisfied for us,” he wrote, “but only progress or retrogression, and that it is tantamount to
retrogression when we are contented with our present place among the nations of Europe, while all our
rivals are straining with desperate energy, even at the cost of our rights, to extend their power.” 8 This
powerful marriage of nationalism and imperialism struck at the heart of British interests and propelled
German expansionism in strategic and economic spheres.9
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The understanding of German and British interests as all-encompassing and fundamentally in
conflict drove the antagonism which threw the world into war in 1914. Virtually no event involving
Britain or Germany was untouched by this rivalry, even when one of the countries was not directly
involved at all. That was not the case for other nations. Only the Anglo-German rivalry was so systemic
and all-pervasive in the years from 1880 through 1914. The Manchester Evening News of September 11,
1897 described the clash of interests well:
Prince Bismarck has long recognised what at length the people of England are beginning to
understand, that in Europe there are two great irreconcilable opposing forces, two great nations
who would make the whole world their province, and who would levy from it the tribute of
commerce. What Bismarck realised, and what we, too, may soon come to see, is that not only is
there the most real conflict of interests between England and Germany, but that England is the
only Great Power who could fight Germany without tremendous risk and without doubt of the
issue.10
Three factors contributed to the omnipresence of this mutual hostility: the uniquely wide variety of
motives for British and German imperial expansion and competition, the connection between European
concerns and global imperial issues in the rivalry, and the use of the ideology of imperial supremacy and
antagonistic rhetoric for domestic political purposes.
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Chapter I: The Motives
Many factors drove the imperialism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, often
intersecting and overlapping with one another. In his 1966 book The Vision and the Need: Late Victorian
Imperialist Aims, Richard Faber identifies six of them: colonizing, economic, aggressive, strategic,
missionary, and leadership.11 Most empires focused on two or three of these motives – especially as
some can seem mutually exclusive – but Faber sees all six reflected in the British Empire of the late
Victorian period and lasting until the beginning of the First World War. 12 What Faber does not discuss is
how the German Empire also exhibited all six imperial motivations. Moreover, Britain and Germany
competed across all of these categories as well. Further investigating each category within Faber’s
classification – and how those categories intersected in the British and German cases – can help prove
this point. In the case of the Anglo-German rivalry, Faber’s six motives can be grouped in sets of two:
colonizing and aggressive, missionary and leadership, and, most importantly, economic and strategic.
I. Colonizing and Aggressive Motives: Population, Race, and Prestige
With respect to the British and German imperial competition which ran most heatedly from
1880 to 1914, the colonizing and aggressive motives worked in tandem to drive hostility and led to
clashes of values and territorial claims.
Faber defines the colonizing motive as “the need to provide space for surplus, or dissident, or –
in the case of convict settlements – criminal, population.” 13 This motive is the one most commonly
associated with colonization in the modern mind, and has been a main driver of imperialism going back
to the Athenians.14 By the late Victorian era, Britain had already gone through several cycles of colonial
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expansion with various settler colonies being established. Some former colonies, like the United States,
rebelled. Others still retained formal ties to the metropole. At the start of the Great War, these colonies,
known as Dominions, included Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and South Africa, each of them with
large numbers of English settlers and a high level of self-government. All retained deep economic and
cultural ties to Britain.15 This informal empire – in that it was not governed from London – was one of
the primary pillars of the British world-system, providing a remarkably dependable population, great
industrial and natural resources, economic efficiency, and a dedicated reserve of global manpower. 16
The British did not plan this in advance; in fact, some of the Dominions became self-sufficient despite
their starts as penal colonies (Australia) or trade emporia (Canada).17 Regardless of origin or political
autonomy, the Dominions were loyal partners in the Empire. 18 This fact was remarked upon with envy
by Alfred von Tirpitz – the man most responsible for the expansion of the German Navy, and thus a
major player in the Anglo-German antagonism – when he said that Englishmen overseas “became
almost as a matter of course an agent of the ‘Foreign Office’ as soon as English interests were at
stake.”19
Tirpitz’s envy was reflective of the difficulties that Germany had in this same realm. In the late
nineteenth century, Germany – far more so than Britain – was home to a rapidly growing population
that needed outlets for settlement. The German population grew sixty percent from 1871 to 1910 20,
despite large outflows of emigrants – over two hundred thousand in 1882 alone. 21 To Tirpitz, “many
millions of Germans who emigrated were lost to us both morally and actually, and enriched those

15

Darwin, 11.
Ibid.
17
Faber, 34-35.
18
Darwin, 11.
19
Grimmer-Solem, 181.
20
Chickering, 1.
21
Kennedy, Antagonism, 168.
16

16
countries which were afterwards our worst enemies.”22 During his 1895 trip across the United States, a
prime destination for German emigrants, Tirpitz noted that Chicago was the third-largest German city on
the planet23, proving to him the necessity of state action to remedy this loss of national talent.24 The
founding of settlement colonies would protect the nation’s labor force, potentially absorbing up to one
million migrant workers that could otherwise strengthen rivals like the United States and the British
Dominions.25 Politically-influential Germans saw that many millions of the nation’s working class would
“always be driven to seek a livelihood outside the borders of the German Empire,” but sought to ensure
that “the German element is not split up in the world, but remains united in compact blocks, and thus
forms, even in foreign countries, political centres of gravity in our favour, markets for our exports, and
centres for the diffusion of German culture.”26 For men like Bernhardi, the lack of colonies where
Germans could “find remunerative work and a German way of living” led to “the strength of the German
nation … [being] absorbed by foreign nations and steeped with foreign sentiments,” which was
“obviously not a condition which can satisfy a powerful nation.”27 As there were only so many
temperate regions in which large-scale European settlement was viable, and most of those regions were
already independent nations or claimed as colonies by other European powers, German colonial
expansion necessarily entailed conflict. General Bernhardi put it well:
We shall soon, therefore, be faced by the question, whether we wish to surrender the coming
generations to foreign countries, as formerly in the hour of our decline, or whether we wish to
take steps to find them a home in our own German colonies, and so retain them for the
fatherland. There is no possible doubt how this question must be answered. If the unfortunate
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course of our history has hitherto prevented us from building a colonial Empire, it is our duty to
make up for lost time, and at once to construct a fleet which, in defiance of all hostile Powers,
may keep our sea communications open.28
This call for naval expansion and its relation to colonial and economic security (more on which later)
directly implicated the British Empire as the primary rival to German Weltmacht.
Empires sought prestige while also reflecting the racialist, Social Darwinist views prevalent at
the time. Faber writes of “the belief that the acquisition or maintenance of an Empire is, or might
become, necessary to enjoy Great Power prestige,” and of “fin-de-siècle theories, based on ‘the survival
of the fittest’, that the race will be to the fleet and the fight to the strong.” 29 Both of these motives were
present in Britain and Germany. In Britain, prestige was more important than race, as maintenance of
British imperial hegemony was seen as necessary to safeguarding national honor. Britain would be
considered a lesser power without its global Empire, a sentiment espoused by politicians and
intellectuals alike. Lord Milner, British High Commissioner in South Africa30, said as much in a 1906
speech to the Manchester Conservative Club, stating that “these islands by themselves cannot always
remain a Power of the very first rank.”31 The historian James Anthony Froude, biographer of Thomas
Carlyle32, said in relation to Germany and other Great Powers that “our place as a first-rate power is
gone among such rivals unless we can identify the colonies with ourselves.”33 Similar feelings existed in
Germany, albeit to a lesser degree. To the Germans, “imperialism could ensure survival amid
international competition, as other European powers all already had large colonial empires.” 34 The
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lagging behind of the German Empire led to “considerable loss of power and prestige” and presented to
Bernhardi, “perhaps the most momentous crisis in the history of the German nation.” 35 “Nations and
States can achieve no loftier consummation,” he wrote, “than to stake their whole power on upholding
their independence, their honour, and their reputation.”36
Social Darwinism was also important between 1880 and 1914. Philosophers such as Herbert
Spencer expanded on Darwin’s ideas about survival of the fittest and natural selection, presenting war
as natural, ennobling, and the arbiter of civilizational greatness and racial strength. 37 Geopolitical
competition was not seen only through the prism of nation-states, but also of races and ethnicities that
had innate characteristics. This “admixture of nationalism, racism, Social Darwinism, and other
intellectual trends”38 was a factor in Britain, although it did not play as large a role there as did prestige.
Still, racialist attitudes and the language of civilizational combat were represented among the
intellectual elite. A prime example of this comes from British politician Joseph Chamberlain, a strong
supporter of strengthening “the ties between the different branches of the Anglo-Saxon race which
form the Empire and the vast dominion of the Queen.”39 Chamberlain had an extremely high opinion of
“the greatness and importance of the destiny which is reserved for the Anglo-Saxon race – for that
proud, persistent, self-asserting and resolute stock, that no change of climate or condition can alter, and
which is infallibly destined to be the predominant force in the future history and civilization of the
world.”40
Germany was far more deeply influenced by this Social Darwinist ideology, with its elites seeing
war “as necessary as the struggle of the elements in Nature” and lamenting that without it, “inferior or
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decaying races would easily choke the growth of healthy budding elements, and a universal decadence
would follow.”41 The Darwinist rhetoric of ‘survival of the fittest’ was applied to whole nations, and
prominent Germans thought that national survival was only feasible through imperial expansion in
competition with the other races of the world.42 Germans saw themselves at the top of this racial
hierarchy, a sentiment pushed by the Germanophile author Houston Stewart Chamberlain43, who wrote
that “Physically and mentally the Aryans are pre-eminent among all peoples; for that reason they are by
right […] the lords of the world.”44 Chamberlain was part of the völkisch movement, an outgrowth of
Social Darwinism that intermingled the concepts of nation, people, and race in order to provide
justifications for German imperial expansion and dreams of world domination. 45 Bernhardi’s Germany
and the Next War also espoused these ideas. An entire chapter of the work consists of extravagant
praise of the German race throughout history, favorably comparing it to the Latin race and other less
deserving groups. In this chapter, Bernhardi suggests that much of the success of post-Roman Europe
was due to the civilizing capacity of the German race, writing that “The German element […] instilled
new life into these nations, and offered new opportunities for growth. The stronger the admixture of
German blood, the more vigorous and the more capable of civilization did the growing nations
appear.”46 Pro-colonial groups in Germany ran with this argument, claiming that German imperial
expansion “followed historical necessity,” and was “not an adventure or plaything.” 47 They echoed the
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völkisch language described earlier, writing in the newspaper Kolonialzeitung that “We seek colonial
possessions to further and consolidate our Volksleben [national life] and Volkskraft [national power].”48
These Social Darwinist attitudes of racial superiority – and the geopolitical dominance that they
commanded – combined with the importance of honor and prestige, made the aggressive motive a
factor in the Anglo-German rivalry. Alongside the colonizing motive, it contributed to the ubiquity and
ferocity of the growing hostility.
II. Missionary and Leadership Motives: Mutually Exclusive, Mutually Antagonistic
In the case of the Anglo-German rivalry, Faber’s missionary and leadership motives coincide
with and reinforce one another. The missionary motive is defined as “the ambition to proselytize; to
convert other peoples to a religion, a culture or a way of life,” and the leadership motive as “the
conviction of superior ability to provide orderly government, whether as a permanent proprietor or as a
temporary trustee.”49 In the cases of Britain and Germany, these interrelated motives rested on a
bedrock of cultural confidence – if not outright chauvinism – and were embedded into national
identities. The balance between missionary and leadership motives shifted over time, leading to the
former mostly giving way to the latter between 1880 and 1914.50 As with the colonizing and aggressive
motives, the missionary and leadership motives set the British and German Empires directly against one
another in a clash for the global hegemony each saw as its historic destiny.
British imperialism always had some level of missionary urge, dating back to the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries in places like America and Ireland.51 Early settlers were more religious than the
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general populace, often non-conformist in belief, and the evangelical impulse was strong.
Proselytization was banned in certain areas like India so as not to interfere with commercial
opportunities, but this was overturned in the early nineteenth century as Britain itself experienced a
religious revival.52 During the early and mid-Victorian periods, British missionary activity was as dynamic
and penetrative as its commercial counterpart. Missionaries operated everywhere that British goods
were sold, from Africa to China to New Zealand.53 These impulses were found in government as well, as
there were many “gentlemanly evangelicals” in Parliament and the Cabinet during the mid-Victorian
era.54 This did not end in the age of the Anglo-German rivalry, despite the reduction in salience of the
missionary motive to British imperialism. Liberal governments especially were driven by this rationale in
their pursuit of a moral and Christian foreign policy. Gladstone’s campaigns against the ‘Bulgarian
horrors’ and in support of “peoples struggling to be free” were widely popular and helped secure Liberal
majorities in the late Victorian era.55 Conservatives like Lord Salisbury also had these feelings. Salisbury’s
daughter claimed that eradication of the slave trade – a major missionary goal of the British – was her
father’s “only crusading impulse.”56
The notion that the British were more moral than other powers or peoples fused the missionary
and leadership motives and provided an outlet for the same sentiment in a different era.57 The writer
Benjamin Kidd58 ascribed to the British the qualities of “humanity, strength and uprightness of character,
and devotion to the immediate calls of duty without thought of brilliant ends and ideal results,” all of
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which he believed contributed to their imperial success. 59 Lord Curzon, aristocrat, imperialist, and
Viceroy of India, espoused the moral aspects of the empire:
If you look around the world and enquire why it is that in so many foreign countries the
Englishman … has … been invited to undertake, and has successfully undertaken, the task of
regeneration and reform, you will find that it has been because of the universal belief in his
integrity, his sincerity and his purpose.60
Lord Milner, in his book The Nation and the Empire, defended the empire similarly:
Imperialism as a political doctrine has often been represented as something tawdry and
superficial. In reality it has all the depth and comprehensiveness of a religious faith. Its
significance is moral even more than material. It is a mistake to think of it as principally
concerned with ‘painting the map red.’ … It is not a question of a couple of hundred thousand
square miles more or less. It is a question of preserving the unity of a great race, of enabling it,
by maintaining that unity, to develop freely on its own lines, and to continue to fulfil its
distinctive mission in the world.61
Faber describes the transition from missionary to leadership motives as late Victorian imperialists being
“possessed by a fit of tidiness on a global scale and [finding] a positively aesthetic satisfaction in
spreading order.”62 This was not mere fancy, however; influential Englishmen genuinely believed that
their civic institutions and ideas were the highest form of civilization and sought to fulfill their national
obligation to “make the rough places plain.”63 Joseph Chamberlain often promoted this idea of an innate
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British capacity for leadership and the duty it entailed, seeing major benefits accruing to Uganda, India,
and other dependent colonies.64 In his eyes, the task of civilizing the ‘lesser’ peoples of the world would
provide “scope for the exercise of those faculties and qualities which have made of us a great governing
race.”65
Missionary and leadership motives also merged in popular culture and literature, notably in the
writing of Rudyard Kipling. Kipling spoke of the centrality of imperialism to the British identity, echoing
the sentiments of Chamberlain, Milner, and Curzon. His poems and books were widely read in Britain
and he was seen as the avatar of the ‘new imperialism’ represented by the aforementioned politicians. 66
Paul Kennedy says that “Kipling functioned – and willingly functioned – as the Poet Laureate of the
Chamberlainites, articulating their message in a specific artistic fashion.” 67 The poem which best
captures the theme of British national identification with the missionary and leadership motives is “The
English Flag”68, first published in the St. James’s Gazette on April 4, 1891,69 a meditation on how the
English flag – the symbol of the nation – was bound up with the quest for empire and the expansionist
spirit. It begins with an indictment of provincialism among a subset of Englishmen: “And what should
they know of England who only England know?”70 The narrator then asks the four winds – North, South,
East, and West – to answer the question “What is the Flag of England?”71 The winds answer in turn and
exhort the English to brave their tempests and find the glory of their flag. The trials described by each
wind show the instincts of the English people in the face of challenging odds. The South wind says:
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I have wrenched it free from the halliard to hang for a wisp on the Horn;
I have chased it north to the Lizard – ribboned and rolled and torn;
I have spread its fold o’er the dying, adrift in a hopeless sea;
I have hurled it swift on the slaver, and seen the slave set free.72
The North wind says:
I barred my gates with iron, I shuttered my doors with flame,
Because to force my ramparts your nutshell navies came.
I took the sun from their presence, I cut them down with my blast.
And they died, but the Flag of England blew free ere the spirit passed. 73
The East wind speaks of the association of the English flag with the death of Englishmen abroad, linking
their bodies to the glory of the nation:
Never the lotos closes, never the wild-fowl wake,
But a soul goes out on the East Wind that died for England’s sake –
Man or woman or suckling, mother or bride or maid –
Because on the bones of the English the English Flag is stayed. 74
Each wind’s tale ends with an answer to the original question – “What is the Flag of England?” – and an
appeal for Englishmen to find it in imperial glory: “What is the flag of England? Ye have but my breath to
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dare, Ye have but my waves to conquer. Go forth, for it is there!”75 This is Kipling’s conception of the
Empire – the need to find and serve one’s country through selflessness and duty.
For Germany, missionary and leadership motives for imperialism were similarly viewed as
critical aspects of national identity. Much like the British, the Germans saw themselves as administrators
par excellence, and for good reason, as German bureaucracy was envied by many.76 The German
sociologist Max Weber believed that societies could not function without bureaucracies to manage the
complexities inherent in modern life. To Weber, Germans had displayed a better talent for this
administrative organization than others, without sacrificing the creative spark that drove superior
German Kultur.77 According to Peter Watson, “Look at Germany” was a frequent mantra for reformers in
Britain who sought to ape the success of German models.78 Prussian – and later, German – education
was highly acclaimed, its focus on science and philology admired by British university teachers, as was its
compulsory nature.79 “The dominion of German thought can only be extended under the aegis of
political power,” General Bernhardi wrote, “and unless we act in conformity to this idea, we shall be
untrue to our great duties towards the human race.”80
This civilizational duty was also a civilizing duty; one which merged the missionary and the
leadership motives into one. The German economist Karl Rathgen popularized the idea that German
imperial expansion, and the consequent subordination of native peoples, would be morally correct only
if those subject races were brought to a higher level of civilization through good governance.81 Rathgen
made this an explicitly religious argument, appealing to the German Evangelical-Lutheran tradition by
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tying the morality of imperialism not to increased economic prosperity, but to the spreading of Kultur.
This would enable the “lower cultures” to make intellectual, material, and social progress.82 Speaking to
the annual conference of the German Evangelical Social Congress in June 1900, he argued that the
raising up of lesser peoples through colonization was a civilizational duty:
Conquest and subordination without subsequent work raising the culture is without value;
conquest only with the aim of exploitation is reprehensible. … No reward at the cost of those
ruled, no advantage without simultaneous elevation of the conquered. Just as the hierarchy of
social classes and the better conditions of the higher orders will never disappear but must be
morally justified by dedication to the whole and care for the lower-standing classes, so it is as
well in the relationship between ruler and ruled peoples and races.83
These sentiments were promoted by other economists and social theorists, including Gustav Schmoller,
Rathgen’s mentor. Schmoller advocated for locals to operate their own “native small businesses” and
farms, a level of responsibility that would improve the intellectual and economic standing of the
“subdued lower races.”84 The Kolonialmächte cartoon published in the satirical Munich magazine
Simplicissimus circa May 1904 favorably compared German colonial governance to that of its rivals,
including Britain, France, and Belgium (Figure I in Appendix). 85 The artist portrays the German scene as
regimented, organized, and secure – the giraffes are all aligned and the dangerous crocodile has been
muzzled.86 Britain, on the other hand, is drawn as hypocritically preaching to an African native while
plying him with alcohol and torturing him for tax revenue.87 The artist satirized all four empires, but
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chose to present Germany as overextending in virtue, while the other Powers were shown as indulging
in vice. The contrast between German good governance and British duplicity was and remained a
standard trope.
The missionary motive was prevalent in German imperialism from 1880 to 1914, although not
driven by a desire to spread Christianity; instead, it brought the good news of German Kultur. Many
influential Germans of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries had a very high opinion of their
country, with Bernhardi writing that Germany was “in social-political respects at the head of all progress
in culture.”88 Heinrich von Treitschke, the historian and Pan-German imperialist archetype, argued for a
muscular foreign policy directed primarily against Britain so as to preserve and spread German Kultur.89
He wrote of the characteristics of the German people which made them the true geniuses of human
culture:
Depth of conviction, idealism, universality, the power to look beyond all the limits of a finite
existence, to sympathize with all that is human, to traverse the realm of ideas in companionship
with the noblest of all nations and ages—this has at all times been the German characteristic;
this has been extolled as the prerogative of German culture. 90
According to Bernhardi, these characteristics and the capacity of Germans for “generalization and
absorption … specially fits us for the leadership in the intellectual world, and imposes on us the
obligation to maintain that position.”91 Germans identified deeply with their particular concept of Kultur,
which was influenced by “secular idealist notions that ultimate reality was spiritual, and that the
material world not only could but ought to be transcended by ideals.”92 This was reflected in several
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concepts which impacted imperial thought. The concept of Macht – or might – took German military
prowess and transformed it into a civilizational good beyond stricture or criticism.93 Macht was a
primary facet of German Kultur, reflected for example in the music of Richard Wagner. Wagner’s idea of
Gesamtkunstwerk, or total art work, was to synthesize politics, history, art, and modern life into a “total
drama, where symbol and myth become the essence of existence.”94 This obsession with authenticity,
spiritual freedom, and the world of ideas was set in contrast to the “dictatorship of form” of the British
culture, which would never be able to achieve true liberty.95 German Kultur was – like the German
Empire itself – aligned against the strictures of British civilization, based merely on utilitarianism,
empiricism, and rationality.96 According to Modris Eksteins, “Germany, more extensively than any other
country, represented the aspirations of a national avant-garde – the desire to break out of the
‘encirclement’ of Anglo-French influence, the imposition of a world order by a Pax Britannica and French
civilisation, an order codified politically as ‘bourgeois liberalism.’”97 In the years leading up to the First
World War, German Kultur had a strong sense of optimism and confidence in die deutsche Sendung – a
Germanic mission – one which, given the opposition to British civilization, drove further antagonism. The
similarities between the British and German missionary and leadership motives, their mutual exclusivity,
and their incorporation into national identity in both countries made a positive Anglo-German
relationship highly unlikely.
III. Economic and Strategic Motives: The Foundation of Imperial Synthesis
Faber’s final two motives for imperial expansion are economic and strategic. The economic
motive was “in a developed form a search for markets or materials; at its most sophisticated this motive
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implies economic or commercial development supposed to be mutually beneficial.” 98 It intersected with
the leadership motive in the “native small business” proposals of Gustav Schmoller described in the
previous section. The strategic motive, which Faber defines as “the acquisition of territory in order to
safeguard the mother country and its lines of communication, or to protect other dependencies
acquired for other motives,” was omnipresent in the imperialism of the period. For the British, the
strategic motive exhibited itself in the desire to protect trade routes and naval supremacy so as to
defend existing colonies and global imperial hegemony. Germany, as it did not have a grand empire to
defend, used it to gain colonies and as leverage against rival powers. In the case of the British and
German Empires, these two motives formed what I call an ‘imperial synthesis’ and drove global
expansion and the resulting Anglo-German antagonism more than any other factor. This synthesis of
strategy and commerce – initially crafted by the British – would increasingly be adopted by Germany
and was reflected in ideology as well as in practice.
A major ideological influence on British and German conceptions of imperialism in the years
from 1880 to 1914 was the writing of the American navalist historian Alfred Thayer Mahan on sea
power. Mahan crafted his own version of the imperial synthesis, connecting shipping, colonial
expansion, and overseas commerce to blue-water naval growth, all in a neo-mercantilist framework. 99
The tying together of commerce and navalism – economics and strategy – also connected peacetime to
wartime and developed a rationale for naval expansion besides direct conflict. Mahan laid out this
connection of commerce to naval growth in his book The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 16601783, writing:
… it is the wish of every nation that this shipping business [overseas trade] should be done by its
own vessels. The ships that thus sail to and fro must have secure ports to which to return, and
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must, as far as possible, be followed by the protection of their country throughout the voyage.
This protection in time of war must be extended by armed shipping. The necessity of a navy, in
the restricted sense of the word, springs, therefore, from the existence of a peaceful shipping,
and disappears with it…100
He wrote that sea power, in a broad sense, “includes not only the military strength afloat that rules the
sea or any part of it by force of arms, but also the peaceful commerce and shipping from which alone a
military fleet naturally and healthfully springs, and on which it securely rests.”101 This direct link between
militarism and trade, broadened to a global context, would ensure that imperial economic competition
in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries would always have an undercurrent of strategic
threat. That dual nature of maritime commerce would play a key role in driving Anglo-German hostility
and the perception of that rivalry as the most crucial to each nation. Mahan also discussed the need for
colonies and defensive waystations from which to safeguard commerce. He equated a nation’s foreign
colonial and commercial interests with its naval strength, making it seem that both must increase in
tandem.102 Economic growth necessitating colonial growth necessitating naval growth was the vital
insight of Mahanian thought. He saw this integrated conception of sea power as a driving force in
history:
In these three things – production, with the necessity of exchanging products, shipping,
whereby the exchange is carried on, and colonies, which facilitate and enlarge the operations of
shipping and tend to protect it by multiplying points of safety – is to be found the key to much
of the history, as well as of the policy, of nations bordering upon the sea.103
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Mahan’s argument that naval strategy was meant to “found, support, and increase, as well in peace as
in war, the sea power of a country,” was, as described below, wildly popular with contemporaries and
was reflected by both sides of the Anglo-German rivalry.104
Mahan’s views were embraced in Britain, particularly as many of the lessons he took from
history were drawn from the British experience.105 Britain originated the Blue-Water School of naval
strategy, sought to command the sea as part of its wartime naval doctrine, and already possessed a vast
array of colonies, naval coaling stations, telecommunications, and state-of-the-art ships – in short, it had
already accomplished that which Mahan saw as ultimately desirable.106 To Mahan, this made Britain the
model of a thriving sea power state and he sought for the United States to emulate its success, without
displacing Britain from its maritime hegemony.107 According to Paul Kennedy, The Influence of Sea Power
upon History “became the bible of navalists everywhere, particularly in Britain, where its author was
fêted and revered.”108 Mahanian navalism became so well-known in Britain that it penetrated the public
consciousness, even appearing in works of popular fiction. One example is from Erskine Childers’s 1903
novel The Riddle of the Sands, a book which narrates an ultimately foiled German invasion of the British
Isles. One of the novel’s heroes has several of Mahan’s books on his boat.109 That these books were
named makes it clear that Childers thought them part of common knowledge. Still, given the British
Empire’s existing advantages and world position, Mahan’s navalist thought had less of an impact there
than it did elsewhere.
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Mahan’s ideas were most fully embraced in Germany, where many were concerned about
their country’s failure to acquire a sizable colonial empire. 110 Germans saw their nation in second
position when it should have been first.111 Mahan served as a salve to these injured feelings and
provided a framework for German imperial expansion. If Germany wished to protect the colonies it
already had against local and European threats, as well as expand its colonial possessions, it needed a
large, powerful navy that could strike rapidly anywhere German interests were endangered. 112 Most
Germans, including important political figures, saw a strong blue-water navy as a shortcut to the world
power their nation was historically destined to achieve.113 Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst,
German Chancellor from 1894 to 1900114, embraced Mahanian thought and the commercial-strategicnaval synthesis, saying in an 1897 speech to the Reichstag that:
Precisely because we want to carry out a peaceful policy, we must make an effort to build our
fleet into a power factor which carries the necessary weight in the eyes of friend and foe alike. …
In maritime questions, Germany must be able to speak a modest but, above all, a wholly
German word.115
This emphasis on the redistribution of world power was embraced by Hohenlohe’s successor, Bernhard
von Bülow. In November 1899, he said that “in every century there will be a great conflict, a major
liquidation [of some empire] in order to re-allocate influence, power and territorial possessions on the
globe,” asking if “[we are] just about to witness another redistribution of the earth?” 116 This cageyness
was not reflected by all German politicians, however. Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz was much more forward
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in his belief that a strong German navy could ensure German dominance of the new world order. In
February 1899, he said that “In view of the changes in the balance of power in Asia and America, the
Navy will, in the coming century, become increasingly important for our defence policy, indeed for our
entire foreign policy.”117 Tirpitz was so interested in Mahan’s work that he pushed for the translation of
many of his books into German, distributing eight thousand free copies of The Influence of Sea Power to
the German public.118 Kaiser Wilhelm II himself had always been fascinated with naval affairs and his
embrace of Mahan was total.119 In a letter to a friend, he wrote that “I am just now not reading but
devouring Captain Mahan’s book and am trying to learn it by heart. It is on board all my ships and [is]
constantly quoted by my captains and officers.”120 The influence of this Mahanian synthesis of
commerce and strategy was enormous, leading Germany to develop its own navy in opposition to
Britain. The stage was set for a total competition that fused strategy with economics in a clash for world
supremacy.
Neither Britain nor Germany adopted Mahanian thought wholesale, instead crafting their
own syntheses of economics and strategy which relied on many of the ideas that Mahan helped
popularize. Britain’s version of this synthesis was paramount to its imperial hegemony, despite the
challenges from Germany. Britain’s early empire, from the beginning of colonial expansion to the
Napoleonic era, was characterized by mercantilist economic thought and the promotion of closed
spheres of imperial influence.121 After the Napoleonic Wars, Britain moved towards a free trade system
as its empire matured, a policy fully in place by the mid-Victorian period.122 By this point, the ‘workshop
of the world’ was no longer alone as an advanced industrial economy, and competition from the United
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States and Germany increased from 1880 to 1914.123 Historians have often cited this loss of
manufacturing predominance as evidence of a weakening Britain in the leadup to the First World War 124,
but this misses the fact that British imperial strategy adapted in order to sustain its hegemony. To cope
with the relative decline of its industrial sector, Britain leaned into free trade and globalization. It
embraced its geographic position and naval supremacy, using its location between Europe and the
ocean highways, its eastern and western coasts, and its insular and universal tendencies to its
advantage.125 The British economy began to concentrate more heavily on invisible services like shipping,
insurance, finance, and investment, so as to benefit from the expansion of global trade and productivity
– even if that expansion was undertaken by other powers.126 Counterintuitively, this sustained the
Empire by providing the critical services to grow the international commercial empires of its rivals. The
British promoted a free and open international system – embracing the Open Sea instead of the Closed
Door – reaping immense economic and strategic benefits as the facilitator at the center of that worldsystem.127
This economic and strategic synthesis, focusing on invisible services and imperial
consolidation, was the foundation of the British world-system in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth
centuries. P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins labeled this system as “gentlemanly capitalism” 128 and argued that
it was the primary driver of British imperialism, especially during the period between 1850 and 1914
when “Britain’s overseas interests underwent a massive expansion … [and] capital flows funded
economic development and ‘nation-building’ across the world.”129 This system, centered around the City
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of London, allowed Britain to profit from foreign trade. Earnings from these invisible services more than
made up for the decline in ‘visible’ trade.130 It set Britain apart from and, in some ways, above other
powers, as not merely an industrial state, but an agency state which provided commercial services and a
rentier state which profited from large-scale international investments.131 It fully embraced its
comparative advantage as an economic power, supercharging world trade through the provision of
liquidity, capital, and specialized knowledge.132 The dynamic economic conditions of the years between
1880 and 1914 amplified the demand for capital abroad, so as to lubricate commerce, increase
development of infrastructure and business, and bring goods to the newly-globalized marketplace.133
The British financial sector was perfectly situated to take advantage of these changes, becoming an
international clearinghouse for short-term credit and attracting myriad foreign firms to set up shop in
the friendly confines of London.134 The City provided ample opportunities for economic returns given its
status as a world entrepôt, enticing foreign firms and governments to park assets in London, further
facilitating trade and cementing British hegemony. Britain became a mature creditor and profited
handsomely from the system it created, relying on the logic of free trade to drive other nations into
debt-financing their commercial expansion – debt that the City of London was well-prepared to
underwrite.135 The laissez-faire attitude of the British towards finance and invisible services may have
accelerated the Empire’s relative industrial decline, but it simultaneously extended British global
dominance in the face of powerful rivals.
This economic system, however, was reliant on global peace for its proper functioning. The
good working order of international trade could only be maintained through the lack of major conflict. 136
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Being more oriented towards free trade than many of its rivals, the disruption caused by war would
disproportionately impact the British; this is where the strategic motive and Mahanian thought play a
role.137 In 1901, Lord Selborne, the First Lord of the Admiralty, said with respect to Britain that “Its Credit
and its Navy seem to me to be the two main pillars on which the strength of this country rests and each
is essential to the other.”138 That second pillar – the British Navy – allowed Britain’s imperial synthesis
and the world-system it created to survive amid rising challenges. The Navy was crucial not only to
protecting the home islands, but also to defending Britain’s widely-dispersed imperial possessions. For
the British government, particularly the Foreign Office, the strategic motive superseded the economic
motive, as they only seemed interested in economic affairs when strategic positioning was implicated. 139
Still, the strategic needs of the Empire dovetailed with commercial development and the focus on
gentlemanly capitalism. Imperial consolidation – of markets and of occupied territories – was the policy
of the day, and colonial expansion was focused mostly on securing key trade and communications
routes, notably the Suez Canal, known as the lifeline of India.140 Newly-opened territories – often
adjacent to formal British possessions – became fronts for the British Empire to protect and defend in
the strategic sense. 141 The economic-strategic relationship between naval power, imperial security, and
gentlemanly capitalism was well-understood in the period before 1914, as was the potential sense of
threat rival powers could feel from it.142 Free trade was promoted as a salve to these feelings. Britain’s
refusal to discriminate commercially was meant to placate fears of its hegemony and show that its
world-system would benefit all who participated in it.143 John Darwin summarized the British imperial
synthesis:

137

Ibid.
Lowe, Volume I, 5.
139
Kennedy, Realities, 61.
140
Ibid.
141
Faber, 58.
142
Cain and Hopkins, 418.
143
Cain and Hopkins, 418-419.
138

37
The vast scale of British trade, the fleets of merchant shipping, the treasure chest of overseas
investment and the resources it commanded were widely seen as the real embodiment of
British world power. They supplied the economic energy to sustain the show of empire and pay
for its defence. They formed the invisible chains that bound the visible empire of dependencies
and settler states to their far-off metropole. They provided the means to expand the sphere of
British influence and turn the ‘undeveloped estates’ of empire into imperial assets. In a world in
which a handful of imperial ‘superstates’ was expected to hold sway, they were the guarantee
of premier status, and of independence.144
The imperial synthesis of commerce and strategy that the British world-system was built on would
increasingly be adopted by its greatest rival: Germany.
The German version of the imperial synthesis – Weltpolitik, or world policy – was intended to
work within the British world-system as well as against it. Weltpolitik was largely determined by a similar
confluence of factors – economic interests, geopolitical ideologies, great power rivalries, domestic
politics – as was the British system it responded to.145 The German Foreign Office press chief, Otto
Hammann, described Weltpolitik as not driven by militarism or political interests, but “more by the
pressure of population growth, the expansion of German industry, and with it, the growth of German
overseas commerce and trade, as well as by the desire to keep the door open to overseas investments,
raw materials, and export markets.”146 The German imperial synthesis was consciously based on the
British model of liberal imperialism, even as it was often set in opposition to Britain itself. 147 Political
propaganda for domestic audiences lauded this expansionist philosophy, linking it directly with naval
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and colonial growth – a popular combination in the public mind.148 Despite Hammann’s downplaying of
its political and military background, Weltpolitik was more aggressive, protectionist, and outwardly
ideological than its British counterpart.
Economic motives and fears played a large role in Weltpolitik, pushing much of the strategic
side of the synthesis in a Mahanian direction. These concerns crossed political and social lines, with
agrarian Junkers and urban industrialists fearing a loss of export markets or a dearth of raw materials,
respectively.149 Such fears influenced powerful figures including Bismarck; his concerns revolved around
the issue of Germany’s overseas commerce being disrupted or damaged by foreign governments.150 This
was a worry for Bernhardi as well:
We are absolutely dependent on foreign countries for the import of raw materials, and to a
considerable extent also for the sale of our own manufactures. We even obtain a part of our
necessaries of life from abroad. Then, again, we have not the assured markets which England
possesses in her colonies. Our own colonies are unable to take much of our products, and the
great foreign economic spheres try to close their doors to outsiders, especially Germans, in
order to encourage their own industries, and to make themselves independent of other
countries. The livelihood of our working classes directly depends on the maintenance and
expansion of our export trade. It is a question of life and death for us to keep open our oversea
commerce.151
According to Weltpolitik proponents, the only way for Germany to satisfy these commercial anxieties
was to create an economic empire on the model of its rivals, notably Britain.152 Hermann Schumacher, a
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German trade expert, explained the importance of the British combination of naval and commercial
power, saying “It is no coincidence that England is simultaneously leading in world trade and ruler of the
seas. Whoever, like England, depends on international trade to feed and employ its people must sooner
or later take similar paths.”153 Likewise, Gustav Schmoller claimed that rising population pressure,
international competition, and a scramble for colonies and protected spheres of influence ensured that
trade policy and power politics were inseparable.154 The economist Max Sering backed an aggressive
German Weltpolitik that blended commerce and strategy in the quest for a world empire:
If we seek to secure our development as an independent nation, we need to expand our
territory, we need colonies. … [T]here are still significant stretches of land which have not been
seized by the great world empires; a fierce struggle has broken out over the commercial,
capitalistic, and political domination of these areas. And our future, our prosperity, our cultural
and political significance depend on whether we are able to gain our own foothold there or
prevent these areas from becoming the spoils of the already overpowering empires. This desire
does not mean a restless policy of conquest, but rather the demand that we be viewed as an
equal power and not be pushed aside in the still pending great liquidations, in all great questions
and changes of Weltpolitik. The irrefutable precondition for this is a significant strengthening of
our battle fleet.155
Admiral von Tirpitz weaved together naval strength, economics, and world power in a speech to the
Reichstag:
Germany sinks in the next century quickly from her position as a great power, unless she now
systematically and without waste of time advances [her] general sea interests. … The
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development of Germany into an industrial and commercial power is irresistible like a law of
nature…in the case of such commercial and industrial development, points of contact and
conflict with other nations increase. Naval power is essential if Germany does not want to go
under.156
Bernhardi echoed these sentiments almost exactly, but took the extra step in directly advocating for a
violent solution to Germany’s imperial woes:
We did not enter the circle of the Powers, whose decision carried weight in politics, until late,
when the partition of the globe was long concluded. All which other nations attained in
centuries of natural development—political union, colonial possessions, naval power,
international trade—was denied to our nation until quite recently. What we now wish to attain
must be fought for, and won, against a superior force of hostile interests and Powers.157
This natural disadvantage of late unification and missing out on imperial partitions was, contradictorily,
seen as a positive by Bernhardi:
The difficulty of our political position is in a certain sense an advantage. By keeping us in a
continually increasing state of tension, it has at least protected us so far from the lethargy which
so often follows a long period of peace and growing wealth. It has forced us to stake all our
spiritual and material forces in order to rise to every occasion, and has thus discovered and
strengthened resources which will be of great value whenever we shall be called upon to draw
the sword.158
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For Bernhardi and other promoters of an aggressive Weltpolitik, the only target for that drawn sword
was the imperial hegemony of Great Britain. Given the similarities of Weltpolitik to the British imperial
synthesis and the ability of Germany to marshal its resources to counter it, the government in London
saw Weltpolitik as a serious threat, even eclipsing traditional foes in Paris and St. Petersburg. 159
The Anglo-German rivalry was ubiquitous in the years from 1880 to 1914, touching on all
aspects of society and motives for imperial expansion. To Pauline Relyea Anderson, “The antagonism
was partly inherent in the nature of the ideologies and institutions of the two countries, in their political
and social systems, and in their imperialisms.”160 This was no monocausal hostility, and it could not be
understood without acknowledging this all-pervasive nature.
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Chapter II: The Colonial-Continental Connection
The Anglo-German rivalry was ubiquitous not only in its connection to a variety of motivations
for colonial expansion, but also in its linking of European and imperial affairs. The combination of
imperial and continental threats was Britain’s worst nightmare. No other rival endangered both British
local and global security between 1880 and 1914, and British reaction to this threat heightened the
antagonism between the two countries.
British interests were global in scale. Its commercial agents were present in every part of the
world, it had formal and informal claims on enormous tracts of land on several continents, and its navy
constantly patrolled the seas from Singapore to Suez. Politicians and diplomats recognized this reality
and sought to deal with the challenges it presented, especially that of overextension. In 1895, Prime
Minister Lord Rosebery wrote to his Foreign Secretary Lord Kimberley on this subject, saying:
But the guiding principle in both cases is the same: we cannot embroil ourselves in the quarrels
of others unless our own interests imperatively demand it. Imperatively, I say, because our
commerce is so universal and so penetrating that scarcely any question can arise in any part of
the world without involving British interests. This consideration instead of widening rather
circumscribes our field of action. For did we not strictly limit the principle of intervention we
should always be simultaneously engaged in some forty wars.1
These global interests painted a target on Britain’s back. George Hamilton, a colonial official in the
Indian government, wrote of this dilemma in 1901:
As we now stand, we are an object of envy and of greed to all the other Powers. Our interests
are so vast and ramified that we touch, in some shape or the other, the interests of almost every
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great country in every continent. Our interests being so extended makes it almost impossible for
us to concentrate sufficiently, in any one direction, the pressure and power of the Empire so as
to deter foreign nations from trying to encroach upon our interests in that particular quarter. 2
Making this conundrum worse was the fact that, between 1880 and 1914, there was a mad rush for
overseas possessions on the part of nearly every power in Europe. Before 1880, Britain mainly dealt with
occasional challenges from France, but rapid industrialization and globalization altered that
dramatically.3 Rising nations like the United States, Germany, and Japan all sought imperial possessions,
sweeping away Britain’s large informal empire across Africa and Asia and forcing Britain to formally
annex territories or see them lost to hungry rivals.4 Paul Kennedy describes how this process damaged
British hegemony: “No doubt they secured a larger share of colonial real-estate in this scramble than
anyone else – with their head-start, this was scarcely surprising – but once again their position had
relatively declined; informal control of most of the tropics was exchanged for formal control of one
quarter of it.”5 This decline motivated many British imperialists into pushing a policy of strength instead
of aloofness. Joseph Chamberlain was a representative example, saying that:
All Europe is armed to the teeth, and the causes of dispute are very near the surface.
Meanwhile, our interests are universal – our honour is involved in almost every land under the
sun. Under such conditions, the weak invite attack, and it is necessary for Britain to be strong.6
The desire for a policy of global interests and imperial strength was mirrored in Germany, just
as was the British imperial synthesis of commerce and strategy. German imperialists wished to spread
their Kultur, Bildung (education), and Wissenschaft (science) around the globe in a peaceful manner, but
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were also prepared to use Gewalt (force) to achieve these ends.7 These aims of Weltpolitik necessitated
a truly global strategy, one the German left-liberal Reichstag deputy Eugen Richter sarcastically labeled
as “Überall-dabei-sein-Wollens”, or “an urge to be involved everywhere.”8 That urge started closer to
home, as Germany’s unfortunate geographical position in the center of Europe made domestic security
a very real concern. This position between multiple historically-hostile powers ensured that Germany
would have to cement its continental hegemony before being able to vigorously, yet safely, pursue a
policy of Weltpolitik.9 General Bernhardi spoke for many others when he endorsed this path to
Weltmacht, writing:
… the German nation, from the standpoint of its importance to civilization, is fully entitled not
only to demand a place in the sun, as Prince Bülow used modestly to express it, but to aspire to
an adequate share in the sovereignty of the world far beyond the limits of its present sphere of
influence. But we can only reach this goal, by so amply securing our position in Europe, that it
can never again be questioned. Then only we need no longer fear that we shall be opposed by
stronger opponents whenever we take part in international politics. We shall then be able to
exercise our forces freely in fair rivalry with the other World Powers, and secure to German
nationality and German spirit throughout the globe that high esteem which is due to them. 10
As Germany began to approach a level of continental dominance under Bismarck and his immediate
successor Leo von Caprivi, influential Germans demanded this plan be put into action.11 Pressure from
the public and the Kaiser led to a new government which would seek to satisfy those expansionist urges,
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shifting diplomatic attention from Europe to the imperial periphery – something which brought
Germany into direct conflict with Britain.12
Britain had dealt with colonial competition before and had done so with aplomb, but
Germany’s threat to the European balance of power was a challenge that had not been faced for
decades, if not almost a century.13 The idea of continental balance as a goal of British foreign policy was
not new, having been around since at least the eighteenth century when the threat was emanating from
France, and Prussia was courted as an ally.14 The rationale behind this approach was that it would avoid
British isolation in Europe, a situation which would allow the continental hegemon to attack Britain’s
empire and weaken, if not destroy, its world power.15 In the years leading up to the First World War,
Britain saw Germany as the biggest threat to this European balance. Charles Hardinge, the powerful
Permanent Undersecretary at the Foreign Office, wrote in a 1909 memo to Foreign Secretary Edward
Grey that Germany sought “a position of predominance in Europe,” making it “our only potential
enemy” on the Continent.16 The diplomat Arthur Nicolson shared this analysis, writing in a private letter
to Hardinge that:
… Germany has a definite aim in view, towards which she steadily works, and that aim is to
obtain a predominant and decisive voice in all questions in which European Powers and England
are concerned or interested[;] it is patent that, if this aim were achieved, we should be
subservient to Berlin, and practically compelled to her dictation. We are the only Power who can
resist the achievement of that aim.17
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British foreign policy thinkers saw the connection between a well-balanced power structure in Europe
and Britain’s ability to defend the network of global interests that secured its prosperity and influence. 18
The fears of a continental hegemon were not centered on what that Power would do to Europe, but
what it would do afterwards to Britain and its Empire. Germany stoked these fears with its navalist
ideology and the subsequent expansion of its blue-water fleet, taken as a direct shot across the British
bow. Lord Milner, in a 1906 letter to General Lord Roberts, wrote that a Germany which dominated the
Continent, taking “Antwerp and Rotterdam, with an Empire extending from the North Sea to the
Adriatic, … would become, navally as strong as Great Britain and militarily 10 times as strong,” making
an invasion of England “no longer … a remote danger, but a very imminent one.” 19 Grey felt similarly,
writing that “if we sacrifice other Powers to Germany we shall eventually be attacked” ourselves.20 The
prominent socialist Robert Blatchford, in a series of letters reproduced in The Newsman of Essex in
January 1910, put this starkly:
But imagine the effect of a disaster to the Navy; imagine the effect of a German annexation of
the ports of France and Holland.21 Credit would be shaken to its foundations. Banks would
break, food would rise to famine prices, commerce and industry would be paralysed. And then
as our power waned we should be starved and crushed into an abject surrender.22
These fears of the German threat to European balance came into focus as Germany expanded its
priorities to include a vigorous pursuit of Weltpolitik.23
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Germany exacerbated this British sensitivity by tying imperial to European interests in the
hope of badgering Britain into diplomatic concessions. Given Germany’s precarious geographic position
and its need for continental security to pursue its world policy, this strategy made sense. But just as it
made sense for Germany to pursue this imperial-continental link, it also made sense for the British to
see this connection as aimed squarely at the heart of its interests. Typically, German diplomats would
have high preconditions for any deal, asking for a comprehensive alliance that would not only solve
relatively minor colonial issues in Africa or Asia, but also commit Britain to European action. 24 A.J.P.
Taylor has written about this German desire to connect the center to the periphery, saying that “Her
map of Asia, like Bismarck’s map of Africa before it, lay in Europe.”25 Most of the time, Germany did not
wish for Britain to enter an alliance with it alone, but sought to bring them into the already-formed
Triple Alliance alongside Italy and Austria-Hungary.26 These security guarantees would have to be
supplemented by British colonial concessions if Germany was to agree to any deal. 27 This “all-ornothing” approach, combined with the aggressive tenor of Weltpolitik, was intended to pressure Britain
into a deal from a position of urgency or desperation.28 It was a non-starter in London.
The Foreign Office was the primary target of these overtures, which helped develop a sense
of distrust of Germany in important British circles. Diplomats saw the German insistence on a ‘political
formula’ tying Europe to the periphery as an insurmountable obstacle to an Anglo-German agreement,
with Nicolson writing in 1911 that “Unless we intend to reverse our foreign policy of preserving the
equilibrium in Europe, we cannot tie our hands in the manner which Germany proposed to us and to
which doubtless she would revert were she to find us pliant.” 29 Ambassador Cecil Spring-Rice thought
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Germany was aiming at “nothing short of an acknowledged hegemony and that anyone who disputes it
will be made to suffer,” a sentiment shared by many of his colleagues in the diplomatic service. 30 Lord
Cromer, who essentially ruled Egypt for two decades31, cautioned the Foreign Office against the risk of
“heavy [German] blackmail elsewhere,” in relation to the potential for a limited Anglo-German
agreement.32 Francis Bertie, mentor of many Edwardian-era Foreign Office men, saw Germany as the
main threat to Britain, writing that it had “never done anything for us but bleed us. She is false and
grasping and our real enemy commercially and politically.”33 Spring-Rice put this German enmity against
Britain – and its linkage of both European and imperial issues – into perspective, arguing as early as 1897
that Germany was seeking:
… peace and if possible alliance with Russia – in Europe; and outside Europe – an understanding
with France and Russia to the detriment of England. The Czar used to talk of dividing the
inheritance of the sick man: Germany seems to urge dividing the property of a well man –
England. Unfortunately Europe is more occupied with the sick man: but Germany is not one of
the heirs and has all her attention elsewhere.34
This pessimistic outlook was not a guarantee of hostility, but showed that Britain would not take threats
to its empire or the European balance of power lightly. That Germany combined these two in its imperial
strategy buttressed the idea that it was Britain’s greatest threat.
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Chapter III: The Electoral Appeal of Imperial Supremacy
The pervasiveness of the Anglo-German rivalry was also reflected in its merging of domestic
politics and foreign affairs. Mass politics as a phenomenon was new in the late nineteenth century, and
politicians tried many approaches to appeal to the newly-enfranchised working and middle classes. The
use of imperialism and international competition as a release valve for domestic political pressure led to
great electoral success across Europe between 1880 and 1914.1 In both Britain and Germany, foreign
antagonism was stoked for political gain. And it often worked – winning over public opinion in both
countries. But once loosed, putting the genie of jingoistic nationalism back into its bottle became very
difficult. Making this worse, some politicians and officials preferred to lean into the belligerence,
reinforcing it in the public mind. The promotion of imperial expansion for domestic political purposes
cemented it as a necessity in the public imagination and made it an electoral must. The manner in which
this synthesis worked, as well as its prevalence and importance, was different in Britain and Germany.
British imperialism was used for political gain, but the Empire’s age meant it was already a well-accepted
factor in electoral politics.2 In Germany, a much newer state, social imperialism was still a novelty,
making it far more powerful electorally and in the popular mind. 3
I. Britain
In Britain, the relationship between electoral politics, imperialism, and the general public was
complex and nuanced. Some politicians, like Joseph Chamberlain, actively promoted a blend of
imperialism and social policy and used it for electoral gain4, fearing the relative decline of British
hegemony in the face of competition from Germany and the spread of socialism and working-class
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movements.5 Chamberlain focused on tariff policy, commonly known as ‘imperial preference’. For him,
increased tariffs would protect important industries, grow employment, provide funds for pensions and
armaments, and link Britain more closely with its Dominions.6 This was a cogent, direct appeal to
working class voters and would become a major debate in pre-war British politics. Others, including Lord
Salisbury (Prime Minister: 1895-1902), sought to push British national interests without focusing on
electoral politics. In a discussion with the German ambassador, Salisbury, when told by his interlocutor
that it was the duty of the government to lead public opinion, replied that it was harder than the
German realized.7 Defending the Empire crossed party lines, being embraced by both Liberals and
Conservatives, despite its traditional association with Tory politics.8 Politicians on both sides saw
imperialism as a main plank of their political program, although they took divergent approaches. 9 Tories
tended to focus more heavily on protecting and consolidating British power abroad, while Liberals like
Rosebery preached a less static vision of Empire that involved bringing ‘Progress’ to Britain’s subject
peoples.10 As time went on, these conceptions did start to converge11 – partly in response to a roiling
international situation and partly due to a similarly-fractious domestic environment. 12
Still, disagreement on the issue of empire was commonplace in British political life,
particularly on the left side of the aisle. Some saw foreign policy as driven by money.13 Keir Hardie,
founder of the Independent Labour Party, condemned the Boer War as a “capitalist war”:
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The British merchant hopes to secure markets for his goods, the investor an outlet for his
capital, the speculator more fools out of whom to make money, and the mining companies
cheaper labour and increased dividends.14
The Boer War was opposed by Radical Liberals and Labour politicians alike, including David Lloyd
George15, on the grounds that it was immoral and unnecessary.16 Some on the farther reaches of
dissent, notably the Irish Nationalists, were outwardly pro-Boer, although this label was also applied
pejoratively to more moderate dissenters like Lloyd George and Hardie.17 As for Germany, some Radicals
and Labourites saw its aspirations as legitimate and wished to placate it by supporting its claims in
Africa, China, and the Ottoman Empire.18 In 1912, the Radical Liberal MP Noel Buxton compared
opposition to the Boer War to that British ‘anti-German’ policy: “The spirit which promoted the Boer
war is the spirit which is concerned in the present question of Anglo-German relations.”19 Lord Courtney
of Penwith, head of the Liberal Foreign Policy Committee, sought “a friendly approach to the German
government” and downplayed the Agadir crisis of 191120, writing that:
Germany desires to acquire and is bound to acquire coaling stations here and there is one of the
phases of the inevitable. It depends on the manifestation of our temper in respect of such
acquisitions whether they would remain merely mercantile stations or would be converted into
naval bases.21
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In the years leading up to war, Liberal papers like the Daily News, the Morning Leader, the Tribune, and
Speaker supported a pacific foreign policy and disarmament.22 The Nation wrote that “Nothing more
than a memory is left of the old Anglo-German antagonism” on December 15, 1913. 23 Lloyd George
spoke about Anglo-German relations on July 23, 1914 – just five days before the assassination of
Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo – saying:
Our relations are very much better than they were a few years ago. There is none of that
snarling which we used to see, more especially in the Press of those two great, I will not say rival
nations, but two great Empires. The feeling is better altogether between them. They begin to
realise they can co-operate for common ends, and that the points of co-operation are greater
and more numerous and more important than the points of possible controversy. All that is to
the good.24
Many pre-war critics who dismissed the German threat were awakened by the reality of the First World
War. The Liberal writer and historian R.C.K. Ensor wrote: “the liberals … had been making it an article of
party faith that militarist Germany was not so black as it was painted. Now in a flash it seemed to them
self-revealed as much blacker.”25 Despite dissent, imperialism remained the norm of British politics. The
Liberal government which came into power after an electoral sweep in 1906 ran on a platform of ‘peace,
retrenchment, and reform’ in foreign and domestic policy, but ended up largely following the imperial
policy26 of the previous Tory governments – expanding the Navy, responding to German aggression, and
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forming informal alliances with other powers.27 This came as a surprise to the bureaucrats in the Foreign
Office, who expected more conciliatory policy from Foreign Secretary Edward Grey. 28 Continuity of
foreign and imperial policy was not uncommon in this era, given the depth of the entanglements abroad
and the dangers of disruptions in policy. British politicians of all parties had to deal with permanent
national interests – many of which were detailed in Chapters I and II – and were only temporary
custodians of those interests while in government. This degree of policy stability – even if unplanned –
during a period of international and domestic tumult protected British imperial interests and
contributed to the continuation of Liberal government through 1914.
In the decades before the Great War, domestic and imperial issues became ever more
entangled in Britain. The destabilizing push for radical social reform at home, combined with the growth
of the German threat to Britain’s world-system, made for a politics where debates over national policy
became all-encompassing. Paul Kennedy, in The Realities Behind Diplomacy, explores this convoluted
intersecting of local and global issues:
It was, moreover, not a debate on which the different aspects of policy could be dealt with
separately. The arms race impinged upon government finance, and that upon taxation, and that
upon social policy and the domestic-political constellation; the ‘social question’, in its turn, could
also affect government spending and taxation, and have impacts upon external policy; the
furious quarrels about tariffs, or about direct versus indirect taxation, were immediately related
to the naval race, social reforms, the ‘threat’ to capital, and so on. Armaments policy and foreign
policy and taxation policy and social policy all hung together.29
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This universalizing tendency was reflective of the immense socioeconomic changes which characterized
the years from 1880 to 1914. The idea of empire could be embraced both by those who were
discomfited by the stresses these changes provoked and by those who found excitement and intrigue in
new possibilities.30 The one constant in response to the changes wrought by the new century was the
growth of the state; this was necessary to carry out policies of social reform and imperial expansion. 31
The British imperial bureaucracy increased four-fold from 1870 to 1914, and most of this was coincident
with the idea of social imperialism.32 The mix of domestic and imperial was also reflected in the broad
conceptions of ‘national greatness’ which were promoted by social imperialist politicians. Lord Milner
promoted a synthesis of imperialism and social reform, saying in a speech in Montreal in November
1908:
The greatest danger that I foresee is that the ideals of national strength and Imperial
consolidation on the one hand, and of domestic reform and social progress on the other, should
become dissevered, and that people should come to regard as antagonistic objects which are
essentially related and complementary to one another. I believe in national greatness and
power, but I hope I take a fairly comprehensive view of what constitutes them. It is not only
armies and navies, though these have their functions to perform; it is not merely guns and ships,
though these also are necessary; it is not merely a well- filled treasury and good credit; it is not
merely high policy, though according as that is wise, prudent and far-seeing, or short-sighted,
spasmodic and impulsive, the value of fleets and armies and reserve funds may be greatly
heightened or diminished. I say ultimately greatness and power rest on the welfare and
contentedness of the mass of the people.33
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Milner saw these masses – newly-enfranchised in Britain, and a growing center of political
influence – as gaining the biggest benefits from social imperialism. He believed they benefited from
government support and social reform, while also being a demographic that was more patriotic than
most. In the same Montreal speech, Milner said:
Not that I mean to say for a moment that patriotism is the exclusive possession of the well-todo. One often finds the strongest sentiments of patriotism in members of what is commonly
known as the working class, and there is good reason for that too. I think in some respects the
dignity of citizenship, pride in being a member of a great nation, is a more valued possession to
the man in a humble station than it is to the great and wealthy, who have so much else to enjoy
and be proud of.34
This attitude was widespread and reflected in government policy and propaganda, which focused
heavily on selling the virtues of imperialism to the working-class masses. Pro-imperial works by authors
like G.A. Henty and Rudyard Kipling were spread to children of all social classes, and gained prominence
within the working masses.35 This allowed for the dissemination of imperial ideas and the advancement
of patriotism across social lines. Public education was a key venue for this promotion, as it brought a
universal message to a broad swathe of society. Teachers were trained in imperial geography, including
the peoples and products of British territories, and transferred this knowledge to a generation of
pupils.36 Another such effort at the promotion of imperialism to the masses was the creation of Empire
Day, a public holiday meant to celebrate the Empire and promote British patriotism, especially in
children.37 Commemorated on Queen Victoria’s birthday (May 24), Empire Day – although not officially
recognized until 1916 by a wartime government – was adopted by schools and organizations across the
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British Isles.38 These festivities included education about British culture and imperial territories, but
focused on “uplifting entertainments” like pageants, songs, and games.39 The focus on promoting
imperial ideology to the masses was a key conceit of social imperialism.
The British attitude to the blend of domestic and international affairs was explained well by
Milner in Montreal. He connected reform at home directly to imperial security, saying:
It is that one of the essentials of national greatness is good social organisation, and that
patriotism and Imperialism (Imperialism, which is simply the highest development of patriotism
in the free peoples of a world-wide state) must look inwards to the foundations of society, to
prevent disease at the roots, as well as outwards, to ward off external danger and attack. 40
Internal danger was also viewed as an issue solvable by social imperialism. The arch-imperialist Cecil
Rhodes said in 1895 that “In order to save the forty million inhabitants of the United Kingdom from a
bloody civil war, our colonial statesmen must acquire new lands for settling the surplus population of
this country, to provide new markets. … The Empire, as I have always said, is a bread and butter
question.”41 This particular form of social imperialism was electorally important in Britain, but it did not
have as large an impact on the perception of the Anglo-German rivalry as it did in Germany.42
II. Germany
In spite of Germany’s democratic deficit and the political insulation of its ruling elite,
imperialist policies were used for political effect even more than in Britain. On its face, the German
political system was democratic and representative, allowing for universal male suffrage and a wide
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variety of parties43 in the Reichstag.44 In reality, the system was a byzantine structure meant to confine
political representation into one body while giving most power to the Kaiser and his handpicked, largelyunaccountable Chancellor.45 Bismarck, the creator of this constitution, was the perfect fit for such a role,
alternating between cajoling the Kaiser and the Reichstag to pass the laws he deemed necessary to the
functioning of the state.46 After his fall from power under Kaiser Wilhelm II in 1890, German politics
became more susceptible to public opinion and relied on the wrangling of parties in the Reichstag to get
things done.47 Voter participation is a good measure of this trend. It started out at fifty percent in 1871,
rose slowly through the Bismarck years until it broke seventy-five percent in 1887, and increased to
eighty-four percent in 1907 and 1912.48 Given this rise in popular interest in politics, the government
became increasingly reliant on managing public opinion and corralling it into supporting government
policies.49 Social imperialism and the stoking of Anglophobia were key tactics used to promulgate
Weltpolitik and the important German Navy Laws. As in Britain, the ‘distraction’ of Empire helped to
contain the widespread agitation for social change represented by the growth of socialist parties. 50
Historians of the German Empire have long debated whether its policy in the years leading to World War
I was driven primarily by domestic or foreign politics. In truth, both were deeply entwined and
interrelated. It is impossible to put primacy on either.51
The primary example of the union of the domestic and foreign in German politics from 1880
to 1914 is Weltpolitik, the ‘world policy’ which was meant to bring Germany to its ‘rightful’ place among

43

This broad openness to political parties would ebb and flow as time passed, with laws banning socialist parties
passing several times in the decades between unification and World War I.
44
Hoyer, 64.
45
Hoyer, 64-68.
46
Hoyer, 66-68.
47
Qiyu, 150-151.
48
Qiyu, 70.
49
Qiyu, 151.
50
Taylor, Struggle, 372.
51
Kennedy, Antagonism, 359-360.

58
the vanguard of the Great Powers and secure the survival of the political and social order for at least a
generation.52 Under Kaiser Wilhelm II, German politics changed from the Bismarckian model of biding
time and consolidating power to a more aggressive model based on hostility to the perceived enemies
of German supremacy – democrats and socialists internally, and Great Power rivals like Britain abroad. 53
Technological and economic growth “proved to be a powerful source of national pride that inspired a
patriotic unity in many Germans regardless of all their differences,” increasing the appeal of the Kaiser’s
social imperialism.54 Weltpolitik was characteristic of this alteration in the national political mood.
According to Xu Qiyu, colonial expansion and the creation of a blue-water fleet were designed to “revive
the images of the monarchy and the government … by ‘rallying the ‘loyal’ elements around the
Kaiser.’”55 One ‘loyal element’ was the educated middle class (Bildungsbürgertum), widely seen as the
main driver of world-policy.56 German economists saw the bourgeoisie as the prime beneficiary of
expanded trade, the greater need for services, the growing navy, and novel outlets for investment and
income-generation.57 A January 18, 1896 speech by the Kaiser to a group of merchants and industrialists
– the cream of educated German society – laid out the benefits and necessity of Weltpolitik for the
politically-powerful middle classes:
The German Empire has become a world empire. Everywhere in the distant parts of the earth
thousands of our compatriots reside. German goods, German knowledge, German
industriousness travel over the ocean. In thousands of millions is estimated the value of goods
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Germany has going by sea. To you, dear gentlemen, is given the serious duty to help me
integrate this greater German Reich firmly to the homeland. 58
Bourgeois newspapers, writers, and publicists took to this speech, seeing it as confirmation of the worldpolitical goals they viewed as Germany’s destiny.59 But the middle class was not the only interest group
to be conciliated by Weltpolitik; according to A.J.P. Taylor, “Every conflicting interest was bought off.”60
The middle classes were enticed with naval spending to protect foreign commerce, especially in food. 61
Farmers were given high tariffs to increase their income and provide for some level of self-sufficiency in
foodstuffs.62 Junkers were placated with attempts at closer Russia ties.63 Businessmen were given
economic concessions in Asia Minor and the Far East.64 Everyone benefited from Weltpolitik. As
Chancellor Bülow said: “One cannot carry out a foreign policy according to a preconceived and detailed
plan; but one must reckon with the given relations and with the given factors. One must act one way
one time and another way another time.”65
Weltpolitik was intended to “unite the ruling classes in order to stabilize political authority”
and the best way to do this was through a “forceful foreign policy that could earn the support of
domestic society.”66 Bülow made the point in a Reichstag speech of December 2, 1901:
We shall have to carry on our discussions and thus our domestic strife, and there will certainly
be domestic strife, before foreign ears. On the one hand, let us remain conscious in all our
struggle of individual interests, in all our differences of doctrine and party opinion that we are
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here discussing our own affairs, as is our good right. On the other hand, let us not forget that we
can face outsiders united and strong only when from our speeches and decisions in this house
always and everywhere the idea of the general welfare, the national good shines forth. 67
These calls for ‘unity’ with respect to internal affairs were meant simultaneously to bolster the
government’s loyal supporters (reichstreue) and to attack opposition parties and politicians.68 During
Bismarck’s tenure as Chancellor, in the days before the formal adoption of Weltpolitik, the most
threatening dissenters were the Freisinnige coalition of left-Liberals and Progressives69 associated with
the Anglophilic Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm.70 This group seemed to Bismarck to offer a real
alternative to his own governance given its popularity and links to the heir to the throne. 71 To counter it
and to satisfy the pro-colonial members of his own base – the National Liberal and Free Conservative
parties72 – he settled on an anti-British colonial policy. His son Herbert, a political official in his own
right, explained this mid-1880s political calculation:
When we entered upon a pro-colonial policy, we had to reckon with a long reign of the Crown
Prince. During this reign English influence would have been dominant. To prevent this, we had
to embark on a colonial policy, because it was popular and conveniently adapted to bring us into
conflict with England at any given moment.73
Paul Kennedy puts it this way:
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A successful colonial policy might well increase German exports, assist the economy and help –
to a greater or lesser degree – to reduce the prospects for social unrest; more specifically, it
would please certain National Liberal and Free Conservative circles, and bind them closer to the
government. At the same time, it would hurt the political fortunes of the Freisinnige coalition;
and it would make it virtually impossible for ‘liberal’ and ‘English’ influences to operate with
success inside Germany, even if a new emperor came to the throne.74
Weltpolitik only came into full effect after Kaiser Wilhelm II removed Bismarck in 1890, ushering in an
era where similar tactics were used, but in a blunter and more aggressive fashion. The targets also
changed. Now the focus was on “Socialists, Jews, national minorities and other supposedly international
elements” as threats to both internal and external security.75 Of domestic enemies, socialism was the
most pressing, some seeing it as against “all that was dear to the German nation.” 76 Socialists saw
Weltpolitik as a distraction from social questions and refused to countenance it, making them seem
enemies of the state.77 Weltpolitik was promoted as a fix for these seemingly-intractable social ills:
helping to pay for increased social services through growth in Germany’s global trade, relieving
population pressure, and tamping down labor strife and urban unrest by offering higher wages and
consistent employment.78 Given the difficulty in achieving foreign policy success in Europe proper,
Germany needed to look further afield, bringing it into conflict with other powers – notably Britain. 79
Bülow, avatar of the new Weltpolitik, promoted forceful foreign policy as a cohesive force
internally, saying “I am putting the main emphasis on foreign policy… only a successful foreign policy can
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help to reconcile, pacify, rally, unite.”80 This was an idea he had long held, as remarked upon in July 1897
by his contemporary at the Foreign Office, Friedrich von Holstein:
Foreign policy is in good condition but internal is not. The change to the right which is openly
planned is not undertaken with sufficient strength and, according to my convictions, must end
within a couple of years by a great swing to the left. I have even heard that there are people 81
who in that case intend to divert the country from internal difficulties by means of foreign
policy.82
Bülow, unlike his immediate predecessors, was highly attuned to the management of public opinion to
achieve specific political ends.83 In his 1916 book Deutsche Politik, he said as much: “Public opinion could
only be brought into play when the national motive was emphasized and the national consciousness
stirred up as over against the insecure and supine feeling which prevailed in the decade after Bismarck’s
retirement.”84 The main end to which he was working was the fulfillment of Weltpolitik. This style of
politics was also aimed at the parties in the Reichstag to unite them against internal and external
dangers; namely socialism and England:
To the Government fell the task of awakening the patriotic feelings which were asleep in all
parties, of giving them life and of keeping them alive, unprejudiced and spontaneous, until they
seemed strong enough for the practical work of fulfilling the national responsibilities of the
Empire.85
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Bülow’s project86 of uniting the Reichstag to pass legislation and implement Weltpolitik was called
Sammlungspolitik – a policy of ‘bringing together’.87 After some political volatility early in his tenure as
Chancellor, the real test of Sammlungspolitik came in 1906, when he opportunistically dissolved the
Reichstag.88 The resulting ‘Hottentot’ elections of 190789 “became nothing less than a national
referendum on German colonialism and Bülow’s Weltpolitik.”90 The result was a resounding success for
Sammlungspolitik, with the pro-government parties in a majority and the Social Democratic Party
(SPD)91 losing nearly half of its seats.92 This ‘Bülow bloc’ was united by Weltpolitik and hostility to
socialism93, an uneasy alliance of conservatives and liberals increasingly unable to compromise on
domestic issues thus putting more significance on world-political pursuits.94 As the prime target of
Weltpolitik was the British Empire, this heightened the Anglo-German antagonism and lent it an air of
critical importance. Nowhere was this more obvious than in German naval politics.
The German Navy was one of the few truly national institutions in the Empire, attracting mass
public support and promising an expansive imperial future.95 It was beloved especially by the middle and
lower-middle classes which saw it as a meritocratic embodiment of the German ideal. 96 Industrialists,
seeing the insecurity of Germany’s overseas commercial position, hailed a powerful navy as “insurance
against future setbacks,” at home and abroad.97 A great fleet would protect and extend German foreign
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trade and provide consistent government spending in support of the armaments, shipbuilding,
steelworks, and other industries.98 This spending would enrich the owners of those companies and
provide stable industrial employment, thus helping to solve the Social Question.99 In 1912-1913, orders
from the German Navy comprised twelve percent of Krupp’s overall business – an immense fifty-three
million marks.100 In a February 6, 1914 letter to Foreign Secretary Edward Grey, Britain’s Ambassador to
Germany Edward Goschen recounted a conversation with German Foreign Secretary Gottlieb von Jagow
on the subject of a potential naval pause.101 Jagow said that this was politically impossible, as “the
interruption for a whole year of Naval construction would throw innumerable men on the pavement,
without their being able to find work elsewhere.”102 Jonathan Steinberg sums up the broad-based
politics of German naval expansion well:
It could claim an honourable, liberal past and appeal to the rising industrial and commercial
classes as a thoroughly middle class organization. To many radicals, it offered the universal
panacea of colonial expansion and settlement, which, they believed, would ease, if not solve,
domestic social problems. To the economists and historians it seemed the perfect instrument
for the fulfilment of their neo-mercantilist or social Darwinian theories of international relations.
It could carry German Kultur to every corner of the globe and wrest for Germany that place
among nations to which the German academic community believed she had been historically
destined.103

98

Berghahn, 27.
Berghahn, 30.
100
Qiyu, 219.
101
British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914, Volume X, Part II: The Last Years of Peace, ed. G.P.
Gooch and Harold Temperley (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1938), 736.
102
Ibid.
103
Steinberg, 59.
99

65
Widespread support for the navy portended widespread distrust of England, the target of the German
fleet plans from the start.104 Admiral Albert Hopmann stated this directly: “The life elixir of our fleet is
the rivalry with England. Without this [our fleet] loses its reason for existence.” 105 This Anglophobia was
stoked for political gain, but also reflected contemporary events.106 In the 1890s, several maritime
embarrassments – mostly at the hands of the British – befell Germany: Britain sent a ‘flying squadron’ to
the Cape in response to the Kruger telegram in 1896 (see Part II), the British and Americans used naval
power to interfere with German policy in Samoa in 1899, and British naval ships seized German
merchant vessels on suspicion of carrying contraband for the Boers in 1900. 107 After 1896, any proposed
naval increases would be complemented by a public campaign against Britain. 108 The most effective
version of this campaign would be to “make the public feel that Germany faced humiliation and bullying
at the hands of Great Britain, the world’s dominant naval power, and then use this to excite popular
enthusiasm for naval construction.”109 Alfred von Tirpitz – arguably a cleverer politician than naval
strategist – was the main engine behind the expansion of the fleet.110 He saw the British response to
Weltpolitik as a lever by which to achieve his domestic political ends, namely the growth of the German
Navy. The Agitationsmittel (good slogan material) of these British responses could be used to
consolidate support in the Reichstag and among the public for the proposed 1898 Navy Law. 111
British observers did not see Tirpitz’s proposal as the limited bill portrayed by German
politicians. They would be proved correct. Belligerent articles appeared in Britain’s nationalist press,
including a cryptic warning in The Manchester Evening News, which wrote on December 3, 1897:
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What the Diet (Reichstag) has to consider, therefore, is not whether two “tactical units” are
necessary and likely to be sufficient, but whether it is prudent for a Power which “does not wish
to rival the naval Powers of the first rank” to embark on a career of naval ambition, when it is
certain that such a policy must, by disturbing what Mr. Goschen has called “the balance of
power in the navies of Europe,” entirely upset the ingenious theory invented by the German
Government to give a semblance of finality to a programme which cannot in the nature of things
be final, and is probably not seriously intended to be final by its authors.112
Tirpitz used these criticisms to rally support for his naval plans, attracting even previously-harsh critics
from the conservative Agrarian faction to the cause.113 Still, many figures in government, including
Chancellor Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, were unsure about the bill’s prospects114; they were wrong, as the
1898 Navy Law passed the Reichstag easily on the second reading.115 The only serious dissent came from
August Bebel, leader of the SPD, who was laughed at by his parliamentary colleagues when he spoke
against the bill and the anti-British sentiment which powered it:
There is, especially on the right side of this house, a large group of fanatical Anglophobes made
up of men who want to pick a fight with England and who would rather fight today than
tomorrow. But to believe that with our fleet, yes, even if it is finished to the very last ship
demanded in this law, we could take up the cudgels against England, is to approach the realm of
insanity. Those who demand it belong not in the Reichstag but in the madhouse. … (Prolonged
Laughter).116
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Bebel was not creating these “fanatical Anglophobes” out of whole cloth; indeed, Tirpitz himself spoke
to the Kaiser of the fleet’s ultimate orientation against England:
[Upon completion of the fleet] only England would be superior. But even against England, when
other factors such as geographical situation, weapons systems, mobilization, torpedo boats,
tactical training, planned organizational expansion, and unified leadership by the monarch, we
would no doubt have good chances. … England will have lost any inclination to attack us for
general political reasons and because of the sober calculations of their businesses. Such a mass
of seapower … will enable Your Majesty to pursue overseas policy on a grand scale. 117
These sentiments were used even more aggressively to promote the 1900 Navy Law, which expanded
the fleet and increased the pace of construction. This update, known as a Novelle, was proposed by
Tirpitz immediately after the passage of the 1898 law118 and intended for public introduction in 1901 or
1902.119 The timetable was accelerated, however, to take advantage of “a moment of intense antiBritish sentiment nationwide,”120 as a result of Britain’s actions in the Boer War and its seizure of
German merchant vessels.121 The 1900 German Navy Law passed easily on this wave of public feeling.122
Unlike its predecessor though, it was explicitly anti-British:
It is not necessary that the battle fleet at home is equal to that of the greatest naval power. In
general this naval power would not be in a position to concentrate its entire naval forces against
us. Even if it succeeds in encountering us with a superior force, the destruction of the German
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fleet would so much damage the enemy that his own position as a world power would be
brought into question.123
The way the Novelle passed, as well as the bill itself, deeply disturbed the British.124 After 1900, the
primary task for fleet advocates like Tirpitz became managing the Anglophobia they had stoked for
political purposes, while keeping the Navy on a firm political footing.125 Tirpitz was granted a respite by
Bülow’s success in the Hottentot elections of 1907, but the oscillation from managing to stoking antiBritish sentiment continued through 1914. 126 Pauline Relyea Anderson makes the point well:
Because German imperialism was undertaken in part to escape a thorough-going reform at
home, it was in essence and continued to be at variance with British imperialism. … Such
differences would not have been decisive however – they were not so in the case of France and
England – if German imperialism had not seemed so determined and formidable, characteristics
due to the nature of the interests and forces behind it. For these reasons, each arising primarily
from internal conditions, Germany could hardly have concluded an Anglo-German alliance of a
permanent nature.127
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Part II – Thinking the Worst: From Suspicion to Scorn in Anglo-German Relations
“The Emperor considers a war with England as something to be prepared for, and he yesterday settled
with his Admiral the necessary preliminaries with a view to that event. The German newspapers during
the last three days have left nothing to be desired in the clearness with which they have expressed
animosity to this country, and the Emperor’s telegram was intended to crystallise the popular feeling.
These are the two approved preliminaries, according to modern scientific methods, of any outbreak of
properly-conducted hostilities – first, have your arrangements ready, so as to be able to strike the first
blow – in this case it would be preparing to concentrate the German Navy against the nearest British
Squadron – and then make sure of public feeling behind you. These details settled, you can proceed to
watch events.”1
“It is finally time that another European Power should put its word in South African affairs against the
attitude of the Cape government and especially against the plans of the uncrowned king of South Africa,
Cecil Rhodes, and stop England’s proceedings. The speedy dispatch of German warships to Delagoa Bay
is imperative since no other European is called as Germany is called to act decisively in South Africa. The
opportune moment has come to uphold the German name in Africa in honor and pride and to protect
from English attacks the independence of the Boer state in the Transvaal, a people related to us.” 2
The passages above – one from a British newspaper and the other from a German paper – were
published on the same day (Saturday, January 4, 1896). The first is from the Morning Post3, the second
from the Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung4. Both dealt with the aftermath of the Jameson Raid in the
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Transvaal region of South Africa.5 In the weeks following that failed expedition, Anglo-German tensions
reached near-breaking point, as rival ‘flying squadrons’ of naval vessels were dispatched to the waters
off of southeast Africa and Kaiser Wilhelm II sent a telegram of congratulations to the leader of the
Transvaal, Paul Kruger.6 The Jameson Raid and Kruger Telegram were turning points in the AngloGerman antagonism, each side now viewing the other as a serious threat, if not a prime target of foreign
policy.7 The Morning Post blamed Germany for escalation, while the Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung
blamed Britain. Both spoke seriously of a war between the two countries. The situation was described
by the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to Berlin, Count Ladislaus Szögyeny:
The rivalry for world markets, opposing interests in their colonial policy, and the traditions of
the Bismarckian political school, according to which England was portrayed as totally
untrustworthy and often as perfidious, have prepared the terrain for the hostile feeling towards
England which has manifested itself here with unusual unanimity. In my opinion, it will be no
easy task to convince influential circles that, in their own well-known interests, they must keep
within limits in their stance against England.8
The confluence of two factors – inflamed public opinion and deep-seated imperial anxieties – drove the
rivalry to ever-more rancorous heights, culminating in total war.
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Chapter IV: Press and Pressure Groups
As mentioned earlier, the period between 1880 and 1914 saw an explosion in the influence and
importance of public opinion in the realm of politics. This was a trend which carried across Europe, but
was felt particularly strongly in Britain and Germany. One indication of the newfound significance of
public opinion to government actions was the attention paid to calls for domestic social reform and
enlargement of the franchise.9 The necessity to ground political legitimacy in a broader level of public
support was partially a product of the era of mass media and organized political action – two factors
which pushed governments into a more representative posture. British politics was dealing with the
impact of some form of public opinion even before Germany was unified, with Lord Clarendon, the Whig
Foreign Secretary, saying in 1869 that: “Governments no more than individuals can afford nowadays to
despise public opinion…”10 This development was acutely felt in the realm of foreign policy, where
public opinion operated negatively on policy instead of positively – in that it made it near-impossible for
the government to carry out certain unpopular policies, as in the case of the Bulgarian Horrors 11 of
1876.12 In Germany, this process took off in the 1890s, with an explosion of newspapers, political
journals, and public pressure groups signifying “an era of limitless publicity, where countless threads run
here and there and no bell can be rung without everyone forming a judgement about its tone.” 13 For
historians, assessing public opinion in an era before professional political polling is quite difficult; one
must extrapolate public feeling from the prime vectors of its influence and transmission: the press and
political interest groups.14 One must, especially in the jingoistic period before the First World War, take
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care to “distinguish between the public opinion of different groups, to relate the opinion of a group to
its own peculiar interests, and to allow for the extravagance of professional chauvinists, nationalists, and
their opponents.”15 For instance, one must understand how the opinions expressed in various
newspapers might reflect the particular interests of the paper’s owner, editor, or party more so than a
widely-held popular belief.16 The historian must examine not only the level of influence public opinion
had on government, but also the level of influence government had on public opinion; this differed in
Britain and Germany, with the German government having a far larger impact on public opinion in that
country than did the British government in its own.17 Two specific reflections of public opinion bear
exploration as to their effect on the rising Anglo-German antagonism: the press, namely newspapers
and opinion journals, and political pressure groups.
I. The Press
In Britain, the press was a well-developed organ of political discourse and had cemented itself as
a daily part of the lives of Englishmen well before the late Victorian era. The importance of newspapers
in this regard accelerated with the growth of the electoral franchise, as there was new demand for
accessible political content; this made newspapers even more critical to the national discourse in the
years before World War I.18 Newspapers granted a large percentage of their print space to political
events, summarizing Parliamentary debates, quoting political speeches, and discussing events and
debates happening abroad.19 In 1892, the poet Oscar Wilde wrote on this issue of journalism as the new
focus of political discussion: “The Lords Temporal say nothing, the Lords Spiritual have nothing to say,
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and the House of Commons has nothing to say and says it. We are dominated by Journalism.” 20
Politicians from Gladstone and Disraeli to Salisbury and Chamberlain to Asquith and Lloyd George all
sought to use the press as a mouthpiece for their views and a support system for their political
priorities.21 The press itself was more than happy to join in this politicking, with most outlets aligned
with various political parties or factions – some even being owned by political figures. 22 In the midcentury era, Britain’s political press was largely Liberal-leaning, partly due to its locus of production
being in London and its environs, all of which were then very much in the Liberal camp.23 The press
began to shift in a rightward direction during the tumult of the 1880s, as the domestic and foreign
policies of the Gladstone ministry alienated sections of elite opinion.24 Societal factors also played a role
here, as improved railways and telecommunications allowed for the conservative London dailies to
more rapidly reach the suburbs and countryside, challenging the previously-dominant liberal regional
papers.25 This was an era when new outlets were founded specifically to promote a more aggressive,
muscular, expansionist imperial policy – known as the ‘new journalism’ and exemplified by the Daily
Mail and the Daily Express.26 These dailies achieved widespread circulation and popularity due to their
lower prices and jingoistic politics, and became a fixture of the Anglo-German rivalry in the years leading
to conflict.27 Alfred Harmsworth – later Lord Northcliffe – the man who founded the Daily Mail in 1896,
remarked that his readers loved “a good hate,”28 the target of which would increasingly be Germany.29
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German politics and policies had been criticized quite harshly by many of the Liberal papers in
the Bismarck era, but this would rapidly accelerate in the age of Weltpolitik and imperial conflict.30
Newspapers like the Daily Mail helped drive a more nationalist tone in the British press in the early
1900s31, positively portraying British imperialism and stoking the flames of anti-German animus. 32 This
distinct ability to worsen the political atmosphere was perhaps the most important aspect of the British
press – and the press in general – during these years.33 The famed editor W.T. Stead boasted in 1886
that “In a democratic age … no position is comparable for … the influence and far-reaching power to
that of an editor [who], better than any other man, is able to generate … public opinion, excite interest,
… provoke public impatience.”34 Political actors dealt with this influential and temperamental press in
various ways. In the bureaucracy of the Foreign Office, the ‘official mind’ lamented the intrusion of the
press into sensitive diplomatic matters; in 1905, Thomas Sanderson, the Permanent Undersecretary of
State for Foreign Affairs, decried “the lunatics here, who denounce Germany in such unmeasured terms
and howl for an agreement with Russia.”35 This frustration with the belligerence of the nationalist press
and its interference with the sensitive game of diplomacy would continue through 1914, with officials
like Charles Hardinge declaring public opinion in both nations as constituting “the most serious danger
to our relations with Germany.”36 Politicians outside of the permanent bureaucracy would attempt a
more active management of the press, with varying degrees of success. There were no blatant pressinfluencing operations from the government proper, but individual politicians would use ‘private
consultations’ with editors and journalists to push their favored policies. 37 This gentlemanly approach
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allowed a level of plausible deniability when it came to influencing the press, but it also tended to be
less effective, particularly with respect to foreign affairs.38 As with the Foreign Office bureaucrats,
politicians in government would increasingly feel that the press was becoming unmanageably jingoistic
and anti-German, pulling the public further into that antagonistic direction.39
As in Britain, the German press was a political actor, but was even more fragmented along
regional, factional, and religious lines – something which reflected the broader divisions in the relatively
young nation. Paul Kennedy identifies five distinct categories of German press organs, largely
corresponding to the country’s political groupings: Conservative, National Liberal, Progressive, Catholic,
and Socialist.40 Each of these factions had papers across the nation which pushed their message; for
instance, the National Liberal press had outlets in Berlin (Berliner Börsenzeitung and Berlinische
Nachrichten), Saxony (Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung and Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten), Bavaria and the
South (Münchener Neueste Nachrichten and Süddeutsche Nationalliberale Korrespondenz), and the West
(Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung).41 Given these close ties between press and party, in the German press
“strict adherence was enforced, both in news and editorial policy, to the party line.” 42 These party
organs were joined in the melee of German press by newspapers which were semi-official government
outlets, a practice which started under the canny Bismarck and expanded significantly in the pre-war
years.43 Press bureaus were established in various governmental departments, from the Foreign Office
(Auswärtiges Amt) to the German Navy (Reichsmarineamt), to advocate for the policies those agencies
wished to enact.44 Public opinion and the ideas espoused in the press were seen as crucial metrics by the
German government – so much so that large portions of the surviving records of key departments
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consist of press clippings.45 The government was not shy about intervening in the press, especially
during the years of Weltpolitik after the fall of Bismarck; this was seen in the obsequious treatment of
every development in German imperial policy, from the congratulatory messages at the annexation of
even the smallest Pacific isle to the rhetorical decorations bestowed on politicians when they succeeded
abroad.46 Bernhard von Bülow was one of the most prominent promoters of the government-press link,
seeing it as “an essential aspect of his political operations,” and getting directly involved in placing
favorable stories, reprimanding editors for failing to toe the party line, and even offering payments to
foreign outlets or journalists to place rumors or positive stories abroad.47 Some German outlets, notably
the Kölnische Zeitung, were essentially government mouthpieces, hewing so closely to Bülow’s
pronouncements that they were seen – reasonably so – by foreign observers as official statements.48
Tirpitz was just as much a user of the press for political purposes as was Bülow, particularly when it
came to the promotion of the Navy Laws.49 This started early on, with the establishment of fairly minor
propaganda journals and public outreach coming in 1894.50 This was merely a dry run for the main
event, which was passing the naval laws meant to bolster Weltpolitik and bring Germany to its ‘place in
the sun’. The ‘News Section’ of the Reichsmarineamt under naval officer August von Heeringen was
meant to:
… make contact with the Press, arrange publication of suitable articles, create a favorable
climate in German public opinion for a powerful fleet by reaching the most influential and
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articulate segments of the society, in particular, the universities and professional associations,
and to work with and on important deputies of the Reichstag.51
In the leadup to the 1898 naval law discussed earlier, the News Section (Nachrichtenabteilung) sprang
into action, translating the works of Mahan, recruiting loyal officers to give speeches and write articles,
inviting journalists to watch maneuvers, and, perhaps most importantly, recruiting prominent German
academics to the cause of naval expansion.52 These academics, including many of the economists and
professors described in Part I, would lend the plans for fleet expansion a scholarly air of expertise, and
were successful in part due to the respect granted to academics in German culture. 53 These plans were
not merely short-term in nature, meant solely to aid in the passage of a single law; instead, they were
part of a long-term public campaign to cement the need for a large navy in the public mind. 54 In a letter
to one of his colleagues on the topic of working with the Navy, Gustav Schmoller explained this strategy:
… I have known Secretary of State Tirpitz since old times. He recently sent Lieutenant
Commander von Heeringen to me to discuss how one could … awaken in broader circles an
understanding not so much for fleet plans as for the German colonies, exports, the significance
of international power struggles with England, etc. … [Heeringen] repeated his intention with
precision: voting in the next budget years is less the aim than constantly producing a change in
the views about the significance of our external trade, German exports, the colonies, the power
questions. Only a permanent change in the whole of public opinion can guarantee us the sort of
fleet building [that] is needed and so spread itself over a generation.55
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The most influential of these ‘fleet professors’ was Ernest von Halle, who was the primary liaison
between the Navy proper and academic circles and the man who wrote the vast majority of German
naval propaganda focusing on the economic benefits of naval expansion.56 Von Halle, having received a
large inheritance, had a massive library, used the most advanced technology of the time (typewriters
and stenographs), and employed several assistants to aid in his work.57 His output writing under the pen
name Nauticus for publications like the journal Jahrbuch für Deutschlands Seeinteressen – an outlet he
founded in 1899 pseudonymously – was incredibly prolific, as were his speeches to various interest
groups.58 The actions of the fleet professors and the Nachrichtenabteilung were critical in the passage of
the first Navy Law – and all subsequent Novelles – as they helped bring fleet expansion a measure of
popular approval that would only increase over time.59
One of the primary attributes of the German press was its tendency towards imperialism,
especially as the years progressed towards the Great War, something which drove its increasing
Anglophobia and belligerent tone.60 As the German press largely reflected the opinions of the country’s
political parties, this was not a surprise; as we have seen, German politics took on an air of antagonism
towards Britain throughout the years from 1880 to 1914. This negativity towards the British Empire was
present from the very start of that period, and was supported by Bismarck and his government. 61
Bismarck personally instructed his subordinates to place anti-Britain articles in important publications
and, unlike with other powers who he also worked against, never instructed the press to promote
positive or pro-British articles.62 The nationalist press which was used so skillfully by Bismarck and Bülow
began to move farther in an anti-British direction than was desirable to the government, making Anglo-
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German relations more challenging in the same way that the jingoistic British press did for that country’s
Foreign Office.63 Despite efforts to lower tensions on both sides of the North Sea – joint campaigns were
promoted by Anglophilic German writers like the professor Theodor Schliemann and Germanophile
Englishmen like Francis Wrigley Hurst, the radical-liberal editor of The Economist64 – Anglo-German
rivalry only intensified in the years before war.65 Two examples of this press-driven antagonism are
worth exploring: the 1901-1902 Anglo-German ‘Press War’ and the infamous 1908 Daily Telegraph
interview of Kaiser Wilhelm II.
The so-called ‘Press War’ of 1901-1902 was an inflection point in the Anglo-German rivalry,
coming as it did during Britain’s campaign against the Boers in South Africa which painted Britain in a
negative light abroad – especially among Germans, who saw the Boers as ‘distant cousins’. Tensions as
reflected in the press were already high in the early stages of the Boer War, with vitriol being thrown by
both sides; still, some papers took a more moderate tone, calling for de-escalation and understanding
between Germany and England amidst incensed public feeling.66 The ‘Press War’ truly began in 1901,
when a series of issues in the relationship – the accession of the perceived-Germanophobe Edward VII in
January, the failure of alliance talks in July, and an ill-received visit by Edward VII to Wilhelm II in August
– culminated in an outbreak of rhetorical violence.67 The spark which lit this inferno was a speech by the
British Colonial Minister Joseph Chamberlain on October 25, 1901 in Edinburgh 68 which dealt with the
allegations of British mistreatment of the Boers, ones which were widely covered in the German press. 69
In that fiery speech, Chamberlain dismissed many allegations as mere “fables” 70 and defended others as
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not out of line with contemporary warfare – picking out the German treatment of French civilians in the
Franco-Prussian War as an example of worse battlefield conduct.71 These references were taken very
harshly in Germany and led to outrage and wider hostility to anything British.72 Ironically, Chamberlain’s
speech was also criticized by the press in Britain, portraying a more complicated and nuanced picture of
the British political landscape than was seen by German observers.73 But that image was not the one
which stuck in the public mind or in the press. Tensions further rose when Chancellor Bülow “poured oil
on the fire” in a speech to the Reichstag on January 8, 1902.74 In that address, Bülow quoted the
eighteenth-century Prussian King Frederick the Great, saying vis a vis Chamberlain: “Let the man be and
don’t get excited, he’s biting on granite.”75 This phrase incited the German public into further
Anglophobia, which was seen in the press. That hostility from Germany was received in Britain,
increasing the public’s antagonism towards Germany in turn.76 The notes of criticism towards
Chamberlain were transformed into defenses of his policies and recognition of German antipathy
towards Britain:
No greater mistake could be made than to regard these demonstrations as artificial or to think
they are not genuine. They reflect the feeling of the Germans towards the British, a feeling of
growing in power and capable of becoming one day a serious menace to peace between the two
peoples. … The storm of vituperation…represents no passing emotion, but a deep-seated and
apparently incurable popular disease of animosity toward the British Empire.77
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Another excellent example of the power of the press in exacerbating Anglo-German tensions –
even when trying to calm them – came in the infamous Daily Telegraph affair of October 1908. This
fiasco revolved around a series of conversations in 1907 between the Kaiser and the British Army officer
Edward Montagu-Stuart-Wortley when the Emperor was staying with the Englishman on holiday, later
written up for publication in the Daily Telegraph.78 In these conversations, the Kaiser spoke candidly
about Anglo-German relations, portraying himself as a great friend of Britain, contrary to his views of
German public opinion:
You English are mad, mad, mad as March hares. What has come over you that you are so
completely given over to suspicions quite unworthy of a great nation? … I declared with all the
emphasis at my command, in my speech at Guildhall, that my heart is set upon peace, and that
it is one of my dearest wishes to live on the best terms with England. … I repeat that I am the
friend of England, but you make things difficult for me. My task is not the easiest. The prevailing
sentiment among large sections of the middle and lower classes of my own people is not
friendly to England. I am, therefore, so to speak, in a minority in my own land…79
These lines and others – claims that German naval policy was directed towards Japan, that the Kaiser
helped Britain win the Boer War, and that he had intervened to stop a joint Franco-Russian action in
South Africa – were highly inflammatory and were received as such by the public in both countries. 80 The
British public and Germanophobe press saw the interview as confirming their suspicions that the mass
of public opinion in Germany was anti-British, while even the most conservative papers in Germany
blamed the Kaiser for his expressed Anglophilia and perceived betrayal of the Boers. 81 The political
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fallout in Germany was significant. The interview itself, as was custom, was actually sent by the Daily
Telegraph to the German government for official approval prior to publication; unfortunately, Bülow
and his press officer Otto Hammann were both on holiday and did not read the transcript, instead
passing it to a junior clerk who approved it without altering any of the Kaiser’s words.82 This oversight
was the Chancellor’s fault and, although the Kaiser would take the blame in the press, Bülow was the
eventual scapegoat.83 He would resign shortly thereafter, ending the era most associated with
Weltpolitik and German imperial power with a scandal relating to that policy’s intended target: Britain.
II. Pressure Groups
Political pressure groups were not a new development in British politics, but the tenor and
orientation of those groups shifted significantly in the years between 1880 and 1914. In the earlier part
of the nineteenth century, British pressure groups advocated for more progressive causes – abolition,
electoral reform, repeal of the Corn Laws – but this changed as imperial issues rose to the forefront of
public consciousness.84 These new organizations had a more conservative and consolidationist bent and
were founded to strengthen what they perceived as a weakening Empire.85 Their mission was to raise
imperial consciousness, particularly in the working classes, and instill a sense of pride, duty, and an
understanding of the advantages Empire gave the public.86 These voluntary organizations were largely
founded and funded by the middle and upper classes, and recruited widely-known imperialists and
military figures to advocate on their behalf.87 One of the earliest such groups was the Primrose League,
founded in 1883 as a Tory-aligned political advocacy organization meant to promote a positive message
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of British imperialism.88 The League boasted a membership of one-and-a-half million by 1900, and
focused on setting up public lectures, exhibitions, entertainments, and rallies which promoted the
Empire and its heroes – including the famed General Gordon who was killed resisting an attack in
Khartoum, Sudan.89 Other groups focused on more specific issues, or took a more bellicose tone. The
National Service League, founded in 1902 after the humiliations of the Boer War, sought to increase
Britain’s military capacity by promoting conscription and training of “every able-bodied white man in the
Empire” and cautioning against the peril of invasion.90 Its public meetings were often addressed by the
aforementioned Lord Roberts, who was seen as an imperial icon and spoke about the necessity of
military reform.91 By 1914, the National Service League had two hundred thousand members and was a
powerful political player, contributing to the push for Army reforms which took place in the pre-war
era.92 Britain also had its share of pressure groups promoting the Navy, with the more moderate Navy
League forming in 1894 and a more radical organization, the Imperial Maritime League, breaking away
from the main Navy League in 1907.93 Both pushed for naval expansion and an improved imperial
defense so as to maintain British maritime hegemony, although the Imperial Maritime League was more
aggressive in the pursuit of those shared objectives.94 The Tariff Reform League, founded in 1903,
warned of the ‘deindustrialization’ of Britain and the demise of its economy and promoted high tariffs
against foreign rivals to avoid this supposedly-impending disaster.95 Another group – this one mainly
comprising a core of zealous and socially-elite imperialists – was founded in 1910 and called the Round
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Table.96 It was a cross-party body, partially funded by the Rhodes Trust97, which promoted the idea of
imperial federation – that is, the incorporation of the Dominions more firmly into Britain proper so as to
solidify Britain’s world position and protect its hegemony.98 They pursued this goal through the
publication of pamphlets and press articles, the creation of discussion groups with political figures, and
by making individual contacts with Members of Parliament.99
Other groups focused on promulgating imperial ideas and pride among the youth of the Empire,
hopefully setting the stage for a new generation of imperialists who would defend British world-power.
One such group, the Lads Drill Association, was founded by Reginald Brabazon, Earl of Meath, who also
created the idea of Empire Day.100 This organization, which merged into the National Service League in
1906, was intended to “spread the gospel of empire to the young” by encouraging physical fitness, a
sense of duty, and a feeling of pride in Empire.101 The most famous and long-lasting of the groups
targeting children was the creation of Major-General Robert Baden-Powell, the hero of Mafeking 102,
who saw a need for the “hardening of the nation” and the “building up of self-reliant, energetic
manhood” to protect and defend the Empire into the future.103 To accomplish these goals, Baden-Powell
founded the Boy Scouts in 1908, a group which gained one hundred thousand members in its first two
years of existence.104 The Boy Scouts were instructed in patriotic fashion and undertook outdoor
activities based on Baden-Powell’s own survival and training experience in the Boer War. 105 The ethos of
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the Boy Scouts, and the goal Baden-Powell had when founding the group, was summed up by the man
himself in an appeal to the youth: “Your forefathers worked hard, fought hard, and died hard to make
this empire for you. Don’t let them look down from heaven, and see you loafing about with your hands
in your pockets, doing nothing to keep it up.”106 It is impossible to know for certain exactly how much of
an impact these political pressure groups had on British public opinion and political action in the period
from 1880 to 1914, but it is clear that they reflected a broader swing to the political right among the
public on the issues of Empire and its defense.107 Still, the impact of these groups in Britain paled in
comparison to the impact of similar groups in Germany.
German pressure groups were numerous, powerful, and made significant impacts on the
country’s politics and public opinion, especially in the fomenting of Anglophobia. From the earliest days,
they were anti-liberal and pro-imperial, appealing to the national interests in a bellicose and aggressive
manner that was very difficult for the political class to control.108 Some of these groups were created
during the Bismarck chancellorship, but truly made themselves felt in the reign of Kaiser Wilhelm II
where Weltpolitik was the focus of political action.109 The positive view of imperial expansion which
started to be seen in the 1880s during Germany’s first round of colonization helped boost the fortunes
of the pressure groups and brought a wide cross-section of German society into the fold. 110 As would be
expected based on the earlier discussion of Weltpolitik, various players in economic circles were
members of these pro-imperial groups – including Hamburg and Bremen firms which traded to West
Africa, Oceania, and Zanzibar, chambers of commerce and individual industries that sought new, more
secure, market opportunities, and financiers like Bismarck’s banker Gerson Bleichröder who saw good
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investments available in the colonial domains.111 They were joined by intellectual advocates for Empire,
including the economists, historians, and professors discussed earlier, who wanted Germany to “claim
[its] share in the domination of the earth by the white race.”112 These intellectuals, widely respected in
Germany, were heavily involved in the creation and dissemination of nationalist and imperialist
propaganda, often using political pressure groups as an outlet for those sentiments. 113 Although
government actions and aims often ran in parallel to those of the pressure groups, they did not fully
intersect, something which caused problems for German leaders.114 As we shall see, these private
parties worked hand in hand with the government many times, including during the Hottentot Elections,
when a new organization was created by a group of professors specifically for the purpose of promoting
Bülow’s world policy and contributing to his re-election.115 Imperial pressure groups did not always
agree with the prevailing government policy, outpacing it on certain issues – including Anglophobia –
and forcing political leaders into a more reactive posture.116 As with political parties, however, public
pressure groups were not uniformly pro-Weltpolitik and anti-Britain; some groups were formed
specifically to counter the atmosphere of chauvinism which dominated the age.117 That this organized
campaign to tone down anti-British rhetoric existed shows how deep the antagonism ran in the years
leading to war.118 Three specific German pressure groups bear further exploration given their influence
and impact on the Anglo-German rivalry: the Colonial Society, the Pan-German League, and the Navy
League.
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The Colonial League (Kolonialverein) was the oldest and least belligerent of the three, founded
in 1882 by a group of pro-imperial figures with the support of seventy-one members of the Bismarcksupporting Free Conservative party in the hopes of promoting colonization as “the best lightning rod for
the Social Democratic danger.”119 It initially worked to establish a broad base of support for colonization
policies by educating the public through publications like the newspaper Kolonialzeitung, which it began
publishing in 1884.120 That paper eventually reached a circulation of thirty thousand and made a
noticeable political impact.121 The Colonial Society’s initial motives were not primarily economic in
nature, but this changed in the 1890s and led to a rapid increase in the group’s membership. 122 In 1887,
the Kolonialverein had a few thousand members scattered over one hundred and eight local chapters;
ten years later, the group could boast of more than twenty-three thousand members across over two
hundred fifty local societies.123 In 1895, the Society laid out its goals:
1) To turn the national ardor toward German colonization and to spread in ever-growing circles
the knowledge of the necessity for it; 2) To further the practical solution of colonial questions; 3)
To arouse and support German national colonial undertakings; 4) To work for the best solution
of the questions connected with German emigration; 5) To hold and strengthen the economic
and cultural dependence of the Germans abroad upon the fatherland; 6) To create a center for
all the efforts, now separated, which are directed toward these goals.124
In addition to these overall goals, the Kolonialverein supported naval increases125, promoted German
interests in South Africa – including in the Transvaal and at Delagoa Bay, both of which would be
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flashpoints for Anglo-German rivalry126 – and raised concerns about British imperial expansion across
Africa and Asia.127 The Colonial Society was not as aggressive in pushing these aims on the government
as were some of the other pressure groups, but they did criticize it at times, including over the
Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty (see next section) and its perceived ‘surrender’ to British interests.128 Still,
the Colonial Society was seen as a moderate group that was primarily pro-government and supported a
diplomatic settlement of imperial issues with Britain instead of a more militaristic solution.129
One of the pressure groups most associated with this more bellicose approach was the PanGerman League. The League was founded in 1891 along the same lines as the Colonial Society, but was
revamped and made into a combative force by the influential professor Ernst Hasse when he took it
over in 1893.130 Under Hasse’s leadership, membership in the League exploded; upon his taking control
of the group in 1893, it had a mere five thousand members, but this rapidly rose to almost nine
thousand five hundred by the end of 1896, over seventeen thousand by 1898, and reached its zenith
with over twenty-one thousand members in 1900 and 1901.131 Membership fell off a bit after the drama
of the Boer War, but the group still counted over seventeen thousand members in 1912.132 Despite this
relatively small size, the Pan-German League made a massive impact on German politics and public
opinion.133 Its members came from a wide variety of professions: over five thousand were academics,
nearly as many were businessmen, liberal professions134 counted over three thousand seven hundred,
industrial workers had over two thousand five hundred, and farmers rounded out the group with just
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over four hundred members.135 These groups all had disparate political interests, but came together
under the Pan-German banner to promote its mission of imperial expansion, Weltpolitik, and hard-line
nationalist policies.136 Its stated goals as laid out in its founding documents are remarkably similar to
those espoused by the Colonial Society, but they tend to have a more energetic approach. For instance,
their final aim reads:
By the firm presentation of the views expressed here against indifference and indolence, against
a superficial cosmopolitanism and against the widely over-rated world position of Germany
today and the value of one-sided continental politics, to make our desires finally felt on the side
of the parties of the government.137
The contemporary German writer Paul Rohrbach expressed the ultimate goal of the Pan-Germans and
their vision of the imperial future: “The German nation alone besides the Anglo-Saxons has developed to
the point where it is numerous enough and internally strong enough to demand that its nationalism
have the right decisively to help form the coming world age.”138 The League advocated for these goals
vociferously, and spoke out on issues as varied as the state of German populations in Denmark, the
Netherlands, and South Africa, as well as the foundation of potential colonies in places as far afield as
Brazil.139 The League sought to unify Germandom abroad into one cohesive whole so as to compete with
other rising nations like the United States and Russia140; this reflected the League’s distaste for minority
populations within Germany, including the Jews and the Poles of East Prussia – a group the League
targeted for immigration limits and outright removal.141
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The Pan-Germans also were strong supporters of naval expansion, seeing it as a prerequisite for
a truly global empire and agitating in favor of the Navy Laws which repeatedly came before the
Reichstag.142 One example of this successful propagandizing came in 1897, when the League worked
directly with the Reichsmarineamt to publish a pro-Navy pamphlet entitled “The Decline of German and
the Rise of Foreign Sea Power,” showing their ability to work directly with the government even though
they were an independent organization.143 One key aspect of the Pan-German League was its virulent
Anglophobia144; Britain was constantly named as a target of the League’s plans, as they saw it as the
main hindrance to a more assertive imperial policy and found that labeling an enemy made their
propaganda more effective.145 In terms of government relations, the Pan-Germans were far less
forgiving than was the Colonial Society. From its inception, the League acted mainly in opposition to the
government, constantly pushing for more aggressive imperial and anti-British policies, and frequently
lashing out with harsh criticism for the government – something seen in the reaction to the Kaiser’s
visits to England during the Boer War and the outrage expressed during the Daily Telegraph scandal.146
In fact, when the German government and the League were united in political purpose, it was always
the government moving closer to the League’s position and not, as would be anticipated, vice versa.147
This independence combined with combativeness made the Pan-German League a deeply important
part of the pre-war German political order and a strong influence on public opinion.
The German Navy League (Deutscher Flottenverein) was another significant pressure group, but
it had far greater ties to official circles and a much more specific mission than did either the Colonial
Society or the Pan-German League. The groundwork for the Navy League was laid by Kaiser Wilhelm II
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himself on May 28, 1896, when he issued an All-Highest Cabinet Order instructing the government to
prepare for a massive naval building program; this memo had three main objectives – educating and
instructing the public on German maritime interests, explaining the necessity of naval construction to
protect and expand those sea interests, and promoting groups which understood and advocated for
these policies.148 The Flottenverein was founded by Viktor Schweinburg, the editor of the Alfred Kruppowned paper Berliner Neueste Nachrichten, in April 1898 to fulfill this mission, as well as to promote the
sea interests of the German industrial elite.149 Its mission was laid out upon its founding:
[To work towards] the arousing, cherishing, and strengthening in the German people of
understanding for and interest in the meaning and purpose of a navy. … The Navy League
considers a strong German navy a necessity, especially for securing the coasts of Germany
against the danger of war, for maintaining Germany’s position among the world powers, for
protecting the general interests and commercial relations of Germany, as well as the honor and
security of her citizens engaged in business abroad.150
This lofty purpose was undermined by the early actions of the League, which focused primarily on the
interests of industry; the Reichsmarineamt thought the group placed “the business interests before the
objective consideration” of naval expansion, and the academic circles which ardently desired a navy
found it to be “a representation of the interests of Conservatives, big industrialists, and financiers.” 151 As
time went on, the League saw the use of presenting as a more popular organization and refocused its
efforts in that direction.152
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The Flottenverein attracted a mass membership far larger than its aforementioned peers, largely
due to world events – the Spanish-American War, the 1899 Samoan crisis and the Boer War being
notable examples. 153 The group’s membership reached one hundred thirty thousand by mid-1899,
neared a quarter of a million by the turn of the century, and almost hit one million in 1906. 154 By 1900,
the Navy League counted fifty large regional organizations and over a thousand smaller local ones
spread widely across the country, including in landlocked and working class areas. 155 Its public outreach
efforts were enormous, with the League’s main publication, Die Flotte, gaining a circulation of two
hundred seventy thousand by 1901 and rising later to three-quarters of a million.156 In support of the
1900 Navy Law, the League sponsored three thousand lectures, and spent over six million marks on
books, brochures, and other propaganda writings.157 When the group reinvented itself in 1900 as an
apolitical People’s organization and purged some more undesirable elements – those who did not
adequately camouflage their industrial interests – it grew in popularity and influence. 158 The League was
embraced by academia under the new leadership of General August Keim, a radical nationalist former
Army officer who took up the task of naval propaganda with aplomb. 159 Most of these academics, known
collectively as the ‘fleet professors’ (flottenprofessoren), joined the Flottenverein upon this change of
management in 1900; this included professors like Gustav Schmoller, Max Sering, and Hermann
Schumacher.160 Under Keim, the League took on a populist tone, pressing the government for more
naval expansion and making the League into a grassroots partner that could be difficult to wrangle. 161
After the success of the 1900 law, the Flottenverein’s role became that of “a loyal Eckard, always on the
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watch to see that the great national enthusiasm, which has flared up so brightly, may become an eternal
fire upon whose burning the future of the Empire depends.”162 The organization took this mission
seriously, often pushing the Reichsmarineamt to accelerate the pace of shipbuilding and the passage of
Novelles; this would be the case in 1906, when the League pressed Tirpitz and the Reichstag for a larger
bill.163 In that instance, the strategy backfired on the Navy League. It did not properly understand the
nuances of Tirpitz’s proposal, which would allow for the construction of a new ship type – the
Dreadnought – to compete with Britain, instead sticking to its rote formula of “more ships, [while]
ignoring costs, diplomatic complications, and political realities.”164 This crisis would eventually lead to
the deposition of Keim and his replacement by a more pliable, pro-government figure who would
accede to Tirpitz’s wishes.165
The power of the flottenprofessoren, the Navy League, and German pressure groups more
broadly was described well by the historian Erik Grimmer-Solem when he discussed their impact on the
trend towards radical nationalism and Weltpolitik:
Even if they were not longer active in German fleet politics, Schmoller and his former students
had played a key role in helping to forge this consensus within the bourgeois parties by
articulating and disseminating a vision for Weltpolitik that, while it included the overseas
colonies, extended far beyond to East Asia, South America, and the Middle East and that had
evolved in the “Hottentot elections” into an increasingly racialized nationalist ideology that
fused economic imperialism with settler colonialism.166
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This passage perfectly describes the impact of German pressure groups on the Anglophobic imperial
synthesis that was widely accepted in the years between 1880 and 1914.
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Chapter V: Imperial Anxieties: The Foundation of Tension
Anxiety stemming from the issue of Empire was prevalent in Britain and Germany from 1880 to
1914. Each nation understood and dealt with those anxieties differently. Germany, a rising power, was
concerned with catching up.1 Britain, a status quo power, feared relative decline. The British focus on
retrenchment and consolidation – and the fears it engendered – was the opposite of the German focus
on expansion and belligerence, and the fears associated with that attitude. This mutual reinforcement of
anxiety led to growing hostility and inability to understand one another.
I. Germany
Imperial neurosis was not as prevalent in Germany as in Britain, but it still proved to be a
powerful exacerbating factor in the Anglo-German antagonism. Fear of missing out on imperial
expansion and worry that Germany’s rise as a Great Power could be stymied, both implicated Britain as
the primary cause of the anxiety.2 After 1890, German anxieties increased, as an earlier perception of
Britain as a weakening hegemon was rebutted by events.3
Fear of losing out was a constant in the German public imagination, reflected in political
cartoons, in the early years of the rivalry and in the immediate lead-up to the First World War. An early
example comes after the 1878 Congress of Berlin, where a Russo-Turkish dispute was resolved by a
meeting of the Great Powers. The cartoon “Theilung der Erde” (“Division of the Earth”) published in the
satirical magazine Kladderadatsch on August 11, 1878, depicts Austria-Hungary, Britain, Russia, and
France walking away from the Congress with sacks of loot – namely Cyprus, Algeria, and Bosnia, their
new imperial provinces (Figure II in Appendix).4 Zeus overlooking the scene, lambasts Germania: “Where
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were you when the world was divided up?”5 Internal preoccupation leading to external failure was a key
component of Germany’s imperial anxiety.
Another Kladderadatsch cartoon, from August 13, 1905, depicts a similar sentiment updated for
a new era (Figure III in Appendix).6 A feminized version of Bülow walks anxiously with the frustratedlooking King Edward VII, while British Prime Minister Arthur Balfour flirts with a female representation
of “La France”.7 The image references King Edward’s successful 1903 visit to France, which hastened the
Entente Cordiale of 1904.8 To the German ‘official mind’, the Anglo-French Entente came as a shock, as
it was unforeseen and ran counter to the basic assumptions of German diplomacy, namely that
rapprochement between the British and French (and between the British and Russians, for that matter)
was an impossibility given their conflicting colonial claims.9 “Kommt Eduard?” portrays Bülow as a
nervous paramour, picking flower petals and repeating “He loves me! He loves me not! Loves me …” 10
Edward VII would visit Germany in 1906, but the hoped-for Anglo-German reconciliation did not
materialize, feeding further into German fears of missing out.11
Germans also feared encirclement, concerned that they would be diplomatically isolated and
hemmed in by hostile powers, particularly France and Russia. Bismarck sought to avoid this by
redirecting French ambitions outward towards colonial ends and allying with Russia. 12 The
Dreikaiserbund and the Reinsurance Treaty of 1887 were meant to handle the Russian side of the
equation13, while support for French colonialist politicians like Jules Ferry was intended to placate
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French revanchism towards Alsace-Lorraine.14 Weltpolitik as pursued by Kaiser Wilhelm II and the
chancellors who succeeded Bismarck helped to draw France and Russia together, ironically bringing the
anxieties of encirclement closer to reality. The Algeciras Conference of 1906, in which Germany was
diplomatically isolated (but for Austria-Hungary) and forced to back down on its aggressive demands
over Morocco, is a case in point.15 The phrase itself was officially used in public for the first time by
Bülow on November 14, 1906 in the Reichstag:
A policy aiming at the encirclement of Germany and seeking to form a ring of Powers in order to
isolate and paralyze it would be disastrous to the peace of Europe. The forming of such a ring
would not be possible without exerting some pressure. Pressure provokes counter-pressure.
And out of pressure and counter-pressure finally explosions may arise.16
Thereafter, the threat was at the forefront of the German imagination.17 Despite the fact that British
ententes with Russia and France were aimed solely at settling bilateral issues, Germany saw them as
deliberate attempts at encirclement.18 The best example of this obsession comes from Kaiser Wilhelm II
himself, who claimed on the eve of war that:
So the celebrated encirclement of Germany has finally become an accomplished fact, in spite of
all the efforts of our politicians to prevent it. The net has suddenly been closed over our head,
and the purely anti-German policy which England has been scornfully pursuing all over the world
has won the most spectacular victory … Even after his death Edward VII is stronger than I,
although I am still alive!19

14

Kennedy, Antagonism, 173.
Qiyu, 184.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid.
18
Kennedy, Antagonism, 267.
19
Kennedy, Antagonism, 402.
15

98
This paranoia was reflected in the “Copenhagen Complex” which preoccupied German navalists
including Tirpitz and the Kaiser. The fear of a British strike that would destroy the fledgling German Navy
was rooted in historical fact. In 1807, the British assaulted a neutral Danish fleet in its home waters
unprovoked and bombarded Copenhagen.20 This time, however, German actions directly instigated the
British responses which drove German anxiety. Anti-British provocation was built into the very fabric of
Germany’s navy, from the political machinations described earlier to the idea of the ‘danger zone’ which
was at the heart of Tirpitz’s plan. To Tirpitz, the navy was meant primarily as a tool of coercive
diplomacy against Britain, the greatest sea power and world hegemon.21 The ‘risk fleet’ was intended to
concentrate in the North Sea which separated Britain and Germany’s western coastline as a trump card
in power politics.22 But it could not reach its potential until the ship gap was closed with Britain. Until
then, Germany was in the ‘danger zone’.23 Tirpitz referred to the fleet as being in “the egg-shell” and
Bülow spoke of the need to “operate so carefully, like the caterpillar before it has grown into the
butterfly.”24 This, however, was not enough. The British saw the threat posed by the German Navy in the
early Edwardian era, with Lord Selborne, First Lord of the Admiralty, for example asking pointed
questions about German naval construction and aims.25 Selborne wrote, in an October 17, 1902
memorandum to the Cabinet on the topic of the 1903-04 naval budget:
I am convinced that the great new German navy is being carefully built up from the point of
view of a war with us. … It cannot be designed for the purpose of playing a leading part in a
future war between Germany and France and Russia. … Lascelles26… is equally convinced that in
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deciding on a naval policy we cannot safely ignore the malignant hatred of the German people
or the manifest design of the German navy.27
This realization of German intentions led to the establishment of a North Sea base on the Scottish coast,
the alteration of the two-power standard28 to include Germany, and the consideration of a preemptive
strike, all contributing of course to the Germans’ Copenhagen complex.29 British newspapers like the
Army and Navy Gazette spoke openly of carrying out a preemptive attack. One article from November
26, 1904, speaks of the German provocations which preceded British ideas of a Copenhagen redux:
But it was not the Army and Navy Gazette that demanded that the German Fleet should be
wiped out of existence. We merely pointed out that if it should become essential to European
peace that a stop should be put to German warship building, the British Fleet at the present
time has no particular business of importance on hand.30
Jackie Fisher, the irascible First Sea Lord, brought the idea directly to Edward VII, while Admiral C.C.P.
Fitzgerald called for a preemptive strike as well.31 On February 3, 1905, Arthur Lee, First Lord of the
Admiralty, said the Royal Navy would “get its blow in first, before the other side had time even to read
in the papers that war had been declared.”32 British policymakers saw the rapidly expanding German
Navy as a direct threat, comparing it to a new land army amassing on Germany’s borders.33
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Dread of a Copenhagen strike was prevalent in Germany, especially during the first decade of
the twentieth century. The redeployment of British warships pushed by Jackie Fisher in 1904, the AngloFrench Entente, and the destruction of the Russian navy by Britain’s ally Japan all contributed to the
climate of fear.34 In November 1904, Wilhelm II ordered his navy to prepare for a surprise British attack
early the next year – an assault which never came.35 Naval officers were also frightened, with one base
commander sending a secret memo to Tirpitz predicting an imminent British attack. 36 Even opponents of
naval expansion like the influential Foreign Office bureaucrat Friedrich von Holstein feared that a
preemptive British strike would be the first act in a war against Germany.37 In 1907, rumors of a naval
attack created public panic, with citizens running through the streets shouting “Fisher is coming!” 38 In
Kiel, parents kept their children out of school for days in fear of a British assault.39 The biggest impact
that the Copenhagen complex had, however, was on Tirpitz, an anxiety reflected in his extreme caution
with respect to foreign policy, naval expansion, and confronting Britain.40 Oddly enough, the man who
created the key power instrument of Weltpolitik was the most reticent to use it as such.41 In advance of
a proposed 1904 naval expansion, he wrote that
The fact that Germany would in the next four years start building sixteen ships of 18,000 tons
and, further, the realization that England would in the future have to reckon with the presence
of 50-60 first-class German ships of the line would effect such a shift in the actual power factors
that even a calm and understanding English policy must come to the realization that such an
opponent must be knocked down before he has achieved a military strength so dangerous for
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England as a world power. The prospect of war in the next four years before a single one of the
new ships of the line is ready would be greatly increased.42
The father of German naval expansion ended up disliking the belligerent results of the mechanism he set
in motion. He argued against accelerated shipbuilding and even countered the Kaiser himself on the
topic, evoking the fear of Copenhagen as a paramount concern. 43 Tirpitz was so afraid of this possibility
that he worked to slow the pace of Dreadnought construction, something which hampered German
naval strength at the start of war in 1914.44 To Patrick Kelly, Tirpitz was more concerned with protecting
his bureaucratic accomplishments – crafting the Navy Laws and building a blue water fleet – than he was
with their actual use in reality.45 This was a source of serious frustration for the politicians – and the
Kaiser – who desired Weltpolitik for the reasons discussed above. According to Kelly, Tirpitz “was never
very clear as to when the day would come when completion of a navy, supposedly built to support
Weltpolitik, would finally allow Germany to practice Weltpolitik.”46 This irony of the Copenhagen
complex – that its likelihood was driven by German actions – is described well by Paul Kennedy:
That anxiety was motivated not only by the recognition of German Realpolitiker that ‘from their
standpoint the English would be quite right to present us with an ultimatum to reduce our naval
armaments’. Nor was the complex caused solely by the Germans’ fear of being ‘punished for the
audacity of their aspirations’ – for their drive to gain equality with, or possibly the destruction
of, the British Empire. … But, at a time when the Reich leadership was earnestly discussing such
contingencies as the invasion of Denmark, or of France and Belgium, was it also not the case
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that the Germans feared that Britain would do to them what they were thinking of doing to their
own neighbours?47
II. Britain
Fear of imperial decline was never far away in late Victorian and Edwardian Britain. Paul
Kennedy has described a “widespread feeling of Angst [and] an excessive suspicion of perceived foreign
rivals” amidst a disappearance of the “cosmic confidence” of the mid-Victorian age. 48 Despite the
unprecedented expansion in the last decade of the nineteenth century, British imperialists and the
public at large were, in the words of Lawrence James, “tormented by apprehension,” 49 the worry that an
empire without cohesion or momentum would be surpassed by other powers over the course of the
century.50 “Given Away with a Pound of Tea!!!” in Punch on June 28, 1890 depicted Lord Salisbury as a
grocer who accepts a check from a German boy in exchange for a package labeled ‘Hinterland’ and gives
the boy a free gift, labeled ‘Heligoland’, to go along with his purchase (Figure IV in Appendix). 51 The
cartoon was a response to the recent Zanzibar Treaty, in which the strategic North Sea island of
Heligoland was transferred from British to German control.52 Critics saw the treaty as a capitulation to
German blackmail and the ‘free’ transfer of Heligoland was the final straw.53 Indeed, the cartoon was
published before the treaty was ratified, showing how imperial anxieties tended to assume the worst. 54
Prominent British imperialists exhorted people to counter the feeling of decline. “I do not
believe in the degeneracy of our race,” J.A. Froude wrote in 1888, “but we are just now in a moulting

47

Kennedy, Antagonism, 275.
Kennedy, Realities, 59.
49
James, 212-213.
50
Faber, 126.
51
Douglas, 107.
52
Douglas, 108.
53
Ibid.
54
Ibid.
48

103
state and are sick while the process is going on.”55 To Joseph Chamberlain in 1895, Britons were “all
prepared to admire the great Englishmen of the past… but when we come to our own time we seem to
lose the confidence which I think becomes such a great nation as ours.”56 Even Cecil Rhodes wrote in
1891 that “Your people [Englishmen] do not know their greatness; they possess a fifth of the world and
do not know that it is slipping from them.”57 Rudyard Kipling struck this anxious, austere tone in many of
his poems, particularly “Recessional”58, written in Queen Victoria’s 1897 Diamond Jubilee to counter the
jubilant mood as a reminder that hegemony could not be taken for granted59:
Far-called, our navies melt away;
On dune and headland sinks the fire:
Lo, all our pomp of yesterday
Is one with Nineveh and Tyre!
Judge of the Nations, spare us yet,
Lest we forget—lest we forget!60

Kipling was fêted for this warning against imperial hubris, commentators writing that “his ‘Recessional’
on the Jubilee celebration contains only five verses, but … they are worth all the odes that have
appeared on the subject…”61
As with the German Copenhagen complex, historic memories also drove British imperial anxiety;
they even stemmed from the same period – the Napoleonic Wars. The portrayal of Germany as a
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Napoleonic-level concern was common in popular culture from 1880 to 1914. “Setting the Bull-dog Athinking” in the magazine Judy depicted a German-dressed monkey holding flags denoting two of
Germany’s primary colonial interests – Africa and New Guinea – while Bismarck, sitting on a drum
labeled with Napoleon’s ‘N’ monogram, feeds a French poodle meager crumbs and is watched curiously
by a chained British bulldog (Figure V in Appendix).62 This depiction of Bismarck as a Napoleonic figure
who sought to control both Europe and the rest of the world was a sign of imperial anxiety as filtered
through the historic lens. Cecil Spring-Rice claimed that “We are face to face with the same state of
things which existed in Europe under Charles V, Louis XIV and Napoleon. The only issue is either
submission to the dictator or a defensive war.”63 Edward Grey echoed these sentiments in a speech to
representatives of the Dominions, saying:
… if a European conflict, not of our making, arose, in which it was quite clear that the struggle
was one for supremacy in Europe, in fact, that you got back to a situation something like that in
the old Napoleonic days, then … our concern in seeing that there did not arise a supremacy in
Europe which entailed a combination that would deprive us of the command of the sea would
be such that we might have to take part in that European war. That is why the naval position
underlies our European policy.64
The British diplomat Rennell Rodd saw the Anglo-German struggle as implicating the imperial synthesis
of economics and strategy, giving it a world-historical nature:
… the great struggles of the world had always been for the trade and trade routes of the East …
As soon as a nation reached a high commercial and political development she was led into a
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struggle for the routes and ports that command the Eastern trade. It seemed to me Germany
was, perhaps, even to some extent unconsciously, ripening for the contest.65
The best-known example of the British imperial anxiety in action is the popular fiction genre
known as invasion literature. Fears of a surprise invasion had long been a part of the British psyche,
going back to the ill-fated attempts made by the Spanish under Philip II and the French under Napoleon I
in 1588 and 1805, respectively. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, these anxieties
were transferred to Germany. But unlike the Copenhagen Complex, which was mostly felt in German
policy circles, British invasion anxiety penetrated all aspects of society. In 1908, a confidential Invasion
Inquiry set up by the Committee of Imperial Defence called in the former Conservative Prime Minister
Arthur Balfour to discuss the potential for a German invasion.66 Balfour expounded on the subject for an
hour, explaining how a German invasion was infeasible through careful reasoning and data, which totally
satisfied the worries of committee members.67 Although the idea of an invasion was debunked in the
official mind, it ran rampant in the public imagination. According to Lawrence James, the popular
fascination with ‘invasion scares’ was “in part a reflection of the prevailing national mood of uncertainty
and in part fascination with the new technology … which was being developed for military purposes.” 68
For some, including Henry James, invasion fears verged on paranoia; James, when staying in Rye on the
southern English coast in 1909, wrote to a friend that he felt “exposed” and feared that “when the
German Emperor carries the next war into this country, my chimney pots, visible to a certain distance
out at sea, may be his very first objective.”69
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The idea of a German invasion cropped up far before the turn of the twentieth century, with its
debut coming in the 1871 novel The Battle of Dorking by George Tomkyns Chesney.70 This book, written
just as Germany was unifying and before it established a navy, was serialized in Blackwood’s Magazine
and caused a major stir in the public, impacting actual defense plans.71 Given the intense public
response to the German invasion threat when Germany had no navy, it is no wonder that it became
even more rancorous when a large German navy was constructed. The rash of invasion novels after
1900 was immense, and all dealt with Germany as the prime threat to the British homeland. Many of
these works were serialized in the press, reaching a wide readership across class lines; Lord Northcliffe’s
Daily Mail was a major publisher, something which dovetailed with Northcliffe’s Germanophobia.72 The
novels reflected genuine public concerns grounded in some level of reality. The German battlefleet was
growing rapidly, it was oriented against England, and many Germans spoke openly of Der Tag – the Day
of Reckoning with Britain.73 Of course, the authors exaggerated these fears, but examining the novels
can inform us about how the public thought at the time.
Three of these books are worth touching on in brief, while two others deserve deeper scrutiny.
Consider first the 1909 P.G. Wodehouse parody The Swoop! Or, How Clarence Saved England: A Tale of
the Great Invasion. This humorous work is a send-up of popular invasion tales, touching on a wide
variety of tropes which appear in many of them.74 Wodehouse took the invasion story to its extreme,
writing that “England was not merely beneath the heel of the invader. It was beneath the heels of nine
invaders. There was barely standing-room.”75 He also satirized the public reaction to the invasions, as his
British public saw the invasions as just another “Silly Season” entertainment to be debated and critiqued
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in the press.76 The book’s hero, Clarence Chugwater, is the stereotype of an English Boy Scout: overly
patriotic, melodramatic, always alert to danger (real or perceived), and cleverer than he looks.77
Wodehouse skewered all sides of the debate, poking fun at the public for its obsession and at the
jingoists who always seemed to fear the worst. H.H. Munro, also known as Saki, published When William
Came: A Story of London Under the Hohenzollerns, in November 1913.78 This work is less a satire of
invasion literature as it is a critique of pre-war British high society more generally; Saki is brutal in
lambasting the elite class for its preoccupation with entertainment after a German takeover of
England.79 In his telling, these upper crust socialites would be far more interested in impressing the
Kaiser at a private gathering than they would in trying to restore British freedom. To Saki, as long as the
entertainments were allowed to continue, the German overlords of Britain would remain safe and
secure. He also attacks those rhetorical patriots “who had never handled a rifle or mounted a horse or
pulled an oar, but who had never flinched from demolishing his country’s enemies with his tongue.” 80
One of his main characters states that “England has never had any lack of patriots of that type… so many
patriots and so little patriotism.”81 Still, Saki holds out some hope for a British future, seeing the youth of
the nation as the bulwark against complacency and invasion. In the story, a British family living in exile in
the Balkans chooses a harder life away from their native land solely to claim their own version of
freedom: the proud flying of the British flag.82 Saki also puts these strong martial sentiments into the
mouth of another character, a young clergyman in England, who is portrayed positively as a man of God,
but not one of peace.83 In a potential example of the author’s own feelings being exhibited by a
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character, the clergyman says “I have learned one thing in life… and that is that peace is not for this
world. Peace is what God gives us when He takes us into His rest. Beat your sword into a ploughshare if
you like, but beat your enemy into smithereens first.”84 For Saki, and many other writers of invasion
literature, this message was the key to ensuring the long-term security and predominance of Britain on
the world stage.
The most interesting example of invasion literature from the war period is John Buchan’s classic
novel The Thirty-Nine Steps. Published in 1915, the book showed that British audiences still had ‘spy
fever’.85 It tells the story of Richard Hannay, a normal man who stumbles into a German invasion plot
and, after several harrowing adventures, helps to foil it at the last minute.86 Hannay – a Scottish-born
South African who served in the Boer War – was a typical product of the Empire who linked Britain to
the Dominions in his person; this was a key choice that demonstrated the importance of the imperial
relationship. Given Hannay’s immense popularity and return in several later novels, the public embraced
this depiction of British imperial strength.
The most influential examples of invasion literature were William Le Queux’s The Invasion of
1910 and Erskine Childers’s The Riddle of the Sands. Le Queux’s book, serialized in the Daily Mail in
1906, was the most popular invasion story of the era, selling two million copies worldwide after being
translated into several languages – including German.87 The book describes a fictional German invasion
in minute detail, down to the specific roads, routes, battlefields, and materiel that would be involved.
According to the author, this was the product of a 10,000-mile reconnoitering of the whole of the
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English countryside from the Tyne to the Thames.88 Despite being fictional, this is as much a work of
military planning and tactics as it is a popular novel. Indeed, censoring it was seriously debated by
Parliament.89 In his own words, Le Queux wrote The Invasion of 1910 “to illustrate our utter
unpreparedness for war, to show how, under certain conditions which may easily occur, England can be
successfully invaded by Germany, and to present a picture of the ruin which must inevitably fall upon us
on the evening of that not far-distant day.”90 The book was intended as a warning to the public and the
government to shore up Britain’s defenses, largely along the lines that Lord Roberts espoused in his
address to the House of Lords on July 10, 1906.91 In that debate, Roberts said that:
I endeavoured to explain that while our very existence depends upon our being supreme at sea,
the defence, not only of the Empire, but of these islands, cannot be entrusted to the Navy alone;
and moreover, that the maintenance of our sea-power necessitates our being able to control on
land what may be called the sinews of sea-power. In other words, that the military forces of the
Crown must be constituted, organised, and trained in such a way as will ensure their being able
to take their full share in the defence of the Empire. 92
Le Queux’s book was meant to bolster these ideas in the spirit of deterrence: “To be weak is to invite
war; to be strong is to prevent it.”93 He brings up Lord Roberts repeatedly, claiming that had he been
listened to, the invasion would not have the successes it did before finally being defeated. 94 He also
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writes, at the end of a chapter entitled “The Rain of Death”, about the failure of English society to
prepare for what he saw as inevitable: “London—the proud capital of the world, the ‘home’ of the
Englishman—was at last ground beneath the iron heel of Germany! And all, alas! due to one cause
alone—the careless insular apathy of the Englishman himself!”95
Other imperial anxieties – many reflective of the imperial synthesis – can be found in Le Queux’s
work. Le Queux has his invaders focus on commandeering, sabotaging, or destroying infrastructure. The
Germans interrupt telegraph lines, sabotage railways, and use commercial vessels to block ports and
transport troops and materiel.96 Themes of economic integration leading to calamity are rife in the
pages of The Invasion of 1910, as is the fear of German hyper-competence and the use of purportedly
non-military vessels and infrastructure for military purposes.97 Also revealing are the sentiments and
demands that Le Queux puts in the mouths of his German characters, as they tell us something of the
capacities and concerns associated in the British mind with Germany. One such example comes in his
description of the German demands after the fall of London:
They were as follows:— 1. Indemnity of £300,000,000, paid in ten annual instalments. 2. Until
this indemnity is paid in full, German troops to occupy Edinburgh, Rosyth, Chatham, Dover,
Portsmouth, Devonport, Pembroke, Yarmouth, Hull. 3. Cession to Germany of the Shetlands,
Orkneys, Bantry Bay, Malta, Gibraltar, and Tasmania. 4. India, north of a line drawn from
Calcutta to Baroda, to be ceded to Russia. 5. The independence of Ireland to be recognised. Of
the claim of £300,000,000, fifty millions was demanded from London, the sum in question to be
paid within twelve hours.98
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These extremely high demands show that many Englishmen feared that Germany was indeed trying to
displace Britain as the global hegemon, even going so far as to take key defensive and coaling stations
for naval purposes and stationing troops at important British ports. It also reveals the anxieties around
other imperial possessions, including Ireland and India, both of which are manipulated here for German
interests. Just as revelatory are the words written by the German commander General Von Kleppen in
his diary as London fights back and Germany is forced to revise its plans:
We are completely deceived. Our position, much as we are attempting to conceal it, is a very
grave one. We believed that if we reached London the British spirit would be broken. Yet the
more drastic our rule, the fiercer becomes the opposition. How it will end I fear to contemplate.
The British are dull and apathetic, but once aroused, they fight like fiends. … I confess I am
greatly surprised at the valiant stand made everywhere by the Londoners. Last night they fought
to the very end.99
This passage shows the heart of Le Queux’s message: that although Britain was underprepared for a
German invasion, even verging on the indifferent, it would come together and fight for King and Country
once the danger was understood. This ultimately hopeful message, preceded by hundreds of pages of
the brutal sacking of England by Germany, demonstrates the resilience Le Queux saw at the heart of
British national identity; his book was meant to waken this spirit before it was too late.
The most important work of invasion literature is Erskine Childers’s 1903 classic The Riddle of
the Sands. It is a tale of two Englishmen on holiday in the fjords of Schleswig on the north German coast
who discover, investigate, and ultimately foil a planned German invasion of Britain which would have
focused heavily on dual-use maritime infrastructure like canals and commercial shipping vessels. 100 The
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novel was the product of years of research, as Childers essentially became an amateur spy, growing
suspicious of the intentions of Germany after his service in the Boer War. 101 He sailed the coasts of
Germany, carefully noting important canals and railways, many of which appear in the story. 102 The
Sheffield Daily Telegraph praised it as a book “that deserves to be widely read, and, moreover, is one
that cannot fail to attract attention in high quarters.”103 And attract official attention it did; after its
publication, the First Lord of the Admiralty ordered an investigation of the feasibility of such a plan. 104 As
in The Invasion of 1910, Germans are described as extremely competent and focused on a scheme
“under which every advantage, moral, material, and geographical, possessed by Germany, is utilised to
the utmost, and every disadvantage of our own turned to account against us.” 105 Childers writes that the
German plan is built on two principles – perfect organization and perfect secrecy – which, although
seemingly impossible to achieve, were viewed as well within German capabilities.106 The depiction of
German strengths can tell a great deal about the concerns Britain had towards its rising rival:
She has a great army (a mere fraction of which would suffice) in a state of high efficiency, but a
useless weapon, as against us, unless transported over seas. She has a peculiar genius for
organisation, not only in elaborating minute detail, but in the grasp of a coherent whole. She
knows the art of giving a brain to a machine, of transmitting power to the uttermost cog-wheel,
and at the same time of concentrating responsibility in a supreme centre. She has a small navy,
but very effective for its purpose, built, trained, and manned on methodical principles, for
defined ends, and backed by an inexhaustible reserve of men from her maritime conscription.
She studies and practises co-operation between her army and navy. Her hands are free for
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offence in home waters, since she has no distant network of coveted colonies and dependencies
on which to dissipate her defensive energies. Finally, she is, compared with ourselves,
economically independent, having commercial access through her land frontiers to the whole of
Europe. She has little to lose and much to gain.107
This portrayal of German motives and strengths was alarmist, but not wholly inaccurate, as we have
seen. It speaks to a British perception of Germany as simultaneously admirable (for efficiency and
industry) and threatening (to the imperial synthesis that kept the British Empire in its hegemonic
position).108 The vision of Germany as a rival that implicated both the economic-security synthesis and
British naval power was espoused in a long monologue by one of the English protagonists, Davies:
“Here’s this huge empire, stretching half over central Europe—an empire growing like wildfire, I
believe, in people, and wealth, and everything. They’ve licked the French, and the Austrians, and
are the greatest military power in Europe. I wish I knew more about all that, but what I’m
concerned with is their sea-power. It’s a new thing with them, but it’s going strong, and that
Emperor of theirs is running it for all it’s worth. He’s a splendid chap, and anyone can see he’s
right. They’ve got no colonies to speak of, and must have them, like us. They can’t get them and
keep them, and they can’t protect their huge commerce without naval strength. The command
of the sea is the thing nowadays, isn’t it? I say, don’t think these are my ideas,” he added,
naïvely. “It’s all out of Mahan and those fellows. Well, the Germans have got a small fleet at
present, but it’s a thundering good one, and they’re building hard.” 109
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Admiration and antagonism: such was the British attitude to Germany in the Edwardian period. The
British heroes Davies and Carruthers often talk of the failure of the British government to prepare for
the threat, but they combine this with their ultimate faith in the British people to do what needs to be
done to remain free.110 Davies says:
We’re a maritime nation—we’ve grown by the sea and live by it; if we lose command of it we
starve. We’re unique in that way, just as our huge empire, only linked by the sea, is unique. And
yet, read Brassey, Dilke, and those Naval Annuals, and see what mountains of apathy and
conceit have had to be tackled. It’s not the people’s fault. We’ve been safe so long, and grown
so rich, that we’ve forgotten what we owe it to. But there’s no excuse for those blockheads of
statesmen, as they call themselves, who are paid to see things as they are. 111
Other anxieties that are reflected in the pages of Childers’s novel include the fear of fifth columnists
working either behind British lines or directly for the enemy. One of the villains of the story is Dollmann,
a former British naval officer who has joined up with the Germans, using his knowledge of England’s
hydrography and military dispositions to help plan the invasion.112 Fear of traitors and treachery was
commonplace in invasion literature and helped spark the spy scares that racked London and other cities
in the early twentieth century. The primary concern seen in Childers’s work, however, is the threat of
dual-use technology and infrastructure, which exemplifies the imperial synthesis in action. In the eyes of
Englishmen, British power was for protection of commerce, while German commerce was often used as
a front for the protection and advancement of German power. The mirror-image nature of the German
threat exacerbated British imperial anxiety, something clearly seen in the invasion literature genre.
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Part III – Infrastructure: The Sinews of Peace, the Sinews of War
“To the man of business the cable is primarily an aid to ten per cent; to the statesman thinking of
international complications it is the handmaid of Diplomacy; to the Imperialist it is a symbol of the pride
and majesty of race. … But there is another aspect of the cable – its strategic value in time of war.”1
- The Courier of Dundee, March 8, 1904
Although they seem banal, ports, canals, railways, and telegraphs made empires.2 To historian
Peter Christensen, “the economic, social, and cultural systems of empires are guided by and given form
and purpose through” infrastructure, including maritime, railway, and telecommunications projects.3
Kipling wrote of the importance of roads in his story “Judson and the Empire” in 1893: “They had built
no roads. Their towns were rotting under their hands; they had no trade worth the freight of a crazy
steamer; and their sovereignty ran almost one musket-shot inland when things were peaceful.” 4
Infrastructure lay at the heart of imperial control, economic success, and military power. 5 These
advances in transport and communications between 1880 and 1914 enabled the drastic reduction in
transaction costs and expansion of trade that powered the global economy and linked imperial
metropoles with their colonial possessions.6 “It is no coincidence,” Christensen explains, “that
infrastructures are often likened to the veins, nodes, and capillaries of organic bodies: they are the stuff
of life.”7 Infrastructure was not only the lifeblood of empire, but also of imperial competition. There is
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no better example than infrastructure – namely maritime, railway, and telecommunications projects –
to get at the heart of the Anglo-German strategic-economic rivalry and how it led to total war.
Chapter VI: Maritime Infrastructure – Canals, Ports, and Dual-Use Shipping
Maritime infrastructure was a major domain of competition between Britain and Germany,
reflecting the importance of global trade and navalist ideologies in the years between 1880 and 1914. In
the case of maritime projects, German developments were the most important factor in accelerating
mutual hostility. Merchant shipping and port and construction infrastructure demonstrated the rise of
Germany as a commercial and strategic threat to British hegemony. Canals also bred Anglo-German
conflict, especially the Kaiser Wilhelm Ship Canal – better known as the Kiel Canal. Taken together, these
commercial-strategic infrastructures helped to totalize Anglo-German rivalry.
I. Dual-Use Merchant Shipping and Port Infrastructure
Naval rivalry and related competition in merchant shipping were key drivers of the AngloGerman antagonism in the pre-war era. Mahanian navalist ideology was embraced across both societies,
linking economic development and trade with military power and the ability to project force across the
world.8 By 1870, Britain was the leading power in terms of commercial shipping and port infrastructure,
with significant tonnage in merchant vessels and bustling ports in Asia, Africa, and South America. 9 This
merchant tonnage only grew after the turn of the twentieth century, rising from just over seven million
tons in 1900 to more than eleven million tons in 1913.10 The expansion was not happening in a vacuum,
however. After the devastation of its shipping in the Napoleonic Wars and a slow recovery in the years
leading to 1850, Germany was rapidly establishing itself as a major player in the commercial maritime
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sector.11 Hamburg, an historic center of trade and seagoing commerce, was indicative of this trend. In
1850 it had only nine steamships with less than three thousand tons of capacity, while in 1898 it had
nearly four hundred steamers with over five hundred thousand tons of capacity. 12 Passenger transport
was a huge, and increasingly important, part of this revitalized industry, with the Hamburg-America Line
(HAPAG) and Norddeutscher Lloyd (NDL) becoming two of the largest companies of this type in the
world.13 These companies were boosted significantly by government subsidies, which paid them to take
routes that were strategically important, but unprofitable, passing through the Mediterranean to the
Dutch East Indies, German New Guinea, Australia, Ceylon, and China.14 By 1900, Germany became a
threat to British merchant marine dominance, counting no fewer than three thousand five hundred
vessels with a capacity of well over one-and-a-half million tons; it also had a world-leading twenty-two
steamships with capacity of over ten thousand tons each.15 The German merchant marine was not
merely a danger to Britain’s market power, but to its imperial security as well. The influential professor
Ernst von Halle studied the links between commercial shipping and navies, and was a prime advocate for
the dual-use of the merchant marine.16 He saw it as a valuable training ground and reservoir of
manpower for conscription in the case of war, giving Germany an extra forty-five thousand competent
reserves.17 More importantly, these large, modern ships could be repurposed for military use as coalers,
troop transports, or even armored auxiliary cruisers meant to raid enemy commerce.18 General
Bernhardi was a proponent of these tactics, writing:
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Besides the campaign against the enemy's war-fleet, preparations must be carefully made in
peace-time for the war on commerce, which would be especially effective in a struggle against
England, as that country needs imports more than any other. … It is all the more imperative to
organize our preparations in such a way that the swift ships intended for the commercial war
should be able to reach their scene of activity unexpectedly before the enemy has been able to
block our harbours. The auxiliary cruisers must be so equipped in peace-time that when on the
open sea they may assume the character of warships at a moment's notice, when ordered by
wireless telegraphy to do so.19
That commercial vessels would be used by Germany in a military capacity was seen by the British as
increasingly likely. William Le Queux in The Invasion of 1910 described20 the commercial raiding carried
out by former passenger vessels.21 Erskine Childers in The Riddle of the Sands, envisioned a fleet of
purportedly-private barges that would be filled with troops and towed across the English Channel by
powerful tugboats.22
This growth of the German merchant marine was made possible by the infrastructure which
surrounded it, especially ports and construction yards. These projects were also used by the German
navy, in a prime example of the commercial-strategic synthesis in action. Concurrent with the rise in
tonnage was an increase in construction and repair capacity, improved dredging of harbors,
reinforcement of coastal areas against the elements, and modernization of dock facilities.23 Construction
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yards became a particular issue in the Anglo-German antagonism, as their expansion spoke to
accelerated German shipbuilding in both military and economic spheres. Britain experienced one of
many so-called ‘naval scares’ in August and September 1906 based on reports of secret German
construction and expanded dockyards.24 Although these rumors were dispelled by semi-official articles
in publications like the Naval and Military Record, the fear of clandestine German capacity would return
a few years later.25 In winter 1908, rumors spread in Britain of accelerated production of German naval
armaments meant to hasten the construction of warships. 26 The Admiralty concluded – erroneously –
that Germany had the ability to surpass British Dreadnought construction and erase the Royal Navy’s
advantage in this most modern warship class.27 These estimates were based on several pieces of
information gathered over the course of 1908: that a number of important German shipyards had
expanded in size, that the armaments company Krupp had grown its capacity by thirty percent and
covertly purchased large quantities of nickel used in armor plating, and that German naval estimates
were significantly higher in 1909 than in previous years.28 Some shipyards had also begun stockpiling
raw materials for naval vessels in advance of publicly-announced government orders. 29 Each of these
tidbits was interpreted in the worst possible way, leading the Admiralty vastly to overestimate the pace
and secrecy of German naval expansion and to compensate with a massive jump in British
shipbuilding.30 Instead of authorizing four new Dreadnoughts in 1909, eight were authorized for that
year.31 Going forward, the Admiralty would base its plans on Germany’s potential shipbuilding capacity
instead of its published program, leading to an acceleration of the naval race.32 This misinterpretation of
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German maritime infrastructure was a serious exacerbating factor in the Anglo-German naval race, and
thus the broader antagonism.
Merchant vessels and warships alike needed port infrastructure to reach their potential; in an
era of Weltpolitik, this was not limited to Germany’s home waters. Germany’s search for secure,
strategic, and economically-viable ports in both the Atlantic and Pacific contributed to its rivalry with
Britain. One of the main theaters of competition in the Pacific was China, a vast space slowly being
carved apart economically and territorially by European powers.33 Britain and Germany were the main
economic beneficiaries of the Chinese market, with Britain firmly in the lead.34 In 1895, British tonnage
clearing Chinese ports was over twenty million, while Germany came in second with a mere two
million.35 This dominance was also reflected in the number of firms from each country operating in
China: Germany had ninety-two, while Britain had three hundred sixty-one. 36 After the Japanese victory
in the Sino-Japanese War and the resulting 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki which transferred Chinese
territory to Japan, Germany sought its own territorial concessions.37 A German-owned Chinese port
would reduce dependence on English and Japanese ports for repairs, coaling, and trade, while also
providing a base for Germany’s new East Asia Cruiser Division.38 There were several potential options up
and down the Chinese coast, each with advantages and disadvantages; the naval officer sent to research
and recommend a port was none other than Alfred Tirpitz.39 After showing the flag around coastal
China, Tirpitz and Germany settled on Kiaochow Bay and the nearby town of Tsingtao as the best
candidate.40 The region was seized in mid-1896 and became the center of German activity in Asia over
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the coming decades.41 Germany then invested heavily in port and inland infrastructure meant to
maximize the potential of its slice of China, unlocking its economic capacity and natural resources such
as coal and other minerals.42 Experts like Hermann Schumacher would advocate for railway construction
to link mines to harbors, and for the reestablishment of canals to bring products to market and tap the
economic potential of inland China.43
Now that Germany had established an Asian foothold to go along with its African colonies, the
need for maritime infrastructure – coaling stations, harbors, and landings for undersea cables 44 – to link
the two was crucial.45 Also needed was territory in the Pacific which would allow Germany to connect its
Asian holdings to its interests in South America; Samoa was targeted as the best location for this Pacific
stopover.46 As we have seen, this created a flashpoint between the Germans, British, and Americans, all
of whom had designs on Samoa; one in which the Germans would lose out to a combined AngloAmerican effort. Germany also sought ports in the Atlantic, causing further friction with Britain. The
main example of this came in Morocco, where the Agadir crisis unfolded in 1911. This crisis materialized
for a variety of reasons, one being Germany’s attempt to procure a large naval and commercial foothold
on the North African coast.47 Germany underestimated the British response, thinking that it would not
mind if another power established a port in non-British territory; in fact, this was unacceptable to Britain
and backfired on Germany, leading to a closer binding of the Triple Entente and no German port in
Morocco.48
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II. Canals
Canals, a major type of infrastructure since ancient times, remained relevant through the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, their impact on the Anglo-German rivalry significant, as was
their importance to each nation. Canals reflected the synthesis of strategy and commerce that drove
British and German imperialism. The critical canals with respect to the Anglo-German relationship were
in Germany, but the most meaningful canal to either country – and in the world more broadly – was in
Egypt. That land was long within the British orbit, but it was nominally independent in the midnineteenth century under its leader, the Khedive, and jointly concerned the French as well. 49 The key to
Egypt’s strategic and economic importance was the Suez Canal, opened in 1869 by the French and
purchased in large part by the British under Disraeli in 1875.50 The Canal was Britain’s lifeline to India
and the growing trade of the Far East51, allowing ships in the Mediterranean to avoid the long route
around the Cape and cut significant time off the voyage.52 Being Britain’s largest tangible interest in
Egypt, it was the stated rationale behind their 1882 military intervention to restore the Khedive, who
had been deposed the year earlier.53 Under Arabi, the new power in Egypt, disorder and anti-European
rioting exploded in Alexandria and began to spread to other major ports; although the epicenter was far
from the Suez Canal, British Prime Minister Gladstone stated that “the safety of the canal will not coexist
with illegality and military violence in Egypt.”54 British popular feeling – and the volatility which worried
investors and traders – swelled on the issue of the Canal, bolstering the case for the intervention which
resulted in the occupation of Egypt through the Great War.55
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After this operation which made Lord Cromer effective ruler of Egypt, British military policy
focused on the role of the Suez Canal in wartime, balancing economic, diplomatic, and strategic
concerns. A Cabinet Committee report of November 4, 1882 – just after the evacuation of all but an
occupation force from Egypt – dealt with these issues, exploring options to neutralize the canal, close it
to vessels from belligerent countries, or just to close it to warships.56 The report also touched on the
possibility that an enemy might attempt to destroy or block the canal for “the object of inflicting a blow
on Great Britain, which, of all the Maritime Powers, derives by far the greatest benefit from its use.” 57
The importance of the Suez Canal in wartime was mentioned by William Le Queux in The Invasion of
1910, but the power closing it was Britain:
The British Admiralty had decided to evacuate the Mediterranean and leave Egypt to its fate.
Orders were given to block the Suez Canal, and though this act was an obvious infraction of
international law, it elicited only mild protests from the Powers, which anxiously hoped for a
British victory in the war. The protests were formal, and it was intimated that there was no
intention of supporting them by force, provided the British Government would defray the loss
caused by its action to neutral shipping.58
From the early 1880s, Egypt became a prime factor in British world policy, largely due to the critical
nature of the Suez Canal.59 This strategic position, and its diplomatic precarity, would be used against
the British by Germany until the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale of 1904.60 Bismarck would wield his
“baton Egyptien” to great effect in the 1880s, cajoling Gladstone into colonial concessions in 1884 by
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threatening an international investigation into British actions in Egypt and Sudan. 61 The Berlin
Conference of 1884 was Bismarck’s reward, where he cobbled together a colonial empire across Asia
and Africa solely on the strength of the Egyptian lever.62 He would again apply this tactic of using
Britain’s vulnerability in Egypt – and ties to the Suez Canal – against Salisbury later in the decade. In an
October 2, 1886 letter, Edward Malet, British Ambassador to Germany, described a conversation he had
with Bismarck on the topic of German interests in Zanzibar in which Bismarck threatened to support
French claims in Egypt if his colonial demands elsewhere were not met.63 As we saw earlier, Germany
diplomacy often felt like blackmail to their British counterparts. This was no different. Malet’s letter
ends with a statement on “the great importance which Prince Bismarck attached to the question and
the intimate relation which it bore to the general question of the relations between Britain and
Germany.”64 These diplomatic games negatively impacting the Anglo-German relationship all came back
to the issue of the Suez Canal.
Canals in Germany were an even more serious exacerbating factor on that nation’s rivalry
with the British Empire. They were seen as such by observers and politicians in both countries, even
making it into popular culture. In The Riddle of the Sands, Erskine Childers often dwells on German
canals, sometimes praising them for their size, proper functioning, and efficiency,65 sometimes decrying
them as part of a nefarious plot against England, frequently describing how warships, merchant vessels,
and private yachts all passed through the same routes between the North Sea and the Baltic. 66 Strategic
canals disguised as commercial waterways play a key role in the plot of the novel, as the German plan
for an invasion of Britain relies on the secrecy and plausible deniability they provided. 67 Childers’s
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version of this plan focused on the natural hydrography of the German North Sea coast near the
Netherlands – the protected bay known as the Jade which would become a station for the German High
Seas fleet in World War I – and the potential for canalizing the natural channels in the area to allow for
better maritime mobility.68 The shores of the Jade were linked by railway with major German cities,
army bases, and supply depots, all of which would allow for a rapid mobilization in the event an invasion
of England were to be undertaken.69 Although this was a work of fiction, it was based on the author’s
actual investigations and travel, and reflected the importance of canals to Germany’s strategic posture.
The most important canal for the German imperial synthesis, and thus the Anglo-German
antagonism, was the Kaiser Wilhelm Ship Canal, also known as the Kiel Canal. Linking the Baltic and
North Seas directly through German territory, it allowed ships to bypass the dangerous – and easily
blockaded – waters around the Skagerrak, the strait separating Denmark from Norway that served as
the natural passage between the seas.70 A German-owned shipping canal project, large enough to
accommodate warships, was begun at Kiel under the Canal Construction Act passed by the Reichstag in
1886.71 The foundation stone was laid by Kaiser Wilhelm I himself, a few months before his death in
March 1888, cementing the national and imperial significance of the project.72 This was a joint militarycommercial venture from the start, benefiting both economic interests in major German ports like
Hamburg, as well as the nation’s strategic position.73 The canal’s strategic significance in the case of a
war against the Triple Entente was laid out by Bernhardi:
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The participation of Russia in the naval war must also be contemplated. That is the less
dangerous, since the Russian Baltic fleet is at present still weak, and cannot combine so easily as
the English with the French. We could operate against it on the inner line—i.e., we could use the
opportunity of uniting rapidly our vessels in the Baltic by means of the Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal; we
could attack the Russian ships in vastly superior force, and, having struck our blow, we could
return to the North Sea.74
The ability to operate a multifront operation while using interior lines of passage was a major advantage
in any naval war against the Triple Entente, giving Germany the edge against the fleets of France and
Russia.75
The critical position of the Kiel Canal would only increase as the Anglo-German rivalry –
especially the naval arms race – intensified. The main issue with respect to the canal would come after
1905, when the British began construction on the Dreadnought.76 The size and scale of these ships, and
the new battle cruisers which followed them, necessitated “a complete, and extremely expensive,
overhaul of existing German canals, ports, and shipbuilding facilities.”77 Tirpitz and his acolytes saw
these new warships as directly targeting Germany; in reality, the Admiralty based its plans for the
Dreadnought on naval developments in Japan and the United States, each of which was considering
larger vessels.78 German navalists, including Tirpitz, believed that Britain only began to build
Dreadnoughts to force Germany into widening the Kiel Canal and revamping its existing maritime
infrastructure – a ruinously expensive and politically-fraught process drawing resources away from the
task of building ships.79 Canal politics had long been an issue in Germany, causing Tirpitz trouble in 1899
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when he attempted to pass a canal expansion bill before his major Navy Law; this was defeated after
months of deliberation and nearly fractured the Sammlungspolitik alliance.80 Tirpitz feared a repeat of
this debacle, one which would – this time – cause a permanent break and a destruction of his naval
program.81 Fortunately for him, the Reichstag was wrangled into approving an expansion of the Kaiser
Wilhelm Canal in 1907 at the cost of ten million pounds.82
Still, the expansion would not be completed until 1914 at the earliest, leaving Germany
vulnerable and without the critical interior lines it would need to fight a two-front naval war. 83 This
presented serious problems for German naval planners, who were also dealing with the strategic
challenge presented by a rapidly expanding British navy.84 In addition, planners had to prepare to
defend the Kiel Canal, which was already Germany’s maritime highway and a critical facilitator of its
worldwide trade.85 There was not unanimity within the Reichsmarineamt or the political classes as to
how to direct naval spending in the years of the Dreadnought race and canal expansion. 86 Some,
including Tirpitz, pushed for a Novelle and more construction of Dreadnoughts and fast battle cruisers,
while others feared imminent conflict with Britain and prioritized completion of the canal expansion. 87
Others, like Bernhardi, pushed even farther, promoting new canal infrastructure that would serve
military and economic purposes and make the Kiel Canal less of a strategic bottleneck:
The rapid completion of the Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal is of great importance, in order that our
largest men-of-war may appear unexpectedly in the Baltic or in the North Sea. But it does not
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meet all military requirements. It is a question whether it is not expedient to obtain secure
communication by a canal between the mouth of the Ems, the Bay of Jade, and the mouth of
the Elbe, in order to afford our fleet more possibilities of concentration. All three waters form a
sally-port in the North Sea, and it would be certainly a great advantage if our battleships could
unexpectedly unite in these three places. I cannot give any opinion as to the feasibility of this
scheme. If it is feasible, we ought to shirk no sacrifices to realize it. Such a canal might prove of
decisive value, since our main prospect of success depends on our ability to break up the forces
of the enemy by continuous unexpected attacks, and on our thus finding an opportunity to
inflict heavy losses upon him.88
The addition of such large ships to the German navy created issues around where to base the fleet,
bringing up questions of wartime strategy and politics. In the pre-Dreadnought age, the fleet’s largest
vessels could easily pass between the North and Baltic seas by using the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal; now,
until the canal was expanded, these ships could only make that passage by sailing around Jutland in
Denmark, making themselves vulnerable to attack.89 If the fleet were to be based at Kiel, on the Baltic
coast, Germany would be in essence surrendering its North Sea ports to a British blockade; if it was
based at Wilhelmshaven on the North Sea side, it would show that the German fleet was indeed
directed against Britain.90 Wilhelm II made the final choice, basing the High Seas Fleet in Wilhelmshaven
and contributing to the sense of distrust and hostility in Britain.91 These British feelings were expressed
in the press, with dire predictions being made for the state of geopolitics upon the completion the Kiel

88

Bernhardi, 187.
Kelly, 361.
90
Kelly, 361-362.
91
Kelly, 362.
89

129
Canal.92 In a 1912 article in Pearson’s Weekly making predictions for the year 1915, the re-opening of
the canal played an important part:
What this means to Germany has never been fully understood by the British nation. The Kiel
Canal will give Germany a secure passage, from the Baltic to the North Sea, for her warships.
They will thus be kept free from all possibility of attack by shell, mine, or torpedo, while they
concentrate at a point only a few hours’ steaming distance from the north-east coast of England.
By that time Germany will possess a fleet which will be almost as strong as our own. … And we
have a vastly larger coastline and enormously bigger possessions to defend. … Unquestionably
Germany will strike for world supremacy when a favourable moment arrives, and the likeliest
time is in 1915.93
The author was only a year off in his prediction, as the canal was completed in the summer of 1914. 94 In
fact, the re-opening was scheduled for 1914’s Kiel Week – a celebration of German navalism akin to the
British regattas at Cowes.95 Some British representatives accepted the Kaiser’s invitation to participate
in this event, and various Royal Navy ships were dispatched to show good faith in an increasingly-tense
period.96 On June 25, 1914, these British ships joined with their German counterparts in firing a salute to
welcome the passage of the Kaiser’s yacht Hohenzollern through the canal.97 The festivities continued
throughout the week, but were cut short by an ironic twist of fate. Only three days after the public show
of Anglo-German amity, during a luncheon Tirpitz held for his British guests, news came in of the
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assassination of the Austro-Hungarian heir, Archduke Franz Ferdinand. 98 Little did either party know that
the two nations would be at war just over a month later, but it is certainly a historic coincidence that
one of the prime drivers of the Anglo-German antagonism – the Kiel Canal and its relation to German
naval expansion – was also the center of European attention when the precipitating event of the Great
War occurred. If anything, it shines a light on the importance of maritime infrastructure for the AngloGerman rivalry and how it helped lead to total war.
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Chapter VII: Imperial Railways
Railways were the most important form of infrastructure in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, linking economic and strategic concerns in Europe and across the world. As such,
they were also a locus of the rising Anglo-German conflict, as each empire saw railways as crucial to
global development, imperial power, and commercial success. The British, having invented the modern
railroad in the early nineteenth century1, placed importance on railways as tools of civilization and
necessary for the development and promotion of its empire.2 Railways not only expanded the
commercial horizons of the Empire, but also showed that its Dominions could support significant,
continuous settlement on the same lines as British society at home.3 The reimagination of Empire in the
Victorian age as a tightly-linked chain that was an extension of Britain proper was driven partly by the
railway boom between 1880 and 1914.4 German conceptions of empire also revolved around railways as
a powerful economic-strategic tool. Given Germany’s late start in the imperial scramble, it was
paramount that its limited possessions were made as profitable and strategically-valuable as possible;
railways were key to this, vital to raising the Kultur, economic development, and commercial potential of
colonies.5 The development of railways played into the German self-conception as a technologically and
scientifically advanced nation and promoted that role overseas; railways played an important part in the
unification of Germany, and now they were being made to play that same role with respect to its
empire.6 Railways were particularly important for the Anglo-German rivalry in several regions, from
Latin America and Africa to the Near East. Before exploring some of these specific projects in detail, it is
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useful to better understand the critical role railways played in the imperial synthesis adopted by each
nation.
I. The Background
Railways built between 1880 and 1914 differed widely in gauge size7, construction materials,
revenue structures, and accompanying facilities. But what differentiated them most – and was critical to
the rise of the Anglo-German rivalry – was the purpose for which they were built. The early-twentiethcentury railway historian Edwin Pratt puts railways into three main categories based on their primary
purpose: commercial, military, and strategic.8 Commercial railways made up the vast majority of world
railways, used primarily for goods or passenger transport; military railways served the purpose their
name suggests.9 The uses of those railways could overlap – commercial railways could ferry troops in
times of need, while military railways might be used occasionally for civilian aims – but they fell into
those classifications due to their initial intended function.10 Pratt separates strategic railways into their
own category, as they, unlike commercial or military railways, were intended to serve as dual-use
infrastructure:
While designed partly, mainly, or, it may be, exclusively, to serve military purposes, strategical
railways, unlike military railways proper, form part of the ordinary railway system of the country
in which they are built. They approximate to commercial lines in construction, equipment and
operation, and they are worked in connection with them for the ordinary purposes of trade and
travel; though in their case any considerations as to whether the traffic they carry is
remunerative does not arise, provided only that they are capable of fulfilling their real
7
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purpose—that, namely, of ensuring such military transports as may, sooner or later, be required
of them.11
These strategic railways need not be very useful in peacetime, as long as they provided cover for their
ultimate military purpose:
It is possible that in times of peace the amount of actual traffic passing over them will be
comparatively small, if not even practically nil, and that many years may elapse before the
special facilities they must necessarily offer,—such as extensive siding accommodation and long
platforms for the loading and unloading of troop trains—are likely to be employed to the fullest
extent; but they nevertheless form an integral part both of the railway system and of the
military system of the country, and, having been constructed, they are, at least, available for
military purposes whenever wanted.12
Moreover:
Another important distinction between military and strategical railways is that whereas the
building of the former will be governed primarily by military requirements, that of the latter may
be fundamentally due to considerations of State policy. Strategical railways are wanted to serve
the purposes of national defence or, alternatively, of national expansion. They are especially
provided to ensure the speedy concentration of troops on the frontier, whether to resist
invasion by a neighbouring country or to facilitate the invasion either of that country or, it may
be, of territory on the other side thereof. The fact that they have been built may, in some cases,
even further the interests of peace, should the increased means they offer for military
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transports render the country concerned a more formidable antagonist than it might otherwise
be, and influence the policy of other States or lands accordingly.13
Pratt gives several examples of strategic railways, from rails built along a frontier meant to ferry troops,
to lines linking key areas of defense, to ones bypassing large cities to avoid bottlenecks, to lines built for
coast defense.14 Especially important to the Anglo-German rivalry were strategical railways built in
colonial dependencies as “practical proof of ‘effective occupation’” and which provided both military
and commercial opportunities.15
With railway construction came trade. Pre-produced iron rails, locomotives, and rolling stock
were needed to operate the railways, while new customers for consumer goods were created from the
increased accessibility and wealth brought by the train.16 From 1860 to 1910, global railway tracks rose
by nearly four hundred thousand miles, from sixty-six thousand to four hundred sixty-five thousand.17
Much of that growth was owned, managed, controlled, or financed by British interests. 18 As we have
seen, British finance spanned the globe; roughly three-fifths of all money raised in London from 1865 to
1914 was invested abroad, most of it going to the Empire and increasingly to the Dominions. 19 On the
eve of war, forty-four percent of the world total of foreign investment was in British hands, making up
twenty percent of Britain’s overseas earnings and thirty-four percent of its total assets.20 Vast
infrastructure investments were made in Asia, South America, Australia, and the United States.21
Railways were “the first preference of British investors placing money abroad.” 22 John Darwin explains
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the rationale behind this investment: “British confidence in railway technology, the early development
in Britain of a market in railway shares and the prominent role of British railway contractors overseas
combined to make this an especially attractive outlet for surplus British funds.”23 The British advantage
in invisible services, combined with its propensity for overseas investment, made it the epicenter of
global railway interests.
Germany was also deeply invested in the sector and saw it as a key to Weltpolitik.24 It was
crisscrossed by commercial and strategic railways, with government pushing the development of lines
linking militarily important frontier posts.25 This development accelerated in the years immediately
before the Great War26, making Germany into a European leader in domestic strategic railways.27
Railways, seen as vital logistical tools, were used to bolster the resilience and defensibility of other
infrastructure. Strategic railways ran from the mouth of the Kiel Canal, along much of its distance,
crossing over to the Danish border; these provided Germany with a “strategical advantage in moving
troops from Kiel either for the defence of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal or to resist invasion by sea on the
north of the waterway.”28 Germany likewise began to compete internationally as part of its campaign of
Weltpolitik. On the forefront of this push were the academics who provided the intellectual bulwark for
so much of German world policy in the years from 1880 to 1914. One such figure was economist Karl
Helfferich, who worked in the Colonial Section of the German Foreign Office, a major proponent of
railways as dual-use tools of imperial expansion.29 He saw them as allowing Germany to overcome the
natural limitations of its colonial possessions such as poor harbors and a dearth of navigable rivers into

23

Darwin, 116.
Pratt, 245.
25
Pratt, 233-234.
26
Pratt, 236-238.
27
These strategic railways would be put to use in the rapid German mobilization in 1914, bringing troops and
materiel to the borders with Russia and Belgium in an organized and efficient manner. They would also play an
important role in the decisive German victory over Russia at the Battle of Tannenberg later that year.
28
Pratt, 243.
29
Grimmer-Solem, 290-291.
24

136
the interior.30 To Helfferich, the state must get involved in promoting these projects, because the largescale investment, lack of quick returns, and risk profile would deter private investment; he argued for
rate guarantees, interest breaks, loan support, and covering minimum operating expenses, which would
allow German firms to take the lead on construction without the accompanying risk. 31 He believed that
“only through the extension of transportation through a methodical construction of railways and roads
would it be possible to create the conditions under which private entrepreneurship could become an
active participant in the economic development and utilization of the colonies.” 32 Other influential
Germans were strong promoters of railways too, including the Colonial Secretary Bernhard Dernburg,
who called them “the most important tool of colonization,” and thought they would “habituate the
indigenous population to work and elevate them to a higher level of civilization.”33 His tenure as Colonial
Secretary (1907-1910) was marked by a ‘railway mania’, with Germany investing one hundred twentyfive million marks on railway construction between 1908 and 1911, producing nearly one thousand five
hundred new kilometers of track.34 Clearly, Germans embraced these arguments for railway
infrastructure and sought to rival Britain as a builder on a global level.
II. Railways in Latin America and Africa
Anglo-German railway competition rapidly spread around the world, but was especially
heated in a few theaters; two of these – Latin America and Africa – will be detailed in this section, while
the last – the Ottoman Empire – will be the focus of the following section. Exploring these specific
examples can show us how this particular form of infrastructure was a major factor in the rising
antagonism between the two empires.
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A. Latin American Railways
Latin America was a fertile field for British foreign investment in the years after 1880, offering
“exceptionally favourable conditions … for the growth of a vast business empire pivoted upon
London.”35 It was “far more robust and commerce-friendly than almost [anywhere] in tropical Africa,” as
well as lacking an imperial bureaucracy which restricted European commerce as in China. 36 States in
Latin America were open to foreign investment and did not erect the tariff walls which were spreading
around the developed world at the time.37 Besides, Latin America was replete with mineral and
agricultural wealth that its governments were beginning to exploit. 38 Britain was commercially involved
in Latin America since the early nineteenth century, but this investment expanded significantly in the
years before World War I; in 1880, Britain exported seventeen million pounds worth of goods to the
region, which grew to nearly twenty-nine million pounds in 1890 and eclipsed fifty million pounds by
1910.39 By 1914, trade with Latin America constituted ten percent of Britain’s total overseas trade, a
high amount for a region where Britain only had an informal empire.40
If trade was important to British interests in Latin America, investment was even more critical.
In 1875, it amounted to one hundred seventy-five million pounds, but grew fourfold by 1905 and
surpassed one billion pounds by 1913.41 Foreign investment in the region began with government bonds
but shifted to private enterprise between 1880 and 1914. Two-thirds of British capital in Latin America
in 1885 was invested in government securities, but by 1913, two-thirds was invested directly in private
projects.42 The main enterprise targeted by British investment was railway infrastructure, comprising
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nearly half of all British capital parked in Latin America.43 British railway interests could be found in
almost every country in the region.44 British interests owned sixty percent of Colombia’s railway
network, administered the whole of Peru’s railway system, and built lines even in more inhospitable
nations like Venezuela and Paraguay.45 British investors put over one hundred thirty million pounds into
Mexican railways, mines, and oil concessions, ranking third among all British investment in Latin America
and equaling the total American investment in Mexico.46 The British also owned the major route into the
agricultural heartland of Brazil – the Sao Paolo Railway – which transported the myriad products
produced there to international markets, becoming the most profitable British-owned railway on the
continent.47
Argentina was Britain’s biggest Latin American success story, dominating British trade with
the continent and becoming the prime target for foreign investment.48 Railways were the key to this
productivity and wealth-creation, allowing Argentina to become the world’s largest exporter of maize,
second-largest exporter of wool, and a key player in the market in frozen meat.49 British investment –
more than half of which was put into railway projects – rose from twenty million pounds in 1880 to one
hundred fifty-seven million pounds in 1890, and reached an enormous three hundred sixty million
pounds by 1913 – the same amount as was invested in India at the time.50 British lines, including the
Buenos and Great Southern, the Buenos Aires and Pacific, the Central Argentine, the Western, and the
Central Cordoba, comprised more than seventy percent of Argentina’s total railway mileage, helping to
create the densest railway system in South America.51 These railway investments led to other
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investments in infrastructure like ports, harbors, and telegraph lines, as well as to supplementary urban
and financial services, all of which were dominated by British interests.52
Although it was seen by the official class in Britain as the graveyard of diplomatic careers, by
1913 Latin America was “the brightest jewel in the City’s crown, the richest province of its business
empire and the great white hope of the investing classes.”53 The Foreign Office even allowed British
financial interests to take the lead in regional diplomacy, with the Rothschilds54 negotiating politically
and economically stabilizing loans to Argentina and Brazil in the 1890s.55 Latin America was a primary
theater of the British imperial synthesis, where British power sprung “not from conquest or settlement
but from collaboration in the pursuit of wealth.”56 It provided a profitable outlet for British investors,
comprising a quarter of Britain’s overseas property income, employing nearly as high a proportion of the
British merchant marine, and contributing significantly to the invisible service income which was so
crucial for British power in the years before war.57
This success in Latin America enticed competitors, including Germany, to join in the rush for
overseas income and investment opportunities. Germany had few options if it sought to replicate the
British success for itself and so the prime target for Weltpolitik was a nation where British penetration
was fairly minor: Venezuela. Hanseatic merchants established trading colonies in Venezuela in the
middle of the nineteenth century, and this expanded after German unification into a burgeoning trade
centered on exports of coffee, cacao, and tobacco.58 The government-subsidized steamer routes from
HAPAG and Norddeutscher Lloyd started in the 1880s, a policy which boosted interest in Venezuela at
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home.59 By 1900, German commerce dominated the Venezuelan market, controlling a third of all
commercial activity and two-thirds of its foreign trade in manufactures.60 Investors also flocked to
Venezuelan opportunities, especially in railways and industrial infrastructure. One especially important
project was the single-track railroad from Caracas to Valencia contracted out to Krupp in 1887: the Great
Venezuela Railway (Große Venezuelabahn).61 At the time of its financing in 1888, it was the largest
German overseas investment, and was treated as such.62 Top German railway experts were sent to
Venezuela to carry out important surveys and oversee construction.63 The line was built using materials
only from German contractors, including “steel rails, wheels, and axles from Krupp in Essen; passenger
and freight cars from Zypen & Charlier in Cologne; steel railway ties from Dortmunder Union; and
locomotives from Sächsische Maschinenfabrik in Chemnitz.”64 Krupp also supplied the steel viaducts and
bridges.65 All in all, about fifty thousand tons of material and eight million marks were sent to Venezuela
for the railway between 1888 and 1894.66 On top of this already-large undertaking, challenging terrain,
bad seasonal weather, and political unrest delayed the construction and more than doubled the cost. 67
These problems led the German government to organize an inspection and promotion tour in
concert with the investors in the Great Venezuela Railway and HAPAG, the owner of which – Albert
Ballin – had close ties to the Kaiser.68 Several academics, including Ernst von Halle, were members of the
delegation which was used by the Foreign Office to boost investor interest in Venezuela, prove German
technical excellence, and show Germany to be on par with the other Great Powers.69 The trip also

59

Ibid.
Ibid.
61
Ibid.
62
Ibid.
63
Ibid.
64
Ibid.
65
Grimmer-Solem, 153.
66
Ibid.
67
Ibid.
68
Ibid.
69
Ibid.
60

141
contrasted British and German investment in Venezuela; the British-built railway the delegation took
from their landing in La Guaira to Caracas was poorly-built and ill-maintained, while the German-built
Große Venezuelabahn was so technically precise that “even the bureaucrats of the Prussian State
Railways would not be able to find fault with it.”70 Von Halle concluded that German investment could
be profitable economically and strategically, and that Germany could compete with – and beat – Britain
in the field.71 He also saw it as providing a foothold for German colonization of Venezuela, more deeply
binding Germany to Latin America.72 By 1901, it would be fair to consider Venezuela a part of Germany’s
informal empire and impressive proof of the success of Weltpolitik.73 Twenty percent of Germany’s
overseas capital – over four hundred seventy-six million dollars – had been invested in Latin America,
about three times as much as in Asia and nearly eight times as much as in the Ottoman Empire. 74
Venezuela was the primary recipient of that German investment, and was, relatedly, a prime German
debtor. In 1901, the Venezuelan President Cipriano Castro declared that Venezuela would not recognize
any debts from before his coup and began to seize or destroy assets held by Europeans. 75 Germany, the
largest foreign player in Venezuela, was most threatened by these actions, and it contemplated an
armed intervention76; the biggest stumbling block in that regard was the United States, which under
President Theodore Roosevelt had promoted a more muscular version of the Monroe Doctrine
prohibiting European intervention in the Americas.77 Germany was wary of drawing American ire, but
chose to intervene anyway alongside the British, who were also significant Venezuelan creditors. 78 The
Anglo-German agreement to intervene in Venezuela, blockade its ports, and seize its gunboats was
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signed on November 11, 1902; it would be the most united the two powers would be for the remainder
of the crisis.79
Cracks began to show almost immediately, when the jingoist press in Britain – National
Review and The Spectator being two examples – attacked the cooperation with Germany.80 Rudyard
Kipling wrote his poem “The Rowers”, published on December 22, 1902, in protest:
In sight of peace – from the Narrow Seas
O’er half the world to run –
With a cheated crew, to league anew
With the Goth and the shameless Hun!81
British critics also stressed the damage to the relationship with the United States, a rising power which
had recently routed Spain and taken most of its colonial empire.82 The intervention did indeed upset
American sentiments; Germany’s aggressive quest for territory and world status caused much concern
in Washington and led to the assembly of a large fleet in the Caribbean to protect American interests. 83
The direct action against Venezuela began in early December 1902, with coastal bombardments, naval
seizures, and the sinking of unmanned Venezuelan ships.84 The United States offered arbitration, and
was flatly turned down by the German ambassador, stoking anti-German sentiment in the American
press.85 As public feeling was moving against the intervention, Britain pulled back, reduced its demands,
and agreed to arbitration; Germany, feeling isolated, soon followed.86 The episode was painted in the

79

Ibid.
Ibid.
81
Rudyard Kipling, “The Rowers,” Lancashire Evening Post (Preston, UK), Dec. 22, 1902, accessed at
https://www.britishnewspaperarchive.co.uk/viewer/bl/0000711/19021222/124/0005.
82
Grimmer-Solem, 312-313.
83
Grimmer-Solem, 311-313.
84
Grimmer-Solem, 313.
85
Ibid.
86
Grimmer-Solem, 314.
80

143
British press as a German-led debacle meant to embroil Britain in conflict with the United States.87 The
largely-failed intervention was a turning point in both Anglo-German and Anglo-American relations,
boosting an already-growing enmity in the first case and creating a new level of amity in the second. The
1902 Venezuela Crisis was the origin of the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ and led to a
reorientation of British policy to one of good relations with the Americans and a choice to leave its
possessions in the Western Hemisphere largely undefended.88 In terms of the Anglo-German rivalry, the
crisis was the last time both nations would work together in any meaningful way to achieve a strategic
result.
B. African Railways
British interests in Africa ran deep, both in its own imperial possessions and in the areas
colonized by other European powers.89 Imperialists stressed the importance of transportation and
communications infrastructure in opening up the African continent and reaching its economic potential.
Prevailing economic orthodoxy in Britain, as well as the distaste for commercial pursuits seen in the
Foreign Office, mostly precluded the government from direct involvement in financing these projects,
although this was occasionally disregarded for railways considered strategically important. 90 After the
Zanzibar Treaty of 1890, Britain achieved a level of dominance in Eastern Africa that it sought to cement
through the construction of an economically-viable and strategically-important railway.91 After several
rejections by Parliament and the Foreign Office, the railway’s backers finally received a subsidy from
Joseph Chamberlain’s Colonial Office in 189692, two years after Uganda was made a British
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protectorate.93 The Uganda Railway, running from Mombasa to Lake Victoria, was a conduit for trade as
well as a strategic line further tightening the British grip on the source of the White Nile, a crucial water
source for Britain’s more northerly possessions.94 It also provided Britain with easy access to the region
around Lake Victoria, a frontier between several European powers, including Belgium, Portugal, France,
Britain, and Germany. The railway began service in 1903 and, according to Winston Churchill in the
House of Commons, was making a modest profit of sixty thousand pounds by 190695; by 1913, when its
subsidy ended, the British government had paid nearly three million pounds for East African
development.96 Despite the relatively minor economic production to emanate from this area, the
Uganda Railway was a vital strategic artery at the heart of British Africa.97
Railways likewise played a critical role in the development of Britain’s most profitable and
advanced African dominion: South Africa.98 This began in earnest after the discovery of diamonds and
gold in the middle of the nineteenth century, and by 1890, the Dominion had over two thousand miles
of track, extending across the colony and supercharging investment and trade.99 In 1883, Cecil Rhodes, a
member of the Cape Colony’s Parliament, began to promote the importance of the “Road to the North,”
which he called the “Suez Canal of South Africa.”100 This network – including railways, roads, and
telegraphs – would drive northwards from the Cape to the hinterlands and unify the whole region under
Cape, and ultimately British, control.101 In 1889, Rhodes traveled to Britain and returned with a charter
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for this push to the north; a year later, he would become Cape premier and begin to bring his vision to
reality.102 Railways were extended to the Rand, an area to the north of the Cape that was a great inland
market and the capital of gold mining in South Africa.103 Rhodes also sought control of the railway
leading to Delagoa Bay – one of the last non-British harbors in the region – being built by the
government of the Transvaal; this brought the issue into the remit of the Foreign Office, as the railway
passed through Portuguese colonial territory.104 Anglo-Portuguese negotiations over these concessions
were “frequently disrupted by German meddling” meant to sabotage British interests in favor of
Germany’s Boer allies in the Transvaal.105 This interference was increasingly frustrating to British
diplomats, as well as to Rhodes himself; the delays and issues created helped lead to the disastrous
Jameson Raid and Kruger Telegram which so exacerbated Anglo-German hostilities. 106 Rhodes’s
subsequent fall from power in the Cape was only apparent, as the British proconsul Lord Milner relied
on him to help make policy behind the scenes.107 In the late 1890s, he returned to his pursuit of the
“Road to the North,” this time seeking to link all of the various South African domains and provide a
counterweight to the Boer republics.108 At the same time, he promoted his idea of a Cape-to-Cairo
railway and telegraph network, which would connect all of Britain’s possessions in East Africa, from
Egypt, through Sudan and Uganda, to Kenya, Bechuanaland, Matabeleland, and the Cape.109 This
infrastructure project would provide economic and strategic benefits to British rule in Africa, making
defense easier and more integrated, allowing for internal migration, and creating a bond between
disparate imperial possessions.110 The Cape-to-Cairo dream was memorialized in a famous political
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cartoon in Punch on December 10, 1892, where Rhodes is depicted astride Africa, holding a telegraph
wire linking Egypt to South Africa.111
Germany, not blind to these developments in British Africa, had their own projects to
promote Weltpolitik and challenge British dominance. These railways were seen by many British
observers as a direct threat to British interests, ultimately aimed at “the transformation of Africa as a
whole into a German-African Empire which should compare in value, if not in glory, with that of the
Indian Empire itself.”112 These fears were partially based on the writings of Ernst von Weber who
proposed a German-African Empire by settlement in South and Central Africa followed by political
annexations and consolidation.113 To Edwin Pratt, Germany’s plan was:
(1) the acquiring of territory in Africa by Germany wherever she could get it, whether in the
central or in the coastal districts; (2) co-operation with the Boers as a step towards bringing
them and their Republics under German suzerainty; and (3) the overthrow of British influence,
with the substitution for it of German supremacy.114
Germany was slow to begin railway construction in Africa, only offering concessions to private
enterprise in the late 1890s; by 1905, these projects had begun in earnest, boosted by interest
guarantees granted by the home government.115 Once again, Karl Helfferich was at the forefront of
railway development and promotion, detailing the links between German banks and the financing of
these projects in North Cameroon, Southwest Africa, and East Africa.116
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In 1907, The Railways of Africa (Die Eisenbahnen Afrikas) was published by a pressure group
with the assistance of the Colonial Office and the Reichstag.117 It was a detailed survey of the railway
infrastructure of all European powers in Africa, specifically focused on their development, profitability,
economic impact, and strategic-political significance.118 Die Eisenbahnen Afrikas, intended to promote
colonial railway projects in the Reichstag and among the public, was distributed to “chambers of
commerce, large banks and export firms, universities, technological institutes, statistical bureaus,
provincial school boards, seminars, associations of the academically trained, and primary school
teachers,” – a remarkable propaganda effort. 119 It was released just after the Hottentot elections and
was meant to help boost Bülow’s world policy, as he was first to acknowledge:
The contents and kind of portrayal seem to me well suited to serve the goal of spreading and
deepening the colonial idea. This generally accessible publication based on official materials
showing the urgent necessity of a planned-out colonial railway construction effort will be
welcomed with satisfaction by every friend of colonial matters, especially at the current time as
important railway questions are being considered.120
On the back of these efforts, German imperial railways in Africa expanded significantly.
Edwin Pratt details several of these projects and the threat he believed they posed to British
Africa. To him, the most serious danger was to South Africa and emanated from the bordering colony of
German South-West Africa.121 He quotes German advocates like Dr. Paul Samassa, who wrote about the
German intentions for South Africa in his 1905 book Das Neue Südafrika:
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German South-West Africa is, to-day, a strong tramp card in our hands, from the point of view of
Weltpolitik. In England much has been said of late as to what a good thing it would be for that
country if our fleet were annihilated before it became dangerous.... On our side we might cool
these hot-heads, and strengthen the peace party in England, if we reminded them that,
whatever the loss to ourselves of a war with that country, England would run a greater risk—
that of losing South Africa.122
To achieve this goal, Germany would have to be able to move troops and materiel quickly to the
frontiers with the Cape, Bechuanaland, and British territories further north; this was only possible
through railways.123 Germany sought to link the continent’s east coast to its west coast, passing through
German possessions on each side. Their first attempt was a railway running from Swakopmund to
Windhoek in German South-West Africa, and continuing east across the Kalahari Desert to Transvaal;
this was stymied by the 1885 British annexation of Bechuanaland, directly on the planned railway
route.124 After this, a railway was planned in the opposite direction, running from Delagoa Bay on the
Indian Ocean to Transvaal and further on into the interior, for which a concession was granted in
1887.125 This caused serious strife between Britain and Germany, culminating in the Kruger Telegram
and eventually the Boer War. Given these setbacks, Germany refocused on railway investments in
territory it directly controlled or could easily influence in South-West Africa. 126 Pratt summarizes the
British conception of these railways as dual-use lines meant to threaten its hegemony:
With, therefore, the minor exceptions, the system of railways in German South-West Africa had
been designed or developed in accordance with plans which had for their basis an eventual
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attack on British territory in three separate directions— (1) Cape Province, (2) Bechuanaland
and (3) Rhodesia. The Southern and the North-to-South lines had, also, been built exclusively
with the standard Cape gauge of 3 ft. 6 in., so that, when "der Tag" arrived, and German
succeeded British supremacy in South Africa, these particular lines could be continued in order
to link up with those which the Germans would then expect to take over from Cape Province.127
This idea of the German African railways as militarized was supported by the evidence. Lines ran directly
to military stations, forts and blockhouses were constructed along them, and various magazines and
storehouses were established next to the tracks.128 German officials presented these as intended to
quell native uprisings like the Herero rising in 1907, but Pratt was skeptical: “Any suggestion that the
system of strategical railways which had been built, and the elaborate military preparations which had
been effected, were merely precautions against a further possible rising of the natives would have been
absurd.”129
III. The Ottoman Railways
By the late nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire130, widely known as the ‘Sick Man of
Europe’, had fallen on hard times; its victory in the Crimean War made it into a European dependency
and many Great Powers were eagerly eyeing the spoils once it finally keeled over. 131 Britain and
Germany each had important economic and strategic interests in the Ottoman territory. 132 Britain, long
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invested in the Middle East, gained a greater economic and political foothold there after the Napoleonic
Wars; the era of economic competition after the abolition of the trade monopoly in 1825 greatly
increased British involvement in the region.133 A free trade treaty was signed in 1838 and Anglo-Turkish
trade took off, providing a market for British goods, a source of consistent surplus on visible trade, and a
potential future target for commercial investment.134 After the Crimean War, Britain and France became
sponsors of the Ottoman state, controlling its finances and providing long-term capital under the
auspices of private banks.135 After a series of financial crises and defaults in the 1870s, British merchants
and financiers soured on Turkey’s long-term economic potential and began to look for opportunities
elsewhere; British share of imports and exports fell significantly from 1875 to 1911 and banks sold out of
their positions in Turkish debt.136 Despite this economic disappointment, Turkey was still seen as a
critical strategic region, especially after the 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish War and the British occupation of
Egypt in 1882. Much of the British public had turned on the Ottoman Empire after its brutalization of
Christian minorities in its European lands, a fact which constrained a potential British strategic
partnership with the Sublime Porte in Europe or at the Straits.137
What it did not stop was a strategy of building up Turkey in Asia as a stable, British-aligned
power in order to “protect the whole complex of Imperial communications with India.” 138 Establishing
this bulwark would protect the route to India via land through Persia and sea through the Suez Canal, an
important goal of British policy at the time. The Ambassador at Constantinople, Austen Henry Layard,
even advocated for the construction of strategic railways from the Mediterranean, through the Middle
East via Baghdad, across southern Persia, to Karachi.139 Layard saw this railway as “creating a British
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preponderance of influence throughout the Near East with enormous benefit for trade and Imperial
communications,” as well as “enabling [the British] army in India to co-operate with that in England with
the rapidity and force of an irresistible power.”140 Britain’s main fear was that one of its European rivals
would establish bases in Ottoman territory and use them to threaten India and the routes thereto;
before 1900, that threat originated from Russia, but it would shift after the turn of the century – as
would so much of British foreign policy and public opinion – to Germany.141
Just as the British were reducing their investment in the Ottoman Empire, the Germans were
increasing theirs.142 In spite of Bismarck’s famous remark calling the whole of the Ottoman Empire “not
worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier” – German interests and involvement in Turkey were
significant and on the rise.143 The Pan-German League promoted Ottoman lands in Anatolia as the best
place for German colonization, but advocates were split on full annexation or informal control. 144
‘Peaceful penetration’ would begin under Bismarck, and accelerate rapidly after the accession of
Wilhelm II.145 It started in 1882 with the dispatch of military officers who came into Ottoman service to
upgrade its military through training and the provision of high-quality German arms.146 These officers,
led by Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, would reconfigure Ottoman coastal defenses, train Turkish fighters
on the latest German artillery, and modernize Turkish military structure.147 This ingratiated the Germans
to the Ottoman leadership, producing a wave of commercial successes, from the sale of arms, to the
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provision of competitive loans by Deutsche Bank, to the expansion of the German export market in
Turkey.148
By the turn of the twentieth century, Germany was deeply invested in the Levant, so much so
that several British diplomats saw her as willing to “sacrifice anything to her growing commercial
interests” in the region.149 The commercial penetration would only expand after 1900, with German
merchant offices opening in cities like Bushire, Bahrain, Basra, Mohammera, and Bandar Abbas, German
salesmen outpricing their competitors in the region’s bazaars, and financiers offering very favorable
terms on loans.150 All of these inroads were made with the assistance – direct or indirect – of the
German government, which provided subsidies for commercial activities meant to harm European rivals
and gain market share.151
Anatolia and the Levant were resource-rich regions, with the climate and soil to produce cash
crops in immense quantities, but the prevalence of one natural resource in particular – oil – would drive
Anglo-German competition to a fever pitch.152 Oil was becoming one of the most prized commodities in
the world, powering industry and producing new chemicals and products which would revolutionize
society. While the Kaiser was visiting the Middle East in 1898, German agents secretly surveyed
northern Mesopotamia for oil, focusing on the area around Mosul.153 Oil’s strategic importance after
1900 as fuel for the new classes of Dreadnoughts and battle cruisers sparked a rush for concessions and
exploration.154 In a departure from its usual policy of only providing moral and diplomatic support, the
British government was directly involved with promoting the industry.155 According to Cain and Hopkins,
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this change “demonstrate[s] how economic resources were entwined with strategic priorities, and the
extent to which the Foreign Office had accepted the need to reinforce private firms in areas of political
sensitivity.”156 The biggest British oil concern was founded by adventurer and businessman William Knox
D’Arcy, who gained a half-million square mile concession in Persia in 1901 and struck oil in Abadan, fifty
miles southeast of Basra and near the Persian Gulf.157 In 1909, D’Arcy – with British government
subvention – founded the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC), which would employ two thousand five
hundred people just a year later and complete the world’s largest refinery in 1912. 158 German firms also
got in on the action, with Deutsche Bank gaining a forty-year concession in Mesopotamia in July 1904
along with the right to explore the area between Mosul and Baghdad. 159 The German bank was also
involved with oil production in Austrian Galicia and was a majority owner of the largest Romanian oil
company, investments meant to free the German market from the control of the American
conglomerate Standard Oil and provide strategic independence for German military reserves.160 German
firms were less successful than the British, losing their initial concession in 1907 161; the British publicprivate partnership jumped at the opportunity to cement its dominance in the sector and conciliate the
Germans at the same time.162 Anglo-Persian bought out several other firms, including German ones, so
as to present a more powerful front in negotiations with the Ottoman government. 163 A new
conglomerate was formed in 1911 and called the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC), joining British and
German interests – Anglo-Persian, Royal Dutch Shell, and Deutsche Bank – in a cartel.164 British interests
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controlled a majority stake in this new company, reinforcing Britain’s position without overly
antagonizing Germany.
After the collapse of British influence at the Sublime Porte in the late 1880s, Germany
replaced Britain as the key ally to the Ottoman Empire.165 Instead of waiting for the seemingly-inevitable
Ottoman collapse, Germany saw itself as benefiting more from a stable, intact Turkey which it could
mine for commercial concessions and strategic gains.166 Observers like Ramsay Muir saw this interest as
nefarious and aimed at threatening Britain, writing that “a Turkish alliance was indeed held to be
indispensable … as a preparation for the great struggle for world-predominance to which the German
government was already looking forward.”167 Commercial rivalry was one thing on its own, but when
combined with the expansion of the fleet and Germany’s railway projects in the Near East and
elsewhere, German involvement in Turkey took on an ominous appearance.168 Edwin Pratt agreed,
seeing German plans “as a means to the realisation of still greater aims in the domain of Weltpolitik.”169
If Germany was to succeed at establishing a “Middle-Asian Empire,” it would bring “under German
control the entire region from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, and [provide] convenient
stepping-off places from which an advance might be made on Egypt in the one direction and India in the
other.”170 Pratt quoted a French writer, André Chéradame:
More and more the Germans seem to regard the land of the Turks as their personal property. All
the recent German literature relating to Turkey affords proof of the tendency. … So it is, indeed,
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a matter of the organised conquest of Turkey. Everywhere and in everything, Turkey is being
encircled by the tentacles of the German octopus.171
In reality, those tentacles were the Ottoman railways, the primary German investment in Turkey, a
critical factor in Weltpolitik and the Anglo-German rivalry (Figure VI in Appendix 172).
Ottoman leadership had been looking to build an internal railway since the early 1870s. 173
Fiscal and foreign policy crises later in the decade put a hold on those plans and caused foreign
investment to dry up, especially on the British end.174 German involvement in Turkey was increasing just
as these railway projects were gaining government support. Given Germany’s technical prowess and
large network of internal railways, it was the clear choice for an Ottoman railway partnership. 175 The
first was the Anatolian Railway, which had started as a route from Haydarpasha in Constantinople to
Izmit – a length of about seventy miles – and was built under Ottoman auspices by German engineers.176
It was transferred to German control in 1888 when the Sublime Porte granted a concession to Deutsche
Bank to extend the line further inland to Ankara, a stretch completed in 1893 using all German parts,
material, and expertise.177
Other smaller concessions were granted in the 1890s, sometimes directly displacing British
companies already at work on the lines.178 Many of the firms building German railways in Africa also
worked on the Ottoman lines; the archives of one construction firm – Philipp Holzmann GmbH – prove
that these dual-use railways were conceived as parallel projects, linking German economic-strategic
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ambitions against Britain in both regions.179 In 1896, the Anatolian line was extended south to Konya,
bringing the length of the railway to six hundred thirty-three miles.180 The Anatolian Railway proved its
dual-use bonafides early on, earning a large profit in its first year of service and mobilizing Ottoman
troops to crush a revolt on the island of Crete in the spring of 1897.181 The Hejaz Railway meant to link
Damascus to the Islamic holy sites at Mecca and Medina – this time financed by Ottoman authorities
and direct contributions from religious Muslims – was granted a concession in 1900 and started
construction in 1901 under German engineer Heinrich August Meißner (Figure VII in Appendix). 182 This
line would allow Hajj pilgrims to avoid the British-dominated Red Sea route to the holy sites, and bring
their commerce instead through Ottoman ports.183 The German-American engineer Gottlieb
Schumacher believed its actual purpose was power, not prayer.184 To the railway historians Augustus
Veenendaal and H. Roger Grant, the Hejaz Railway would also increase Ottoman internal control:
[it] would be the ideal vehicle to bring Turkish troops to places of unrest and to secure the
provisioning of the large Turkish garrison in Medina. And the line looked the part, with heavily
fortified station buildings and water tanks, surrounded by barbed-wire barracks and machine
guns, and manned by Turkish garrisons equipped with modern German firearms.185
Pratt saw the purpose as external, believing that the railway was intended not only as a route to Mecca,
but to the Egyptian border186, allowing for an assault on the Suez Canal in time of war.187
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In November 1897, Adolf Freiherr Marschall von Bieberstein, a supporter of a strong TurcoGerman partnership as a means to effect Weltpolitik, took over as Ambassador to the Sublime Porte and
began to involve the German government directly in these infrastructure projects. 188 Marschall was a
prime mover in the German commercial aggression in the Near East. He was also deeply invested in
infrastructure as a tool of Weltpolitik:
[There is] plenty of scope for useful future expansion [and] for solid enterprises employing
German capital and German industry. There are, quite apart from special services for the army,
railways, ports, and bridges to build, electrical works to erect for lighting, tramways, etc. and the
really wretched conditions of most of the steamers that ply regularly here offer good chances
for German competition. We shall naturally not be left alone to do all this and certain
concessions will be granted to others. But one thing we must claim for ourselves and that is
linking the present sphere of interests of the Anatolian railways with the river districts of the
Tigris and Euphrates, and so on to the Persian Gulf.189
Controlling this territory would require a German-run railway to extend its commercial and strategic
power in the region, helping achieve the dream of the Ottoman lands as a “German India”. 190 The idea of
a Berlin-to-Baghdad Railway was thought up by the German engineer Wilhelm von Pressel – known as
‘the father of the Baghdad railway’ and an intense Turcophile – who saw it as potentially reinvigorating
his beloved Ottoman Empire, allowing its peoples to free themselves from European domination. 191
Pressel would promote this idea to the German government and, when Bismarck was uninterested, took
his case to the public, praising the Turkish lands as fertile and ripe for commercial development. 192 Still,
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Pressel’s quest was not enough to get the project off the ground; this only happened when Georg von
Siemens, the director of Deutsche Bank, took a personal interest in the project and pushed its
importance to the German and Ottoman governments.193
German leadership – and Siemens himself – did not see the railway in the same humanitarian
terms as did Pressel, instead focusing on its diplomatic, economic, and strategic importance.194 Such a
project would “link central Europe directly to the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean and thus by a much
shorter and faster land route that avoided the British-controlled chokepoint at Suez,” reducing travel
time from Vienna to Bombay from sixteen days via the Mediterranean and Suez Canal to only nine days
via rail through the Balkans, Anatolia, and Mesopotamia to the head of the Persian Gulf, where the
remainder of the journey could go by sea.195 The Berlin-to-Baghdad Railway would also provide
economic benefits to German firms as lone suppliers of the material, knowledge, and financing. 196
Ottoman leadership saw the benefits to such a large-scale railway project too. 197 According to Arthur
Maloney, the advantages of the project for were significant:
The main factor was that the line would tie together Turkey's scattered provinces. This was not
true of lines ending at the Mediterranean below Anatolia. Such lines tended to detach Turkish
territory. A second advantage was that the line went through the Taurus Mountains of western
Anatolia rather than along the sea coast. This meant the Railway was safe from interdiction by
European naval guns in time of war. A third advantage was that the Germans, unlike the other
European powers, were not likely to attempt annexation of territory served by the Railway.198
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This potential railway line connecting Europe with India was referred to as a “Weltlinie ersten Ranges” –
a world line of the first order – by none other than Karl Helfferich, the German railway guru. 199
These factors combined to make the Berlin-to-Baghdad Railway a necessity for German
Weltpolitik and drove forward the search for a full concession from the Sublime Porte. Marschall
believed that “Germany’s future in the Ottoman Empire,” and thus her goal of world power, “hinged on
the construction of the Baghdad Railway by a German company,”200 using all German materials and “for
the purpose of bringing goods and people to [Asia] via the most direct path from the heart of
Germany.”201 The biggest challenge was finance. German investors, led by Deutsche Bank, were not
capitalized enough to support the project on their own, but internationalizing the railway would prevent
it from being a dual-use tool of Weltpolitik.202 A balance needed to be struck between procuring
substantial funding from an international consortium while retaining overall control in German hands. 203
Sean McMeekin puts this well: “The essential thing was camouflage: Germany must appear not to be
building the railway alone, while still somehow securing the strategic benefit.” 204
In the end, Germany’s proposal for a Berlin-to-Baghdad connection (Figure VIII in Appendix)
won out over a rival British plan to link the Turkish Mediterranean port of Alexandretta205 to Basra at the
head of the Shatt-al-Arab, which would have been cheaper and more profitable for the Ottoman
government but did not provide the strategic benefits the German line did.206 Sultan Abdul Hamid II
finally granted the German concession in December 1899, only after Deutsche Bank reluctantly
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deposited two hundred thousand Turkish lira in the Ottoman treasury. 207 The 1899 concession gave the
German-led consortium eight years to construct a railway from the previously-built terminus at Konya
through Baghdad to Basra, but allowed the Ottoman government the right to purchase the railway
entirely at any time.208 This deal was perceived as heavily weighted towards the Ottoman position, but
German negotiators did receive secret benefits, including an exemption from the ban on foreign mining
concerns and the right to retain any artifacts discovered on Ottoman territory by German miners or
archaeologists.209 These may seem minor, but both played into the Weltpolitik strategy; the importance
of oil and other natural resources to Germany’s growing industrial economy has already been discussed,
while the capture of ancient artifacts contributed to German Kultur and its reputation as a scientific
leader. Surveying and exploration of the planned route began soon after the turn of the century.
After the granting of the 1899 concession, the mood in Germany was generally, but not
universally, positive about the railway’s prospects. The Foreign Office saw the railway as primarily a
strategic project meant to bypass British-controlled trade routes and serve as “a vehicle of German
political, financial, and cultural expansion.”210 It would advance Germandom across the Near East and
provide a strategic lever against Germany’s rivals in the area, namely Britain and Russia. 211 Outright
acknowledgement of this purpose was politically untenable, as it would offend Turkish sensibilities and
risk losing the concession; publicly, therefore, the Foreign Office promoted the commercial nature of the
line and the independence of its purportedly-international ownership.212 Some advocates for the
railway, particularly the financial consortium funding it, were more interested in its commercial
potential than its geopolitical aspects, focusing on its ability to open new markets, increase regional
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production, develop the neglected interior regions of the Ottoman Empire, and provide German firms
with other business opportunities.213 Pan-German cultural ideologues saw it as “the quintessential
pioneering work of German culture and civilization,” which “would make Anatolia and Mesopotamia
susceptible to unfettered colonization, exploration, modernization, and exploitation.” 214 For the
Ottomans, the railway was none of these things, being instead a facilitator in the process of unifying the
Empire, consolidating the regime’s power, and preventing further territorial degradation of Turkey. 215
Initial reactions in Britain were muted. Early on, British diplomats embraced the German
scheme, seeing Anglo-German cooperation in the project as necessary “as a set-off to the Russians in
Persia.”216 The press echoed these sentiments, with an article in the Northants Evening Telegraph
serving as a representative example:
This gigantic railway will be, when actually constructed, even of greater significance than the
great Siberian railroad. For it will block the road for Russia by which she threatens one day to
intercept England’s road to India. Diyarbakir, in the heart of Eastern Armenia, is the recognised
objective of Russia as to the strategic centre of the Near East. The new railway will pass south of
that town, and will bar the way of advance into Syria.217
The press was also sanguine about future British participation in the project, with the same article
saying: “the British capitalist will not show up for the first year or two, but he will be in reserve, and will
at last mainly own the line which is to regenerate the Near East.” 218 As the financing for the railway was
uncertain, there was an opportunity for British interests to get involved in the project. The German
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Foreign Office stymied that effort amid a downturn in Anglo-German relations, refusing to allow British
private finance to participate without concessions from the British government in other theaters.219
“Berlin’s extortionist proclivities” in this matter “fuelled the suspicions of British diplomats,” disabusing
many of them of their notions of a positive Anglo-German relationship and intensifying the growing antiGerman feeling in the Foreign Office.220
These feelings were exacerbated in 1903, when a revised concession meant to jumpstart
construction and assuage financial concerns was sought by a new consortium under the name of the
Baghdad Railway Company (BRC).221 Before the signing of a new concession, the British government
agreed in principle to support the project; when news of this leaked, the British press took umbrage.222
The National Review led the assault on this proposal, writing in April 1903:
There is every reason to believe that so far from having learnt from the Venezuelan mess 223 the
necessity of keeping this country free from all entanglements with Germany, that deplorable
episode has had a similar effect upon our Mandarins as dram-drinking in other classes: the
victim simply craves for more.224
The Spectator, the Morning Post, Daily Chronicle, and Daily Mail all chimed in, with several Conservative
MPs as well as Joseph Chamberlain also registering disapproval.225 This blowback made British
participation in the Baghdad project a political impossibility and the Balfour government was forced to
back out, exacerbating Anglo-German tensions at governmental level.226
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The 1903 concession signed by the Ottoman government and the BRC had benefits for both
Turkey and Germany. It allowed eight years for the construction of a main line from Konya to Basra via
Baghdad, with branch lines along the way227, as well as telegraph poles every sixty-five feet of track and
a series of Ottoman military installations.228 To compensate the BRC for footing the bill, the Sublime
Porte provided annual revenue guarantees – eleven thousand francs per kilometer of active track and
four thousand five hundred francs per kilometer of track in progress.229 The BRC would also gain the
ability to exploit any natural resources along the route, tariff exclusions for railway material and rolling
stock, and the concession to build and operate any other infrastructure, including ports, which would
facilitate construction.230 The foreign reaction to this deal was to focus exclusively on the perceived
German victory as “the prelude of a peaceful German conquest of the Ottoman Empire.” 231 The
governments of Russia, France, and Britain all complained about the arrangement’s German character
and the expansion of its influence in the Near East as a forward thrust of Weltpolitik.232 The British press,
and not just the usual jingoist suspects, was hostile:
Even the man-in-the-street knows that this line has for its ultimate aim the opening of an
overland route from the Mediterranean through Asia Minor and Persia to India. Furthermore, it
is an open secret that Germany aspires to control it both politically and commercially; it was for
that reason that the late Unionist Government declined to become a partner in the
undertaking.233
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As progress on the railway continued, Germany became more invested in it and the British more
concerned. In early 1906, Karl Helfferich left Deutsche Bank for a job as Second Director of the Anatolian
Railway, giving him direct control over the German interest in the Baghdad Railway and signaling that
country’s investment in the project.234 He sought to promote private investment in the railway and the
new commercial ventures which would follow it, a strategy supported by Bülow, who wished to keep
German government spending focused on naval construction.235 British officials tried several times to
slow the railway’s progress and reduce its commercial viability, using its financial levers with the
Ottoman government to prioritize Turkish debt service over the payment of rate guarantees.236 Despite
these efforts, progress on the railway continued and Turco-German bonds tightened.
Starting in 1906, the Ottoman Empire allowed Germany’s HAPAG shipping company to start
regular service to the Persian Gulf, a move which stoked British fears about the creation of a viable
alternate route to the Indian Ocean.237 Alongside the increase in German maritime investment in the
Ottoman lands came a new push from the Persian government to link the Baghdad Railway to Tehran,
countering Anglo-Russian dominance in Persia and opening a new frontier for German commerce. 238
These developments were significant factors in the making of the “unmakeable entente” between
Britain and Russia in 1907, settling their imperial differences and focusing on countering the rising
German threat.239 This new alliance would have world-historical importance in the medium-term, but in
the short-run, Germany saw itself as in a good place with respect to the Ottoman Empire.240 The

234

Grimmer-Solem, 362.
Ibid.
236
Grimmer-Solem, 362-363.
237
Grimmer-Solem, 363-364.
238
Grimmer-Solem, 364.
239
Maloney, 15.
240
McMurray, 70.
235

165
hardening of the Triple Entente solidified German resolve to “go it alone in financing the Baghdad
railway,” and cemented the Turco-German strategic partnership.241
All of this would come crashing down in the summer of 1908, when a group of disaffected
liberals calling themselves the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) – also known as the Young Turks
– led an insurrection against Abdul Hamid’s authority and his perceived closeness with the Germans.242
The turbulence of this period – and the Anglophile leanings of the CUP leadership – threw the Baghdad
Railway into limbo, something Britain tried to exploit.243 The main goal of the British was to stop the
railway at Basra, instead of the 1908 proposal to extend the line into Kuwait, where Germany could gain
a greater strategic foothold on the shores of the Persian Gulf. 244 Pratt explained why:
It would have come into collision with British policy, interests and prestige in the East. It would
have given the German and Turkish allies an excuse for creating at Kuwait a harbour, with
wharves, docks, warehouses, etc., which might be converted into a naval and military base
capable of serving far different purposes than those of trade and commerce—those, namely, of
a new line of advance on India. It would, in combination with the control already exercised by
the Deutsche Bank over the railways in European Turkey, have assured to Germany the means
of sending her Naval forces or her troops, together with supplies and ammunition, direct to the
Persian Gulf, either to strengthen her fleet or to carry out any further designs she might cherish
in the domain of Weltpolitik as affecting the Far East. It would have meant that, as far as the
head of the Persian Gulf, at least, rail-power would have rendered her less dependent on the
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exercise of sea-power, on her own account, and would have enabled her to neutralise, also, as
far as the said Gulf, the sea-power of England.245
The events of 1908 forced the Germans to reconsider their desire to extend the railway to
Kuwait and contemplate some sort of arrangement with the British so as to at least complete the
sections of the project which they had already begun.246 Anglo-German plans in 1909 to internationalize
part of the railway failed, as British diplomats distrusted their German counterparts; the hostility and
distrust which had steadily built over the prior decades made their impact felt.247 In 1910, the Sublime
Porte approached British financiers, asking if they would like to take over from the Germans on the
railway project; the British declined, as their goal was not so much control over the Baghdad Railway as
it was stopping construction entirely and containing German Weltpolitik.248 After this abortive attempt,
Turkey began to look back to Germany for support; the efforts of Helfferich and the engineer Meißner
played important roles in convincing the Young Turk leadership that Germany could be a trustworthy
partner.249 Further political complications and coups within Turkey eventually brought the German
faction back into power for good, and with that accelerated railway construction. 250 After 1911, the
British and German governments approached agreement on the Baghdad Railway, eventually signing a
convention on June 15, 1914 – two weeks before the assassination of Franz Ferdinand and less than two
months before the outbreak of war – cautiously settling the issues of the railway’s terminus, riverine
shipping in Mesopotamia, and its financing.251
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In contrast to the reduced importance of the Baghdad Railway to the British and German
governments, the press and public opinion became more inflamed. German pundits were open about
the anti-British dual-use design of the project, 1911 being a banner year in that regard. Dr. Paul
Rohrbach, a German expert on Weltpolitik, published his book Die Baghdadbahn that year, in which he
laid out the importance of the Turkish alliance and the role the railway played in threatening England:
There is, in fact, only one means possible by which Germany can resist a war of aggression by
England, and that is the strengthening of Turkey. England can, from Europe, be attacked by land
and mortally wounded only in one place—Egypt. If England were to lose Egypt she would lose,
not only her control over the Suez Canal and her connexions with India and the Far East, but,
presumably, also, her possessions in Central and East Africa. The conquest of Egypt by a
Mohammedan Power, such as Turkey, might, in addition, have a dangerous effect on her
60,000,000 Mohammedan subjects in India, besides being to her prejudice in Afghanistan and
Persia. Turkey, however, can never dream of recovering Egypt until she controls a fullydeveloped railway system in Asia Minor and Syria; until, by the extension of the Anatolian
Railway to Baghdad, she can resist an attack by England on Mesopotamia; until her army has
been increased and improved; and until progress has been made in her general economic and
financial conditions. … The policy of supporting Turkey which is now being followed by Germany
has no other purpose than that of effecting a strong measure against the danger of war with
England.252
These anti-British aims were echoed throughout the press, including in left-wing outlets. The socialist
paper Leipziger Volkszeitung wrote that “the new situation shortly to be created in Asia Minor would
hasten the break-up of the British Empire, which was already beginning to totter," while the influential
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Marxist Karl Radek wrote in Die Neue Zeit that “The Baghdad Railway being a blow at the interests of
English Imperialism, Turkey could only entrust its construction to the German Company because she
knew that Germany's army and navy stood behind her, which fact makes it appear to England and Russia
inadvisable to exert too sensitive a pressure upon Turkey.”253 Academics joined these sentiments too.
Professor R. Mangelsdorf wrote in the Akademische Blätter that “To some extent, indeed, Turkey's
construction of a railway system is a threat to England, for it means that an attack on the most
vulnerable part of the body of England's world-empire, namely Egypt, comes well within the bounds of
possibility.”254
British observers took these messages seriously. Edwin Pratt saw the Baghdad Railway as
directly linked with the German imperial railways in Africa in a strategy meant to end “in the eventual
creation of a Cape-to-Cairo German-African Empire.”255 His summary of the perceived goals of the
Baghdad Railway – and, indeed, German strategic railways across the world – is worth quoting in full:
The programme of Weltpolitik comprised in the German schemes embraced not only countries
but continents. In addition to the aspirations cherished as regards Europe, that programme
aimed at the eventual annexation to the German Empire of three other Empires—the Turkish,
the Indian, and a new one to be known as the German-African. It was further to secure the
means of sending troops direct from Germany via Constantinople and the Baghdad Railway to
the frontiers of Persia for possible operations against that country in combination with the
Turkish military forces, these having first been brought under German control. The Baghdad
Railway itself was, in the same way, and with like support, to afford to Germany the means of
threatening Russian interests both in Persia and in Trans-Caucasia. It was to nullify England's sea
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power in the Mediterranean, if not, to a certain extent—through the establishment of a new
Power at the gate of India—in the Far East, as well. It would, as Mahan showed, have flanked
our communications with Australia, giving Germany an advantage in this direction, also, had
Asia and Africa failed to satisfy her aspirations. Regarded from the point of view of its designed
effect on the destinies of nations, on the balance of political power, and on the reconstruction
of the world's forces—all for the aggrandisement of a single people—the full programme must
be looked upon as the most ambitious and the most unscrupulous project of world-conquest
that has yet been placed on record in the history of mankind. For its attainment, however, it
clearly depended no less upon rail-transport than upon force of arms; and in this respect it
represented Germany's greatest attempt to apply, in practice, that principle of rail-power to
which she had devoted eight decades of inquiry, trial and organisation. 256
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Chapter VIII: Telecommunications
The electric telegraph, invented in the 1830s, revolutionized communications, economics, and
geopolitics, inaugurating an era of mass media, near-instantaneous interaction, and global connection. 1
George Parkin, the Canadian writer and prominent advocate for imperial federation, said in 1894 at the
Ottawa Colonial Conference that the telegraph was “a new nervous system” of the world. 2 The most
economically and strategically important telecommunications infrastructure was not the easilydisrupted land-based system which passed through several different countries, but the submarine
cables which crossed oceans and connected continents.3 The telegraph was initially viewed positively –
Kipling’s poem “The Deep-Sea Cables” is a stirring testament to the idea of the telegraph as an
instrument of comity4 – but this soon shifted when governments saw the benefit of “an efficient and
secure means of communication, and … a vital part of the network of imperial defence.”5 Proponents of
the telegraph began to see it as granting a “marked advantage” to any power to “send … orders all over
the world safe from interruption,” direct officers on the battlefield, and “concentrate for a crushing
attack against a foe who must needs remain divided.”6 Cables could be used to censor information
during war or to intercept the communications of rival powers, which was viewed as important as mass
media became more prevalent and the manipulation of popular opinion politically necessary.7 Given the
fact that it was such a novel technology, wartime rules around telecommunications were unsettled
between 1880 and 1914.8 The cutting of enemy cables was frowned upon in public, but all of the powers
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reserved the right to use this tactic in war9; indeed, British strategic planning included cable-cutting as
one of the key initial tasks in case of conflict.10 Cables were considered a tool of imperial control,
allowing home governments to gather and disseminate information across the world, as well as being, in
the words of Lord Brassey, Governor of Victoria (Australia), “a great imperial binding force.” 11
Cables were a classic dual-use technology, with both economic and imperial benefits, and
Britain was at the forefront of their development12, being the only power to have the market demand,
commercial and financial organization, and widely-dispersed imperial possessions to warrant a global
cable network (Figure IX in Appendix).13 Foreigners saw this network as one of the bulwarks of the
British world system; General Bernhardi wrote:
England at the same time girdled the earth with her cables and fleets. She thus attained to a sort
of world-sovereignty. She has tried to found a new universal Empire; not, indeed, by spiritual or
secular weapons, like Pope and Emperor in bygone days, but by the power of money, by making
all material interests dependent on herself.14
In 1887, British concerns owned seventy percent of the world’s undersea cables, and this only dropped
to sixty-three percent when competition ramped up at the turn of the twentieth century.15 The main
lines connecting Europe to India, South America, East Asia, and Africa, controlling the traffic travelling
across the world, were under British control.16 Undersea cables were vital to British investments in
South America17, and were called the “keys to the continent” of Africa by Cecil Rhodes.18 The industry
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concentration in British hands was reflected not just in the ownership of the actual cables; British
companies were also the dominant players in laying and repairing undersea cables.19 These businesses,
centered around the near-monopoly Eastern Group founded by John Pender 20, owned the purpose-built
ships needed to conduct such a delicate technological enterprise. In 1896, for instance, British firms
owned twenty-four of the thirty cable ships in the world, including the Great Eastern and the Hooper,
the two largest ships in existence at the time.21 British interests also “possessed a virtual monopoly of
the vital gutta-percha, which was used to insulate the wires,” a necessity for submarine cables.22
This dominance was created through a confluence of factors. The dynamism and global
nature of the British economy, as well as its growing dependence on invisible exports, fostered the
expansion of telegraphy. Governments promoted this growth in multiple ways, helping to form a
powerful telecommunications industry with London at its heart23, most notably by enticing all cable
companies to land their cables on British soil, regardless of origin or ownership. 24 Unlike its competitors,
the British government did not demand reduced rates for government business from companies in
exchange for granting landing rights25, and this encouraged cables from across the globe to land in
Britain before continuing to their final destination, cementing it as the “telegraph exchange of the
world.”26 This informational hegemony was vital to the British imperial synthesis, allowing enhanced
commercial intelligence to reduce transaction costs, create accurate prices, and aid in investment
decisions.27 The contemporary German historian Thomas Lenschau wrote that:
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All important commercial and political news were known in England two to three hours before
the Continent, a fact that one needs only say, in order to recognize what an incredible
advantage it gives English firms over their competitors in international trade.28
Parliament also provided subsidies for building specific lines, payments which expanded rapidly
alongside the telegraph network and totaled nearly three million pounds by 1900. 29 These public-private
partnerships, although de jure informal, were, in fact, tightly bound.30 In exchange for state support,
telecommunications companies were expected to cooperate with the government during wartime,
censoring or stopping information from passing their cables and operating under the auspices of the
Royal Navy to cut enemy cables.31 The Eastern Group was particularly entwined with the government,
being included in discussions of cable strategy and trading strategic construction for monopoly rights. 32
Daniel Headrick summarizes this approach and its results: “Companies that served the British Empire
and cooperated closely with the British government flourished, while British companies that served
foreign countries shriveled and were swallowed up, either by their competitors or by their clients.” 33 The
combination of commercial and strategic benefits to the expansive British telegraph network were
recognized by the French government in 1900: “England owes her influence in the world perhaps more
to her cable communications than to her navy. She controls the news, and makes it serve her policy and
commerce in a marvellous manner.”34
British cable dominance was largely unchallenged until the turn of the twentieth century; this
new competition, some of which originated from Germany, was driven more by political factors than by
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economic ones.35 As we have seen, the 1890s were a key decade for the Anglo-German relationship,
seeing a change from wary competition to outright hostility – a change which happened in both nations.
The rivalry in telecommunications was no different. Germany was concerned about the impact British
cable dominance had on news and information from far-off lands; most of the news coming out of
colonial theaters was reported by British Reuters correspondents, carried on British-owned cables, and
slanted in a pro-British direction.36 This allowed Britain to shape the information environment to its
advantage in disputes with Germany, including in the Samoan crisis of 1894, when Britain downplayed
German interests in the area.37 The issue would arise again during the brouhaha over the Kruger
Telegram in 1896, when Britain sent its ‘flying squadron’ to Delagoa Bay and used its power to limit
external communications from the Transvaal.38 The Conservative paper Kreuzzeitung suggested in
January 1896 that one lesson to be learned from the British reaction was the “impossibility of allowing
England to control the underseas cables.”39
Britain also stymied German telegraph plans throughout the 1890s, setting the stage for
further competition after the turn of the century. After the Sino-Japanese War and Treaty of
Shimonoseki, the British and Germans each gained footholds in China and needed to link them into the
broader telegraph network via undersea cable.40 Germany proposed a joint venture linking its
possession of Tsingtao, Britain’s Weihaiwei, and Russia’s Port Arthur to a cable which would then go on
to Hong Kong – another British territory – and from there into the wider undersea network. 41 For
strategic reasons laid out by the Admiralty, the British rejected this idea, instead granting Eastern a
monopoly of landing rights in Weihaiwei and Hong Kong in exchange for the company laying a British
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line between the two harbors.42 Britain not only disrupted plans for Anglo-German cables, but also
interfered with Germany’s own projects which might impinge on British hegemony. The most important
example of this in the 1890s was the Azores Affair of 1894, when Germany, due to its increasing trade
with the Western Hemisphere, sought to lay a cable running under the Atlantic Ocean. 43 Given the
distances involved, the cable would have to land at two intermediate locations: the Azores Islands,
owned by Portugal, and Porthcurno, at the tip of Cornwall in England, where the main cables from
Eastern landed.44 Eastern gained a concession from Portugal to use the Azores, and both were
interested in the German proposal – Portugal saw it as a better link to its possessions abroad and
Eastern liked the fact that they would control a line which gave them more direct access to Germany
and Central Europe without interference from the British authorities.45 The German government and
Eastern agreed, and the Germans signed a contract with a cable manufacturer on August 17, 1894,
putting in a perfunctory request to the British government for landing rights in Porthcurno a few days
later.46 As we have seen, British policy was generally liberal and allowed nearly all foreign cables to land
on its soil. This was an exception to that rule: the government denied the German request in October
1894, citing a previous agreement that all Anglo-German cables would be jointly owned by the two
governments.47 According to the contemporary French telecommunications expert Charles Lesage
writing in 1915, this was a significant event48:
The British Cabinet, which indeed almost always agreed to landing requests, refused the House
of Felten und Guilleaume49 the right to establish a station at Porthcurno. It was a big event in
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the telegraphic world. In Germany, the big English companies were bitterly accused of having
exerted pressure on the Government. Presumably, this accusation is well founded; what is
certain is that the threat of German competition caused much emotion in London, in the
political world, and also among the people of the City.50
In one respect, Lesage was incorrect: this was not a decision driven only by commercial concerns. The
government hoped to disrupt this line to prevent a link which could bypass British control and create
cracks in its informational hegemony.51
The Boer War was last event of the 1890s which brought a new era of cable competition.
During this conflict, Britain used its information dominance to cut off communications to the whole of
South Africa – including direct government communications from neutral powers to their agents in the
region (Figure X in Appendix).52 This drew howls of protest from Germany, which resented British
interference in its internal diplomatic communications and legitimate commercial interests.53 The
wartime censorship regime would not end until July 1902, proving to Germany that Britain would use its
cable supremacy to its own advantage.54 The reaction to these events was significant: Germany got into
the cable industry with gusto. A British newspaper wrote about the upcoming launch of Germany’s first
cable ship in October 1899, seeing it as the start of a new era: “Hitherto, Germany has played practically
no part in the work of laying submarine cables. Henceforward, however, she will probably figure
conspicuously in this department of human activity.”55 This prognostication was correct, and sparked a
new cable fever in Britain, this time with a direct strategic bent.
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Strategic considerations began to play a key role in British cable strategy after 1870, largely
due to the importance of India to the British world system (Figure XI).56 As British territory expanded,
cable communications to the outposts of empire became more necessary, and the fear of disruption of
lines of communication more urgent.57 Strategists saw vulnerabilities in the cable system, namely the
reliance on single lines of transmission, the fact that these lines often followed well-traveled trade
routes, and the passage of crucial cables through non-British territory.58 The Courier of Dundee worried
that:
Great Britain is supposed to have a virtual monopoly of submarine cables, and statistics bear out
the supposition. But British control of many of the lines is subjected to geographical conditions
which diminish, and in some cases neutralise, their strategic value.59
The Colonial Defence Committee – formed in 1885 after a cable scare in China and including
representatives from the Admiralty and the Colonial, Foreign, India, and War offices – created a task
force in 1891 to investigate submarine cables and formulate a strategy.60 The primary finding of the
committee – besides the need to include cable communications under the defense establishment and
not the Board of Trade or Colonial Office61 – was that Britain should create an ‘all red’62 cable system
which “linked all parts of the Empire without ever touching foreign soil.”63 This ‘all red’ network
expanded significantly in the late nineteenth century, linking India eastwards to Singapore, Hong Kong,
Australia, and New Zealand, and westwards to Aden, which already had connections to Zanzibar,
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Mozambique, and the Cape via Durban.64 The surfeit of naval bases and coaling stations controlled by
Britain made creating these strategic routes a viable proposition, but it also created difficulties for
military planners who would now have to prepare to defend a vastly dispersed territory. 65
According to Paul Kennedy, British cable strategists “developed a virtual fetish” for ‘all-red’
routes in the years before the Great War and sought to create redundancies and duplicative lines across
the network to increase survivability and keep communications open in wartime. 66 Several of these lines
were laid in the aftermath of the Boer War, which tested British cable dominance and brought Germany
into the contest for cable supremacy.67 Redundant cables were laid around the western coast of Africa,
but in far deeper water to prevent attack, running from Cape Town to St. Helena to Ascension to Sierra
Leone; further duplicative lines were laid under the Indian Ocean, connecting Durban to Singapore via
Mauritius, the Seychelles, Ceylon, and Australia.68 The most important strategic cable laid before 1914
was the Pacific cable, which would cross the entirety of the Pacific Ocean and link Canada to Australia,
connecting from there to India (Figure XII in Appendix).69 This had been requested for years by Canadian
and Australian politicians for commercial reasons, as it would provide competition to the existing
Eastern-owned routes which were forever increasing their transmission fees.70 Eastern lobbied the
government hard on the issue, and succeeded in delaying the cable for several years; it was only
approved by the Colonial Office under the leadership of Joseph Chamberlain, who saw it as necessary to
British strategic preparedness and imperial unity.71 Parliament passed the Pacific Cable Bill in August
1901, considering the cable as a quid pro quo for Canadian and Australian military service in the Boer
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War.72 The cable was completed in October 1902 and stretched from Vancouver to Australia and New
Zealand via Fanning Island, Fiji, and Norfolk Island; the uninterrupted three thousand four hundred fifty
miles from Vancouver to Fanning Island was the longest stretch of submarine cable in the world73,
requiring the construction of a new ship, the Colonia, to hold it.74 Through the pre-war years, British
cable strategy balanced commercial and strategic considerations, trying to retain British informational
hegemony, while creating ‘all-red’ routes that would inevitably lead to international cable competition. 75
The Inter-Departmental Committee on Cable Communications of 1902 detailed this conundrum, writing:
We have not found it easy to formulate a general rule. We think, however, that appreciable but
not paramount value must be attached to all-British routes; and we regard it as desirable that
every important colony or naval base should possess one cable to this country which touches
only on British territory or on the territory of some friendly neutral. We think that, after this,
there should be as many alternative cables as possible, but that these should be allowed to
follow the normal routes suggested by commercial considerations.76
By 1911, British planners considered the ‘all red’ system complete, providing Britain with secure
submarine communications to all of its myriad imperial outposts.77 This dominance was not taken lightly
by Germany, and in the years from 1900 to 1914 it worked to undermine British cable supremacy and
create its own network of international communications.
In 1898, the British cable strategy did not even include Germany as a potential foe 78; by 1911,
Germany was the pacing threat which dominated the minds of the British planners. 79 This was of a piece
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with the rise in the Anglo-German antagonism over these years, and was driven by economic and
strategic concerns in both nations. Germany was expanding its international trade, and telegraphy was
no outlier in this regard, with the number of telegrams exchanged between the United States and
Germany rising tenfold from 1880 to 1901, and doubling from 1901 to 1910.80 The primary driving factor
in the German cable industry, however, was politics. The events of the 1890s proved to the government
that British cables could not be trusted and that Germany must play a large part in the future of the field
if it wished to achieve its world aims.81 Germany’s relative dearth of imperial possessions and its late
start to the colonial race put it at a disadvantage; German leadership in scientific and technical fields, as
well as the government’s promotion of navalism and Weltpolitik made those challenges surmountable.82
Germany did build up a significant cable network to its own colonies, but the construction of its own ‘all
red’ network was impossible without acquisition of further territories.83 One mitigating strategy used
was to lay lines between neutral stations – for instance, the cable route from the Azores to the United
States which was, after the setbacks of 1894, finally completed in 190084 – so as to deter British cablecutting during war.85 Still, many German-owned stations in neutral countries relied on British workers to
run them, as they remained the undisputed leaders in the technical competencies needed to operate
the lines, making them unreliable as a means of wartime communication. 86
Germany laid cables to many of its strategic interests in this period, dovetailing with other
infrastructure projects, both railway and maritime. One key region was the Ottoman Empire, where
German interests were growing at a faster pace than the infrastructure which supported them. German
communications with Turkey in the early 1890s had to pass through multiple other nations, on lines

80

Headrick, 106.
Ibid.
82
Headrick, 105-107.
83
Kennedy, Cable, 743.
84
Headrick, 107.
85
Kennedy, Cable, 743-744.
86
Kennedy, Cable, 748.
81

181
owned by British and Russian firms; a company was founded in 1899 to rectify this situation by running a
German-owned cable through Hungary and Rumania to Constantinople.87 British interests blocked this
cable for years, and landing rights in Constantinople were only granted in 1905 after Germany
threatened to cut off the major land telegraph line which passed through its territory. 88 Germany also
wished to run lines alongside the Baghdad Railway, improving communications along the route by which
it sought to undermine British strategy and commerce. In 1908, after the railway construction was well
underway, Germany planned to lay an undersea cable from its terminus at Basra, under the Persian Gulf
and Indian Ocean, to Goa and Sumatra.89 The powers which would need to grant a concession for this
cable, Portugal and Turkey, refused under intense British pressure.90 In 1913, Germany directly asked
the Foreign Office to drop these objections; the British response was a resounding negative: “Sir E. Grey
is advised that Germany has no great commercial need for a cable such as that described and he is
accordingly led to the conclusion that the object of the request is political.”91 A more successful German
project was its joint venture with the Dutch to run a line from Germany’s Pacific possessions and the
Dutch East Indies to Manila, where an American Pacific cable was to land. 92 The completion of this route
in 1904 connected Germany with its Pacific colonies on non-British cables, a primary goal of the
government.93 The contemporary German writer Richard Hennig explained the purely strategic motive
for these cables: “The new lines do not meet any requirement of business nor any requirement of
peace, their purpose is much more an eminently strategic one, and just laying them constitutes a move
against British cable policy.”94 In addition, Germany wished to run cables to South America to aid in its
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growing pursuit of business interests there; unfortunately, the landing rights in Brazil – the only
potential outlet for this cable – were owned exclusively by the French government. 95 Surprisingly, the
French and Germans were able to come to an agreement on these lines – a rare moment of cooperation
between the two powers aimed at undercutting the British cable supremacy.96 Despite the success of
the arrangement, Charles Lesage saw a major downside which directly contributed to the push towards
war97:
May I, moreover, add here that the rather abnormal negotiations of which I speak were one of
those miscellaneous facts which contributed to mislead Germany as to the true nature of
France's relations with England, that is to say, led him to believe that the Franco-English
understanding was little, even less than a piece of paper.98
This misperception of the seriousness of the Dual Entente led Germany to underestimate the potential
British support for France in wartime, something the Germans would come to regret.
A newer telecommunications technology – the wireless telegraph, or radio – was brought into
the Anglo-German economic-strategic competition from the start.99 The first successful public
demonstrations of the radio were conducted in Britain in 1896 and 1897 by Guglielmo Marconi, and his
technology was adopted by the British navy in 1900 for wireless ship-based communications. 100
Germany was especially impressed by this invention and saw it as a means of freeing its strategic and
commercial communications from the British cable hegemony.101 The government forced a merger
between the two largest German radio companies in 1903, creating the conglomerate Telefunken, and
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heavily boosting it by granting patent protection, subsidies, and military orders.102 Germany believed
that radio would allow it to fully bypass the British-dominated cable system, and began to create
powerful transmission stations in its colonies to communicate with Berlin.103 The distances to be
covered were significant, as Germany’s closest colony was Togo, five thousand kilometers away, and the
next closest to Togo was a further three thousand kilometers.104 By 1914, the connection to Togo was
complete, as were stations across the Pacific and Africa; these wireless links were powered by some of
the most advanced technologies in the sector.105 Britain also built a wireless chain, but it was nowhere
near as crucial to its strategy; its military planners saw radio as easily intercepted, insecure, and
unreliable.106 British strategists acknowledged the greater level of competition in wireless as opposed to
wired telegraphy, reporting to the Committee of Imperial Defence in February 1914 that Britain had not
gained a principal place in radio communications and that Germany was “particularly active in this
direction.”107 For Britain, wireless was a complement to its dominance of the undersea cables; for
Germany, it was a substitute.108
All in all, telecommunications – both wired and wireless – were a major theater of the AngloGerman conflict between 1880 and 1914. As with other forms of infrastructure, Anglo-German
economic-strategic competition was rife in this domain. Charles Lesage noted this, writing in 1915 on
the cable-war109:
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A manifestation, legitimate so far, of German imperialism, the execution of the submarine
network is an episode in the general struggle engaged in for twenty years between Germany
and England for predominance in the world.110
Despite its efforts to overcome British communications hegemony, Germany was still at a significant
disadvantage when the war began.111 Daniel Headrick summarizes the British communications
dominance in the years before the war:
Great Britain had finally achieved the ultimate goal of communications strategy: Its own cable
network was invulnerable to attack or interference, and it had the ability to spy on its enemies
or isolate them from the rest of the world. It was an important weapon in the world wars to
come.112
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Conclusion
“In the beginning of the twentieth century men were everywhere unconscious of the rate at which the
world was growing. It required the convulsion of war to awaken the nations to the knowledge of their
strength. For a year after the war had begun hardly anyone understood how terrific, how almost
inexhaustible were the resources in force, in substance, in virtue, behind every one of the combatants.
The vials of wrath were full: but so were the reservoirs of power. … And when the dread signal of
Armageddon was made, mankind was found to be many times stronger in valour, in endurance, in
brains, in science, in apparatus, in organisation, not only than it had ever been before, but than even its
most audacious optimists had dared to dream.”1
- Winston Churchill, The World Crisis (1923)
On June 28, 1914 – two weeks after the signing of the Anglo-German agreement on the
Baghdad Railway and just three days after the reopening of the Kiel Canal – the heir to the AustroHungarian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, was assassinated in the streets of Sarajevo by a Serbian
ultranationalist named Gavrilo Princip.2 In the turbulent weeks that followed, the infrastructure that
would become the sinews of war rumbled to life: diplomats hurried between European capitals via
railway and sent crucial messages to their counterparts via telegraph. The speed of modern
communication and transit hastened events and drew all of Europe into what was initially a Balkan
conflict.3 The ultimata sent from Vienna to Belgrade were carried on telegraph wires and relied on this
immediacy to rationalize the brief windows of reply they required. 4 In fact, the Austrian declaration of
war on Serbia was the first ever sent by telegraph, and would be followed quickly by others as the rest
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of the continent was pulled into the conflict.5 Telegrams from Belgium beseeching Britain for assistance
and France notifying the British that they were going to the Belgians’ aid arrived in London on August 4,
1914, and were discussed in the House of Commons by Prime Minister H.H. Asquith the next day in
support of his request for a vote of credit to prepare for war.6 Britain sent its own ultimatum via
telegraph to Germany on August 4, and newspapers reported that “the telegrams show … that England
is now at war with Germany.”7 The railways of Europe became clogged with troop trains in the mad rush
to mobilize according to rigid, pre-planned timetables.
The contingencies of Summer 1914 are numerous – from the unfortunate wrong turn taken
by the Archduke’s driver on June 28 to the interpretations of the ultimata sent around Europe – proving
that war was not inevitable.8 Indeed, it came as a surprise to many across the Continent; government
officials were on holiday, military planners were caught unready, and diplomats were confounded by the
responses – or lack thereof – of their counterparts.9 Still, war seemed unavoidable to some, including
British Foreign Secretary Edward Grey, who famously recounted in his memoirs how he felt the night
before war was declared on Germany:
A friend came to see me on one of the evenings of the last week – he thinks it was on Monday,
August 3. We were standing at the window of my room in the Foreign Office. It was getting
dusk, and the lamps were being lit in the space below on which we were looking. My friend
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recalls that I remarked on this with the words: “The lamps are going out all over Europe; we
shall not see them lit again in our life-time.”10
The war which arose from the July Crisis was the most pervasive and destructive the world
had ever seen. It was fought in totality, with whole populations mobilizing at the behest of their
governments for military or economic service, and the use of armaments which caused profound
devastation to buildings and bodies. Grey writes of the redefinition of conflict driven by the Great War:
‘War’ is the same word as it was a century ago, but it is no longer the same thing. It used to
imply a contest between armies; it will henceforth, by common consent, mean the destruction
by chemical agencies, of the crowded centres of population; it will mean physical, moral, and
economic ruin.11
The human cost of the war was immense: about ten million soldiers killed, double that number seriously
wounded, several million civilians dead of starvation or targeted directly, and nearly twenty million dead
of influenza.12 The economic costs were enormous as well, not only in the destruction of property and
industry, but also in the dislocations and reorientation of the world economic system.13 “The full extent
of the economic disaster of the war is not yet known,” Grey wrote in his memoirs in 1925, “Europe is
still engaged in grappling with it; we have certainly not seen the end of it; it is possible that we have not
seen the worst of it.”14 The war’s social impact was similarly huge, because of the unprecedented need
for manpower in factories and at the front.15 These social changes varied from country to country, but
none were spared from the volatility; the pre-war social order – and indeed the world order altogether –
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would be forever altered.16 Grey summarized the enormity of this upheaval and its different impacts
across Europe:
Six Great European Powers took part in the war. France is the only one of them of which it can
be said that the social and political order has not been changed to an extent and degree that
seemed impossible or incredible to us in 1914. Russia has had a revolution and is in a condition
that seems to baffle description; Germany is a Republic; Italy has had a revolution sufficient to
change her whole political system; and Austria-Hungary, as a Great Power, has disappeared.
Britain has had a Labour Government, though, according to our precedents, we are making our
revolution slowly and by constitutional methods.17
Despite its contingent origins, this total war did not spontaneously generate. If the lamps were indeed
going out all across Europe in 1914, they began dimming far earlier than that.
The First World War was, in the words of Arthur Marwick, “the ultimate expression of the
German challenge to British supremacy.”18 The challenge was decades in the making. The war itself may
not have been preordained, but any military conflict between Britain and Germany was bound to be as
total as the rivalry in peacetime. There were several other conflicts which came to a head in Summer
1914, but none matched the rancor and pervasiveness of that between London and Berlin. Germany had
several war scares with France surrounding the issue of Alsace-Lorraine, and had rattled sabres with the
Russians over their spheres of influence. Britain nearly came to blows with Russia at Penjdeh in 1885
and with France at Fashoda in 1898, but neither border skirmish resulted in widespread European war.
The all-encompassing nature of the Anglo-German competition from 1880 to 1914 helps to explain the
totality of the war which followed it.
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The nature of the German challenge to the British world system was unlike that of any other
power; Germany’s rise endangered all aspects of British hegemony – cultural, political, military,
economic, and strategic. This multifaceted threat was aimed directly at the heart of the British-led
status quo, something acknowledged in both nations. Germany’s ambassador in London spoke to
Colonel John Seely, Under-Secretary of State for War, explaining how Germany was not a satiated power
and its Weltpolitik had not yet run its course: “Our people do not like your status quo. It means that for
all time you will have command of the whole of the sea and all the best places in the land. Our people
cannot accept your status quo.”19 The British press saw the rivalry in similar terms. The Spectator of May
20, 1911 wrote: “There is an inevitable conflict of ideals between Germany and Great Britain, between
the satisfied nation and the unsatisfied nation, between the nation which desires to maintain the status
quo and the nation which desires to alter it.”20 No other Great Power competition was as ubiquitous,
and none reached the same peaks of antagonism. The geopolitical story of the years between 1880 and
1914 is not only of the rise of the Anglo-German enmity, but also of its dominance over all other
European international matters. What began as wary competition shifted dramatically to outright
hostility. This was evident to observers in both empires in the years before war. General Bernhardi was
indicative of the overall German feeling:
The official statements of the English statesmen have, in spite of all pacific assurances, shown
clearly that the paths of English policy lead in the direction which I have indicated. The warning
against aggressive intentions issued to Germany, and the assurance that England would support
her allies if necessary with the sword, clearly define the limits that Germany may not transgress
if she wishes to avoid war with England. … In this position of affairs it would be more than ever
foolish to count on any change in English policy. Even English attempts at a rapprochement must
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not blind us as to the real situation. We may at most use them to delay the necessary and
inevitable war until we may fairly imagine we have some prospect of success. If the Imperial
Government was of the opinion that it was necessary in the present circumstances to avoid war,
still the situation in the world generally shows there can only be a short respite before we once
more face the question whether we will draw the sword for our position in the world or
renounce such position once and for all.21
In 1907, Viscount Esher, member of the Committee of Imperial Defence, explained why Germany was
the only logical enemy of British world power:
Meanwhile the Germans proceed unabashed on their way, and have their objectives clearly in
view. The German prestige, rising steadily on the continent of Europe, is more formidable to us
than Napoleon at his apogée. Germany is going to contest with us the Command of the Sea, and
our commercial position. She wants sea-power and the carrying trade of the world. Her
geographical grievance has got to be redressed. She must obtain control of the ports at the
mouths of the great rivers which tap the middle of Europe. She must get a coastline from which
she can draw sailors to her fleets, naval and mercantile. She must have an outlet for her teeming
population, and vast acres where Germans can live and remain Germans. These acres only exist
within the confines of our Empire. Therefore, ‘L’Ennemi c’est L’Allemagne.’22
The omnipresence of the German threat, and the paramount status it occupied in the British mind, was
summarized well by Eyre Crowe:
So long, then, as Germany competes for an intellectual and moral leadership of the world in
reliance on her own national advantages and energies England can but admire, applaud, and
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join in the race. If, on the other hand, Germany believes that greater relative preponderance of
material power, wider extent of territory, inviolable frontiers, and supremacy at sea are the
necessary and preliminary possessions without which any aspirations to such leadership must
end in failure, then England must expect that Germany will surely seek to diminish the power of
any rivals, to enhance her own by extending her dominion, to hinder the co-operation of other
States, and ultimately to break up and supplant the British Empire.23
The actions of the German Empire between 1880 and 1914 proved Crowe and his colleagues at the
Foreign Office right. Total antagonism culminated in total war.
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Appendix

Figure I: “Kolonialmächte” from Simplicissimus, May 1904.1
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Douglas, 81. (Copyright ©1993. Reproduced by permission of Taylor & Francis Group.)
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Figure II: “Theilung der Erde” from Kladderadatsch, August 11, 1878.2

2

Douglas, 62. (Copyright ©1993. Reproduced by permission of Taylor & Francis Group.)
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Figure III: “Kommt Eduard?” from Kladderadatsch, August 13, 1905.3

3

Douglas, 158. (Copyright ©1993. Reproduced by permission of Taylor & Francis Group.)
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Figure IV: “Given Away with a Pound of Tea!!!” from Punch, June 28, 1890.4

4

Douglas, 107. (Copyright ©1993. Reproduced by permission of Taylor & Francis Group.)
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Figure V: “Setting the Bull-dog A-thinking” from Judy, January 21, 1885.5
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Douglas, 78. (Copyright ©1993. Reproduced by permission of Taylor & Francis Group.)
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Figure VI: Map of the Turco-German railway network, circa 1910.6

6

Christensen, viii.
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Figure VII: Map of the Hejaz Railway and greater Red Sea region.7
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McMeekin, Express, 144. (Copyright ©2010 by Sean McMeekin. Used by permission. All rights reserved.)
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Figure VIII: Map of the Berlin-to-Baghdad Railway in 1912.8
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Figure IX: Map of British naval bases and submarine cables, circa 1900.9
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Figure X: Map of submarine cables around Africa, 1879-1901.10
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Headrick, 61.
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Figure XI: Telegraph connections between Britain and India, circa 1875.11
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Figure XII: Map of Pacific cables, circa 1905.12
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